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ABSTRACT
International Construction firms have extensively used joint ventures as a vehicle to
enter new construction markets in South East Asia since the early seventies. Despite
its immense popularity, the failure rate of such ventures has been quite alarming.
While extensive research has been carried out in the manufacturing and service
industries in determining the factors that influence the performance of joint ventures,
similar work has not been carried out in the construction industry.
This study seeks to fill this gap. A thorough review of the joint venture literature
shows that eleven factors have influenced the performance of joint ventures in the
manufacturing and services industries. These are partners' objectives in forming the
joint venture, partner selection process, partner size, equity control, management
control, partner need, commitment, trust, cooperation, conflict and cultural differences.
The main aim of this study is to test the relevance of these factors to joint ventures
in the construction industry. In this study, a longitudinal research approach is used in
order to closely examine the influence of these factors on joint venture performance.
Sixteen cases of joint ventures from the Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Project which
was built between 1983 and 1990 were chosen for detailed examination. Data for the
study was collected through personal interviews, questionnaire and search of MRTC
archives. A research model was also developed in order to organise and analyse the
cases in a logical manner.
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The results of the study indicate that cultural differences have a significant influence
over the performance of international construction joint ventures. Equally critical are
the influence of partner related variables such as trust, commitment, cooperation and
conflict. Task related variables such as level of equity and resource contributions have
had less impact on the performance.
Key Words:	 International Joint Ventures
Construction Management
Singapore
Strategic Alliances
Cultural Differences
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION
The late eighties saw the rise of East Asia as a force to be reckoned with in the global
economic arena. The new economic buoyancy and prosperity have also brought with them
severe strain on the existing infrastructure facilities (Business Times, Sept 21, 1993).
Efficiency in manufacturing has not been matched by the provision of telecommunication,
transport, sewerage and power generation facilities in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia
and Thailand. This will require massive investments in their national infrastructural
programmes to sustain the economic boom, well into the next century. The Construction
Industry Development Board of Singapore (CIDB) in its annual review of Asia-Pacific
construction market, reported that the countries in this region would be spending up to
US$ 1.16 trillion a year on construction projects alone in the next 2 to 3 years (CIDB,
1994). Figure 1.1 shows the estimates of annual construction volume of work for countries
in this region. In a closed-door seminar on attracting foreign investment to the Asia-
Pacific region held in Bangkok, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand, Mr.
Amnuay Vairavan said that massive investments would be required over the next ten years
to improve the existing infrastructure in Asia and that this cannot be achieved without
foreign expertise and investment.
While the markets in these newly industrialising countries, with ever increasing
population, provide exciting opportunities, entries into the market are likely to be
restricted to those firms which are wiffing to work together with local firms as a team. In
this context, joint ventures provide international construction firms with an attractive
15
		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	 	 	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	
	
	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	 	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	 	
	 	
	 	 	
	
	
	
	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	
strategic option - to enter markets where the demand for local participation offers few
other alternatives.
IMPORTANCE OF JOINT VENTURES
The construction firms in east Asia are predominantly small and medium sized. Singapore
has nearly 3000 construction firms registered with the Construction Industry Development
Board out of which less than 50 are qualified to bid for contracts valued above S$ 50
million. Malaysia has nearly 12500 contractors registered with the Prime Minister's office
but only 250 firms are qualified to bid for contracts valued above M$ 50 million. Their
handicap in size and the lack of experience in handling heavy infrastructure construction
projects have forced the local governments to seek the assistance of large multinational
companies to accomplish their economic objectives. A study conducted by World Bank
(1984) showed that nearly 80% of all fonnal construction projects in the developing
countries were accomplished by foreign firms (Simkoko,1989). It would be politically
unwise for the local governments to be seen as totally dependent on foreign contractors
to stimulate economic growth in their respective countries without providing sufficient
opportunities for the small and medium sized domestic construction firms to participate
and learn during the nation building process.
Hence the developing countries see joint ventures as one of the best instruments for
meeting the competing interests of national development and the prevention of the
domination of the economy by the foreign investors (Sornarajah, 1992). Countries such
as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines do not allow fully owned foreign
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subsidiaries to operate within their countries. They require a minimum percentage of local
participation in most of business ventures operating in their territories. Malaysia's new
economic policy requires a 30% ownership of local Bumiputras, 40% by other Malaysian s
and only 30% by foreigners. The foreigners can own only up to a maximum of 49% in
Indonesia and only up to 40% in the Philippines. Thailand permits foreigners to bid for
heavy construction work subject to permission from the Ministry of Commerce. But
normal building construction contracts are out of bounds for foreign firms. (The existence
of a treaty of amity between Thailand and United States signed in 1968 confers local
status to the nationals of each other. Because of this, American firms need not apply for
permission to work in Thailand) (Sornarajah,1992). Only Singapore and Hong Kong, in
the Asia-Pacific region, provide free access to foreign firms, as part of their free market
policies.
Studies have also shown that in developing countries joint venture investments have been
more successful than foreign investments made through other means (Beamish 1988). For
American based companies, cooperative arrangements such as joint ventures in developed
countries outnumber wholly owned foreign subsidiaries by a margin of four to one
(Contractor and Lorange,1988). Killing (1983) in his study found that Japanese and
European firms preferred joint ventures as a mode of entry into developing countries than
did American firms. This has changed in the second half of eighties and the Americans
are equally enthusiastic about forming joint ventures in the developing countries (Awadzi,
1987).
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International joint venture for a construction project is a form of direct foreign investment.
Construction industry cannot use the conventional forms of market penetration such as
agents, distributors and licensees, since the nature of the industry precludes their use.
Construction firms must rely on direct access to foreign markets either through branch
offices, subsidiaries or joint ventures. A joint venture is the most popular form of entry
because of the perceived benefits it brings to the host country through technology transfer,
job creation and capital inflow (Sornarajah, 1992).
JOINT VENTURE - A SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION
Over the last 30 years the term "Joint Venture" has come into increasing use. Apart from
numerous books published on the subject, a great number of articles have been written on
various aspects of joint ventures. These research publications have unfortunately not
adopted a uniform definition to describe the term "Joint Venture". The general difficulty
of searching for an comprehensive definition was confirmed by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) who in their publication on
Competitive Policy and Joint Ventures (1987) said: "The specialist literature gives many
definitions.., although none provides a truly definitive answer. They are based on one or
other of the following criteria: comparisons with mergers, common objective, decision-
making procedures, legal, economic and financial structures. Each of these definitions is
in fact open to criticism, because none covers all the characteristics of joint ventures,
in particular all the different actors, objectives, types of organisation and contractual
relationships."
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In the legal literature too there is considerable confusion about a precise definition for the
term. One United States federal court judge remarked that "Joint Venture" remains "one
of the most fluid concepts in all of the law"(Gadsby and Hannah, 1985). Joint venture is
not even treated as a separate legal entity by most of the international courts.
Unincorporated joint ventures are normally treated under the laws pertaining to partnership
and incorporated joint ventures are treated under the laws pertaining to limited companies
(Sornarajah, 1992).
It is obvious from the above discussion that it is not possible to adopt an existing
definition of joint venture that would be universally acceptable. There is further confusion
about the usage of the term "consortium" to describe cooperative arrangements similar to
joint ventures. The first book which systematically dealt with what is now described as
a Joint Venture is an English publication by Bolton called Business Consortia in 1961
(Herzfeld, 1983). He did not use the word Joint Venture, even once, in his entire book,
but managed to provide an almost perfect definition for the term "Joint Venture". He
defined the meaning of consortium as "the organisation which is brought into being to
enable two or more companies to operate as a single entity for a prescribed and limited
purpose". He grouped consortia into two classes, "single" purpose consortium and
"continuing" consortium. He noted that there was a wide difference between the problems
and practical methods of living together in a joint organisation when the alliance was
expected to be limited in time by the achievement of a single project, for which the
alliance was formed, and the corresponding problems and methods in an organisation
which was expected and intended to be permanent. Andrews (1987) in his paper on
Construction Project Management in Joint Ventures agreed with the purpose of creating
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a consortium for a prescribed and limited purpose. He noted that consortium was best for
those desiring no permanent continuing association, for which purpose there were better
and simpler forms of organisation. He also observed that the term joint venture and
consortium were used interchangeably in the literature. He felt the two terms referred to
the same process of forming a single temporary organisation by two or more parties,
preferably disparate, operating under joint control, for a prescribed and limited purpose.
Other researchers have also concurred with Bolton's and Andrew's views on the definition
of a consortium but added a few more qualifiers. In his Ph.D thesis on Export Bidding
By Consortia, Mathur (1984) defined consortium as "An ad-hoc arrangement by two or
more firms to co-operate for a limited period of time with the intention of obtaining and
executing a capital goods contract. The characteristic that distinguishes consortia from
other relationships is that all partners agree to accept joint and several responsibility for
providing the goods and services contracted for. Therefore, the question whether a
particular relationship can be designated as a consortium is not resolved by examining the
legal or management structure adopted by the "partners" but by examining the contractual
relationship they together establish with the "client". Bolton (1959), in his article on
Construction Consortia, was the first author to emphasise the need for "several and joint
responsibility" to the client. This particular attribute of the consortia brings out the
importance of the client in determining the existence of consortia. Without the award of
a contract to the consortium by a client, there is no reason for a "single" purpose
consortium to exist. This dependency on award of a contract also shows the ad-hoc and
temporary nature of this type of organisation in the construction industry. Mathur argued
the term "consortium" used in his definition significantly differed from the one that is
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used to describe manufacturing, banking and marketing joint ventures that have an on-
going activity not directly related to any one project and which were usually understood
to exist only when they had a distinct legal or organisational personality. This distinction
in definition of joint venture and consortium is supported by Kurkela (1981) in his book
on International Construction and Project Export Contracts. He observed that a joint
venture company must not be confused with joint venture type of cooperation based on
an agreement of the parties only and usually entered into in order to maximise the use of
the technical and economic resources of the parties in projects, either technically or
economically, would be impossible for either of the parties to undertake on its own. Such
type of temporary arrangement based on a written agreement, he argued, could be
referred to as a "Consortium". The term Joint Venture, be observed, referred to a more
permanent cooperation in the form of a company. He noted that this form of arrangement
was likely to continue for an indefinite period.
Most of the business literature on joint ventures concern the manufacturing industry.
Tomlinson (1970) in his study of international joint ventures in India and Pakistan with
U.S. firms defined joint venture as "A commitment, for more than a very short duration -
of funds, facilities and services by two or more legally separate interests, to an enterprise
for their mutual benefit". This definition confirms the earlier discussions about the more
permanent nature of the term joint venture. Beamish (1984) defmed joint venture as
"Shared equity undertakings between two or more parties, each of whom holds at least
five percent of the equity". He is one of the earlier researchers to bring the issues of
sharing and control into joint venture definition. Shenker and Zaira (1987) doubted the
ability of a minimum five percent share holder to make anything but a token contribution
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to the management of the joint venture. In their view, an international joint venture is:
A separate legal organisational entity representing the partial holdings of two or more
parent firms, in which the headquarters of at least one is located outside the country of
operation of the joint venture. The entity is subject to the joint control of its parent firms,
each of which is economically and legally independent of the other." They suggested a
minimum share holding of at least 25 percent for the minor shareholder to have any
meaningful joint management control. In the opinion of the present researcher, it is not
really important whether the minority share holder has five or twenty five percent share
holding in the joint venture; what is important is to have a written provision in the joint
venture agreement giving him the right to control.
Considering the wide range of definitions given to the term "Joint Venture", it is quite
possible that the term is incapable of having a single definition. Perhaps joint venture can
be considered as a generic term. Rather like a species of an animal, the term cannot be
adequately defined and descriptions tend to mislead for want of truly uniform
characteristics shared by the entire species. Experts are united in agreeing that they can
recognise a sample of the species when they see one (Linidater and Paines, 1990).
The joint ventures in the construction industry are mostly "partnerships for a single
transaction". But there is a growing tendency among international firms to form a long
term strategic alliance with their local partners to pursue work jointly beyond a single
contract. Some of the joint ventures described in the case studies of this thesis have
adopted this long term strategy. Hence the usage of the definition of a consortium
provided by Bolton is not adequate for the purpose of this research. Gadsby and Hannah
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(1985) in their paper on international joint ventures in the construction industry identified
five essential criteria that characterised a common law "joint venture". To constitute a
joint venture the venturers must:
1. Agree usually in writing, to form a joint venture.
2. Contribute some resources or skills to the common undertaking.
3. Limit the venture to a single identified project or transaction or group of
projects or transactions.
4. Share a right of mutual control over the enterprise.
5. Share all profits or losses.
These five key criteria encompass all the ingredients of joint ventures recommended by
various researchers and will be used in this research to characterise joint ventures.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
An international construction joint venture (JV) is like an "economic marriage". Like a
marriage itself, a joint venture offers great opportunities to exploit and share resources,
skills and financial strength. This type of organisation may permit two firms acting as a
unit to undertake projects which neither could have accomplished alone. Therefore the
international joint venture is highly desirable. At the same time, a joint venture shares
with marriage many problems and pitfalls which need to be avoided. There is an
indispensable need for mutual trust, sharing of resources and information, and
confidentiality (Gadsby & Hannah, 1985). Should any of these essential ingredients be
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lacking, the joint venture is likely to weaken and eventually fail. Literature is full of
studies on joint venture failures. Killing (1982) reported a thirty percent failure of joint
ventures formed between United States firms and partners from the developing world.
Beamish (1985) found a 40 to 50 percent instability rate of JVs in developing countries.
Based on these studies, there is a one in three chance of failure of a newly formed joint
venture. In a study of the influence of control and conflict on performance of Japanese-
Thai joint ventures, Tiliman (1990) found that conflicts between partners caused JVs to
fail. The rate of failure reported by the past studies is a very disturbing fact, requiring a
thorough examination of the various factors that affect the satisfactory functioning of the
JVs in general.
The research problems examined in this study are adapted from the studies of several
scholars(Tomlinson, 1970; Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1984; Awadzi,1987) who studied the
performance of JVs in the manufacturing industry. An exhaustive literature search also
showed that no similar study has been conducted in the construction industry. Andrews
(1984) noted that JVs have a long history but a short literature. Another author
commented that although JVs were growing in importance in the construction industry,
very little research has been devoted to the operation and management of JVs. The
purpose of this study is to fill that gap.
25
The study would attempt to answer the following research questions:
1. What are the motivations for foreign contractors and their local partners to
form JVs?
2. To what extent do host government regulations and attitudes impact upon the
decision to enter into JVs?
3. What are the relative bargaining powers of the partners and how does this
influence the partner selection process?
4. What are the equity contributions of the partners and how does this influence 1/
performance?
5. How do structural and behavioral factors such as trust, commitment, and need
influence the performance of the joint ventures?
6	 Do conflicts arise between partners? How are they resolved? What influence do
they have on performance?
7.	 Do JVs of one nationality perform better than JVs of other nationalities? What
the effect of cultural differences between partners on JY performance?
These research questions are presented in a schematic form in Figure 1.2.
NEED FOR THE STUDY
International construction joint ventures are increasingly becoming popular both with the
multinational construction firms and local governments in order to achieve their individual
objectives. This increased usage is likely to continue in the Asia-Pacific region for several
years to come. This prediction is based on the inability of even the largest firms to "go
26
MOTIVATIONS FOR
JOINT VENTURE
PARTNER SELECTION
AND
JV FORMATION
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PARTNERS
JV OPERATION & PARTNER BEHAVIOUR
COMMITMENT/NEED/TRUST
MANAGEMENT CONTROL
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CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
JOINT VENTURE
PERFORAMANCE
Figure 1.2 Elements of the Study
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for it alone" due to the high cost of large infrastructure projects, high level of risk
involved in the projects and the rapid rate of technological development among the
leading contractors. If the prediction about the growth is true, then there is a need for
research that would provide insight into the workings, and their ramifications, of the
international JVs.
Second, a perusal of the available literature indicates that research on joint ventures is a
favourite topic among researchers in the manufacturing and business fields. Even there the
focus is on specific aspects of joint ventures such as partner selection, influence of parent
control on the performance of joint ventures, influence of conflict on JV performance, etc.
Only a handful of works deal with different facets of joint ventures simultaneously. As
noted earlier, there is a dearth of comprehensive research on joint venture performance.
This study expects to fill the gap in the available literature in the construction industry by
providing an integrated framework for analysis of JVs. It will attempt to link the
motivations for forming joint ventures, the choice of JV structure, partners' contributions
to the venture, inter-partner relationships that develop during the operation of the JVs, and
joint venture performance. The results of the study are expected to provide useful
guidelines for the international construction industry in forming and operating effective
and efficient international joint ventures.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study uses a case study approach to investigate the factors affecting the performance
of JVs. This approach is chosen in order to observe a large number of factors that affect
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the performance of joint ventures over a period of time. The Singapore Mass Rapid
Transit Project constructed between 1983 and 1990 employed sixteen JVs as contractors
to construct the sixty six kilometre railway transit system.(The project is explained in
detail in Chapter 4.) This huge data base lends itself adequately to study the validity of
hypotheses suggested in the third chapter.
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
The first chapter defines the research problem and sets forth the purpose, need and scope
of this study. The second chapter presents a review of the literature. The review is divided
into three sections. The first section examines the various factors that have been identified
by previous researchers that influence the performance of joint ventures. The second
section reviews the relationship between these factors and joint venture performance. The
third section examines the literature on the measurement of JY performance.
The third chapter develops the conceptual model to be used for the analysis of the cases
presented in the following chapters. A set of research propositions and hypotheses are
developed to study the relationship among the variables identified in the model.
Chapter four presents the description of the Singapore Mass Rapid Transit project. This
chapter identifies the nature of the project, the description of the various contracts that
were awarded to joint ventures and the government's influence on the project.
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Chapters five to seven analyse the performance of Local, i.e., Singaporean contractors in
JVs with foreign partners. In Chapter five, the performance of JVs with European
contractors as partners is studied. In Chapter six, the performance of JVs with Japanese
contractors as partners is examined. In Chapter seven, the performance of JVs with newly
industrialising countries' (NIC) contractors as partners is reviewed.
Chapter eight ( Comparison of Cases) presents a comparative analysis of the group case
studies and tests the validity of the hypothesis developed in Chapter 3.
Chapter nine (Summary,Conclusions and Recommendations) presents a summary of the
research findings. Areas of future research are indicated to motivate further research on
international construction JVs.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter is a review of prior literature on factors affecting the performance of
international JVs. The main objective of the review is to critically examine the work of
other researchers in this area. A comprehensive data base search was first done to
establish the total amount of literature available on JVs. A detailed secondary search was
done to determine the number of articles or books written on joint ventures in the
construction industry. The results of the data base search are presented in Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1
RESULTS OF DATA BASE SEARCH
No Name of the Data	 Period of	 Total No. of	 No. of articles on
Base	 Search	 articles on JVs construction JVs
_____ _____________________ ___________ ______________ only
1	 ABIIINFORM	 1987-94	 6276	 289
2	 BRITISH THESES	 1984-94	 13	 0
COLLECTION
3	 COMPENDEX	 1990-93	 57	 7
4	 DISSERTATION	 1861-94	 277	 1
ABSTRACTS INT.
5	 ECONLIT	 1969-94	 287	 0
6	 ICONDA	 1987-94	 37	 37
7	 LEGAL	 1987-94	 315	 4
PERIODICAL
8	 PSYCHOLOGY LIT. 1987-94	 13	 0
9	 PAlS	 1972-94	 463	 2
TOTAL ARTICLES	 7738	 340
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Studies on JVs in the construction industry amount to less than five percent of total
number of articles written on JVs. The more revealing statistics is that only one thesis out
of 290 theses written on JVs is on construction JVs. It is this lack of research on JVs in
the construction industry that prompted the present researcher to carry out the current
study.
Due to the lack of literature on construction JVs, the literature review presented in this
chapter is heavily biased towards work done on manufacturing and services JVs.
Rashid(1991) expressed similar difficulties in finding adequate literature on global
strategies pertaining to international construction industry for his doctoral research. He
observed that his literature review indicated the confusion that prevailed as to whether
construction was strictly a manufacturing or services sector. The World Bank included
construction as part of the industrial sector along with manufacturing and mining while
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GAT1') excluded construction from the
manufacturing sector. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
argued that construction should be split into a services component and a manufacturing
or goods component. The above arguments indicate that the outputs of construction retain
the characteristics of manufacturing and services. The present researcher agrees with
Rashid's hypothesis that since construction straddles across both the goods as well as
services sectors, modifying existing scholastic work should be adequate to bring the
industry before academic scrutiny. Lim and Low (1993) have identified a set of key areas
in which the construction sector differs from the manufacturing sector. Their findings are
summarised in the following section.
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The products of construction are invariably stationary. While the final product is
stationary, the labour force and materials which services the end product is highly mobile
and move to the areas where they are required. On the other hand, the end products of
manufacturing are highly mobile. But during the manufacturing process such as assembly
of televisions, cars etc., the components of production move along the assembly line to
the locations where the labourers are for final assembly as end products. Because
assembly is readily mechanised, manufacturing is more amenable to the use of robotics
and automation. The efforts made to improve productivity are more likely to succeed in
the manufacturing environment than in construction whicin is subject to vagaries of
weather, difficult sub-soil conditions and coordination among various trades, etc.
Standardisation of design is often not possible in construction. This means that the
beneficial influence of the learning curve can not be exploited. On the other hand
manufacturing efficiency and improved productivity are dependent on using standard
designs.
The project organisation assembled by the client for constructing a product is temporary
in nature. The architects, engineers and contractors are appointed to perform a specific
task and their appointment is terminated at the end of the project. The manufacturing
organisation is more permanent and the members of the project team often come from the
same organisation.
Building owners are often deeply involved in the construction process whereas the buyers
of manufactured products generally have no direct access to the production process, nor
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have any significant influence over the product design.
The buyers of new buildings pay before the product is completed. Because new
construction may involve large capital outlay, progress payment by the client to finance
the construction is a critical aspect of the construction industry. In the case of
manufacturing, the buyers of finished products pay for the goods only at the time of
purchase.
The durations of construction projects or their individual phases are relatively short
compared to the life cycle of the manufacturing process. Hence it is expensive to
restructure the construction project work force or organisation once it is in place.
Reorganisation in the manufacturing industry are often carried out in a methodical manner
without disrupting the manufacturing process.
The above differences are by no means exhaustive. But they do highlight that unlike
manufacturing, construction industry is a more complex and fragmented industry. Many
authors have suggested that application of manufacturing management practices and
techniques to construction would improve the overall performance of the industry
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE
The review is divided into three sections. The first section examines the various factors
that have been identified by previous researchers that influence the performance of joint
ventures. The second section reviews the relationship between these factors and joint
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venture performance. The third section examines the literature on the measurement of JV
performance.
MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF JV PERFORMANCE
Prior literature has identified twelve important determinants that can influence the
performance of a JV. These determinants were chosen on the basis of their choice as a
research topic by various researchers. They are motivations for forming a JV, criteria for
partner selection, compatibility of objectives, equity control, management control, partner
need, conimitment, inter partner trust, cooperation, conflict, size compatibility of partner
firms and cultural differences.
Motivations for forming an international JY
Many researchers have pointed out that Multi National Corporations (MNCs) would prefer
to operate wholly owned subsidiaries in foreign countries than to share their knowledge
with local partners through various forms of cooperative arrangements such as a JV,
licensing arrangements etc. (Lacraw, 1984; Beamish, 1984). The very nature of these
arrangements present a danger to the MNCS for dissipation of firm specific advantages
through sharing of resources.
Despite this natural reluctance to form JVs, JVs are popular in both developed and
developing countries (Awadzi,1987). Killing (1983) established three main reasons for
forming international JVs in developed countries. They are : 1) host government
36
persuasion or legislation; (2) partner's needs for other partner's skills; and (3) partner's
needs for other partner's assets. He observed that 17 percent of the JVs in his study were
formed due to government persuasion, 64 percent due to the skills needed and 19 percent
because of assets possessed by the other partner. Beamish (1984) conducted a similar
study in developing countries and found that 57 percent of the JVs were formed due to
host government requirements, 38 percent due to the need for other partner's skills and
only 5 percent because of the need for other partner's assets. Tomlinson (1970), Janger
(1980) and Gullander (1976) all noted that government persuasion or restriction was the
main motive for the MNCs to forming a JV.
In the absence of host government interference, the MNCs form JVs with local firms in
order to obtain resources from or pool resources with local firms (Awadzi, 1987). Dutta
(1988) identified five reasons for forming a JV by the MNCs. They are: 1. entering new
and potentially profitable markets; 2. sharing greater economic risks in new business
ventures; 3. satisfying nationalistic demands and lessening risks of expropriation; 4.
maintaining good relations with host governments; and 5. pooling organisational know-
how to realise synergistic benefits.
The literature on motivation of local firms to form JVs is scattered and few. It is generally
accepted that one of the primary reasons for the local firms to form JVs is to acquire
technology. Reynolds (1984) in his study of Indian JVs with Americans noted that the
Indian partners considered technology assistance from American partners as important.
Freidman and Beguin (1971) observed that risk sharing and access to foreign capital are
also important motives for local firms to consider formation of JVs with foreign partners.
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They also identified five major objectives sought by host governments. They were:
1. Integration of the IV in the national economic plan;
2. Financial contribution of the foreign investor to the JV;
3. Local Manpower training, including training of managerial and
non-managerial workers;
4. Development of import substitution and or export promotion industries;
5. A share in the large-scale social development projects with large MNCs.
Whatever may be the motivation for forming a IV, one has to recognise that there are
additional costs involved in forming and operating a JV. It is only when the benefits
accrued from forming a JV exceeds the cost, then only the IV can be stable (Beamish,
1984).
Criteria for Partner Selection
Many researchers have suggested that the choice of a partner may be an important
variable influencing the performance of a JV, since it influences the mix of skills and
resources which will be available to the venture and thus the JV's ability to achieve its
strategic objectives (Peterson & Shimada, 1978; Tomlinson, 1970; Walmsley, 1982;
Killing, 1983). These researchers have also highlighted the difficulties in choosing the
right partner. Killing (1983) compares the recommendations about selecting a JV partner
to that of recommending to one's daughter the kind of man she should marry. He argues,"
One of the greatest problems in partner selection is that many of the characteristics which
one might be willing to agree are generally desirable, such as honesty, dependability and
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trustworthiness, typically only become evident in times of stress, such as in the middle
of the crisis three years after the venture has been formed".
Tomlinson (1970) who did the pioneering study in this aspect, examined six categories
of selection criteria. These were:
1. pressure to select a specific partner due to the host government's direct or indirect
directives or regulations;
2. specific facilities possessed by the local firm, such as plant, marketing or distribution
facilities or a strong market position;
3. local resources of managerial and technical personnel, materials, components, or local
capital;
4. status and capability of the associate in dealing with local authorities and public
relations.
5. favourable past association as agent, customer, licensee or as a partner in other
undertakings; and
6. ability to provide a local identity.
Tomlinson's (1970) research identified that MNCs who possessed resources that the host
government considered important to its development were able to choose their partners
freely. He also noted that past association was the most important for selecting a particular
partner. While Tomlinson (1970) considered the categories of facilities, resources, partner
status and forced choice as equally important criteria for selection, he found that MNCs
did not consider local identity as an important criterion.
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The most comprehensive work on partner selection was conducted by Geringer (1986).
He distinguished between criteria associated with the operational skills and resources
which a venture requires for its competitive success (he termed these as task-related
criteria) and criteria associated with the efficiency and effectiveness of partners'
cooperation (he termed these as partner-related criteria). His research study which included
interviews with senior executives of 90 JVs that were operating in the U.S.A., noted that
many JVs did not conduct a systematic partner selection process. He noted that several
JV partners were primarily identified through a chance meeting at a trade fair, a comment
noted in a newspaper, a meeting resulting from executives having adjoining seats on an
aeroplane flight etc. He observed that successful JVs however employed a systematic two
stage screening process. They first screened the potential partner on complementarity on
task-related dimensions and only when the potential candidate satisfied these criteria, did
the firm proceed to check the potential partner's ability to satisfy partner-related
dimensions. Geringer (1986) noted that partner-related criteria such as compatible
management, trust and commitment and cultural differences are very complex issues and
can only be evaluated subjectively.
The only reason for a firm to pursue a JV is that it is the best route to achieve a particular
objective. The partner selection process must be preceded by clear definition of what are
critical needs that is expected to be provided by the potential partner in order to achieve
the chosen objectives. One should not expect a perfect match. But an orderly selection
process should be able to present the firm with a choice of potentially compatible partners
to choose from.
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Compatibility of Objectives
Tomlinson (1970), Simiar (1982) and Tung (1984) have all suggested that the success of
a JV primarily depends on compatibility of the partners' objectives. In their opinion JVs
are primarily formed to maximise the partners' joint objectives. However it is not
uncommon that there will be conflict of interest between the joint objectives and partners'
individual objectives often affecting the smooth operation of the JV.
Chowdury (1989) observed that the discrepancy in the primary objectives of parent firms
of the JVs might arise from a) difference in partners' cultural backgrounds; b)
incompatible characteristics of the parents (e.g., functions, size, resources and
orientations); and c) changes in the parent firms' or JV's environment since the
establishment of the JV. Wright (1979) and Simiar (1982) were of the view that
differences in cultural backgrounds of partners as reflected in norms, expectations,
business philosophies and policies can result in goal incongruence. Simiar (1982) observed
in his study of Iranian JVs with MNCs that the global orientation of the MNCs often
clashed with the local emphasis of the local partner.
Yashino (1968) and Tung (1984) who have extensively studied JVs between Japanese
firms and Western MNCs viewed goal incongruence often occurred due to disparity
between primary benefits expected by the parents. For example, if the primary objective
of the MNC is to establish a presence in the host country and the local partner's primary
objective is to generate quick profit, these two conflicting objectives are likely to cause
friction between the partners. In such situations, attainment of goals by one partner would
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result in the reduction of goal achievement by the other partner.
Equity Control
The level of equity ownership in a JV by each partner is often the result of a lengthy and
tedious negotiation process. Many MNCs and local firms equate equity position with
control over critical functions and decisions in the 3W. Several researchers have
established correlation between equity ownership and performance of JVs. Killing (1982)
and Schaan (1983) conducted in-depth interviews with senior executives of a small
number of JVs to determine the relationship between performance and equity ownership.
They found that JVs in which the MNCs held a minority or majority share performed
better than the JVs in which the partners held roughly equal shares.
Lacraw (1984) studied the equity ownership obtained by 153 MNCs in JVs with partners
in seven ASEAN countries. He found that MNCs who possessed and contributed critical
resources to the JVs demanded and obtained majority ownership in the JV. This supported
the findings of Freidman and Beguin (1971) who also found that MNCs were particular
in obtaining majority ownership if the JY was to deal with complex technology previously
developed by the MNC. He supported Killing and Schaan's findings that JVs who had
equal ownership performed poorly compared to the JVs in which MNCs had majority
ownership.
But researchers ( Kojima, 1973, Ozawa 1978) who extensively studied Japanese JVs in
Asia noted that Japanese firms, despite taking a lower share of equity ownership,
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managed to retain control over the operations of the JV. Lacraw (1984) also noted similar
patterns among the Japanese firms who through control of critical resources managed to
control the operation of the JVs.
The evidence from this review is that majority equity ownership is neither necessary nor
sufficient for maintaining effective control. Control is not an issue as long as MNCs have
a majority ownership but it becomes one when equity ownership is shared as in the case
of a 50-50 joint venture or where a MNC has a minority ownership share and the local
partner desires to implement decisions contrary to the interests of the MNC.
Management Control
In their pioneering research on management control of JVs, Freidman and Kolmanoff
(1961) distinguished between "voting control" or de jure control, through majority voting
rights, and de facto control, which is the managerial control a partner actually exercises.
They found that MNCs effectively controlled the JVs of which they are partners through
supplementary agreements, representation on the board of directors and veto power over
critical decisions.
Schaan (1983) in his study of Mexican-Canadian JVs, found that MNCs focused on
controlling specific tasks rather than trying to win overall control of the entire operations.
He also found that the MNCs used both positive and negative control mechanisms to get
their way. They used positive control whenever they were in a position to influence the
decisions in accordance with their overall objectives and used negative control to block
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decisions that would undermine their authority.
Hayashi (1978), who extensively researched into Japanese JVs found that they exercised
a significant influence on the JVs through strategic placement of their personnel in key
positions. He noted that even in situations where the host government restricted the
number of expatriate staff, they brought their staff into the project as "Technical Advisors"
to the local managers. He observed that the Japanese unlike the Westerners, were more
concerned with the managerial control of the JV than with equity control.
The literature is divided regarding the influence of foreign partner's control on JV
performance. Researchers such as Killing (1983) and Schaan (1984) generally concluded
that foreign partner control was positively correlated with the success of the JV. However,
researchers such as Tomlinson (1970), Beamish (1984) and Artisan (1985) found a
negative correlation between foreign partner control and JV performance.
These apparent contradictory results may be the result of the partners failing to distinguish
between controlling the direction of the venture and control of day to day operations of
a particular project undertaken by the TV. Andrews (1984) suggests that this distinction
is essential for JVs to succeed.
It can be concluded from this review that management control has an influence on TV
performance. The final outcome of the influence is dependent on the mechanisms used to
retain effective management control and complexity of the project undertaken.
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Partner Need
Beamish and Lane (1983) were the first researchers to establish partner need, the long-
term mutual need between the partners for each other's resources and contributions as an
important determinant of JV performance. Beamish (1984, 1988) established through his
extensive study of international JVs in developing countries the partners have expressed
mutual need for the following types of resources: human resources, market access,
government or political access, and specialised skills or knowledge. He studied the
relationship between performance and partner need and concluded that partners of
successful JYs showed a long-term need for each other's contributions while the unstable
ones were characterised by short-term emphasis on partners' contributions. He further
concluded that successful JVs were characterised by strong partner need while the
unsuccessful ones showed a weak need for partners' contributions.
iv performance literature correctly points out that mutual long-term need between partners
will have a positive influence on the performance of the JV. There is no need to form a
JV if there is no need for a partner. JVs that are formed only to comply with host
government regulations may perform poorly since in such ventures the foreign firm may
not consider the contributions of the local partner as important.
Partner Commitment
Tomlinson and Thompson (1977) defined 'commitment" in terms of whether the MNCs
perceived the JV with a local partner as a significant part of their global strategy. They
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observed on the basis of a study of 11 Canadian JVs in Mexico, that cornniitment is a
very important determinant of a JV's success. Tomlinson and Willis (1978) extended this
research to study the relationship of commitment to the JV by both locai and foreign
partners. They noted that commitment to provide on a long-term basis, resources and
capabilities to the specific needs of the JV is an important prerequisite for its success.
Beamish and Lane(1983) and later Beamish (1984, 1988) extensively studied the
relationship between commitment and JV performance. Beamish and Lane (1983) studied
the relationship between commitment and JV performance in 37 Canadian and Mexican
JVs and Beamish studied the same relationship in 16 international JVs in developing
countries. Their study supported the major conclusions of Tomlinson's (1970) earlier
studies, that there is a positive relationship between commitment and JV performance.
In order for the JV to succeed, all the partners to the JV agreement should have a total
commitment to the JV as well as to each other. Without need there is no commitment and
without commitment the performance of the JV will inevitably suffer.
Inter-partner Trust
Some of the studies that examined the relationship between trust and JV performance
concentrated on international JVs between U.S. and Japanese firms (Peterson and
Shimada, 1978; Tung, 1984). These researchers identified mutual trust as an important
variable affecting the success or failure of a JV.
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Peterson and Shimada (1978) who studied Japanese-American JVs found that the Japanese
placed heavy emphasis on mutual trust in their relationship with their American partners.
Peterson and Shimada (1978) observed that the Japanese considered contractual provisions
as mere intentions than strict obligations and this, they attributed to the nature of Japanese
culture. Peterson and Sullivan (1982) found that Americans on the other hand placed
heavy emphasis on formal and binding contracts to conduct their business with their
Japanese partners. This behaviour can also be traced to the American culture. Peterson and
Sullivan (1982) confirmed through their research that perception of trust is directly related
to cultural backgrounds of the partners.
It is not possible to conduct a JV business based purely on trust or on a heavy reliance
on the conditions of the JV agreement. It is not possible to draw a set of clauses that
would take every future contingency into account. Mutual trust is essential to overcome
the limitations of the contractual agreement.
Size Compatibility of Partner Firms
Franko (1971) studied the relationship between the size of the partner firms and JV
stability. He observed that larger firms who have a high risk-bearing capacity, were
naturally reluctant to form a JV. In cases where they had formed JVs with local partners
only to satisfy regulatory needs of host governments to facilitate market entry, such
ventures he hypothesised would be very unstable and were likely to be dissolved.
However, Franko (1971) could not conclusively prove his hypothesis.
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A few researchers studied the relationship between partners' relative sizes and JV
performance. Davidson (1982) suggests that in a large-small pairing, the larger partner
may find it difficult to keep its entire focus on the activities of the JV. The relative size
might also result in different attitudes toward disposition of profits. The larger partner may
prefer growth compared to dividend pay out while the small partner may prefer just the
opposite.
The findings of Roulac (1990) is used here to summarise the effect of inter-partner size
on JV performance. He cited several reasons why a small-large pairing can result in JV
instability. Indifference to the operational problems of the JV by the large partner may
have serious consequences on the smaller partner whose resources and revenue
expectations are closely tied to the JV project. If the project demands the contribution of
additional resources to resolve the existing problem, the smaller partner may find it very
difficult to contribute its share of the required additional resources. This may result in the
ultimate collapse of the venture itself. (The relative importance of the JV project to
partners of different sizes is shown in Figure 2.1.)
Cooperation/Conflict
The review of the effect of cooperation/conflict on JV performance has been a popular
topic for many researchers. Beamish & Lane (1982) studied the effect of conflict on 31
JVs in developing countries and identified 58 different problems resulting from conflict
between partners. Some of the key variables causing conflict identified by Beamish &
Lane (1982) were: partner's eventual dispensability; one or both partners' use of JV as
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a training ground; short-term commitment of one or both partners' to the JV; disparity of
goals and long-term vs short-term performance needs. Simiar's (1983) research supported
Beamish & Lane's (1982) arguments that goal incongruence caused severe conflicts.
Awadzi (1987) studied the power of one partner to interfere with the goal attainment of
another partner and noted that conflict is possible only when the interfering party has
some power. It follows from this argument that more resources one partner contributes
relative to the other partner, the more power the partner would have to influence andlor
interfere with the attainment of the other party's goals (Awadzi, 1987).
Task interdependence can also be a serious source of conflict.. The greater the task
interdependence among partners, the greater the potential for conflict. Another source of
potential conflict is need to share resources. The JV can run into rough weather if one of
the partners does not want to share its resources for fear of losing their firm-specific
advantages. Killing (1982) has observed that power sharing arrangements can also be a
source of conflict. He concludes that conflict is more likely to develop when power is
equally balanced. Awadzi (1987) supports this finding through his study on JY. He
observes that where power is unbalanced, there is less potential for conflict.
It can be summarised that conflict can happen due to one or more of the following
sources: the power of one partner to interfere with the goal attainment of another partner;
task interdependence; need to share or pooi resources; power sharing and most critical of
them all, cultural differences. The focus of this study will be on determining the specific
areas of conflict and how these conflicts can upon impact the performance of the JV.
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Cultural Differences
JVs develop their own culture with contributions from the partners, but also with whatever
cultural values other organisational members bring with them. It is this process of culture
in action, i.e. the development of a new culture for the JV, which is a source of many
conflicts, and a major contributor to the failure of many JVs (Swierczek, 1994). The
influence of culture is felt in various aspects of JV formation and operation. Compatible
objectives are difficult to establish between partners who come from different cultures.
Culture plays a significant role in the partner selection process. Cooperation and
coordination, two critical variables for the success of joint venture operations can be
impossible when cultural conflicts surface.
The influence of culture on JV performance is succinctly expressed by Kilman et.al.(1985)
Culture is the social energy that drives-or fails to drive the
organisation. To ignore culture and move on to something
else is to assume, once again, that formal documents,
strategies, structures, and reward systems are enough to
guide human behaviour in an organisation and that people
believe and commit to what they read or told to do. On the
contrary, most of what goes on in an organisation is guided
by the cultural qualities of shared meaning, hidden
assumptions and unwritten rules.
No literature review on culture is complete without reviewing the work of Hofstede' s
(1980). He defined culture as, "the collective programming of the human mind, obtained
in the course of life, which is common to the members of one group as opposed to the
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another" (Hofstede, 1980, p 61). On the basis of survey of over 1 16,000 employees of
IBM in 50 countries and the application of an extensive method of factor analysis,
Hofstede (1980) grouped the employees according to similarities on four specific
dimensions of culture: Individualism-Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance
and Masculinity. The four cultural dimensions are briefly discussed below:
Individualism vs Collectivism:
"Individualism describes the relationship between the individual and the community in a
given society" (Hofstede, 1980, p 213). He explains that highly individualistic members
of the group will take steps in weighing how much the company will allow them to fulfil
their personal goals. Commitment to the company often comes from an expected personal
gain that can be derived from participation. Low Individualism, in contrast, is manifested
in a desire of the persons to maintain social ties and personal relations in the organisations
they belong to. Hofstede (1980) describes a collective group as one which conimits itself
to maintain social ties to fulfil obligations imposed by group expectations.
In an individualist culture task comes before the relationship; in collective culture, the
relationship has precedence over the task (Hofstede, 1983). He argues that for Project
Management to succeed in organisations where personnel from both individualistic
countries and collectivist countries are jointly involved, sufficient time should be provided
in the project schedule for relationship-building.
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Power Distance (PD):
A greater power distance indicates an accepted hierarchy in organisational relationships.
One of the consequences of a high power distance society is high authoritarianism as a
social norm. In high PD cultures, workers are comfortable with close supervision.
Subordinates feel more comfortable with superiors who are autocrats - and may choose
not to participate in the decision-making process. In low PD countries, low
authoritarianism is the social norm. In these countries subordinates may even be
encouraged to take the initiative.
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA):
This refers to tolerance of ambiguity. In societies with high uncertainty avoidance, people
try to limit conflict and avoid situations where risk is high. To achieve this the society
will try to avoid ambiguous situations by establishing greater career stability, formal rules,
intolerance of deviant ideas or behaviour, and a belief in absolute truths(Basset, 1991).
Masculinity (MASC):
This dimension measures the division of roles between the sexes in society. Strong
masculinity scores characterises societies that maximise the social sex role division. In a
masculine society, masculine goals such as opportunities for promotions and high earnings
in work are emphasised. Feminine societies value good interpersonal relationships and
service to others. Although the degree of masculinity or femininity in a country is very
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important for the self-concept of its citizens, differences in this dimension are less relevant
to the way project management works (Hofstede, 1983).
Hoftstede's (1980, 1983) work provides a basis for understanding the general nature of
the behavioral patterns of various nationalities. The impact of culture on the JV
organisation is implicit and it manifests its presence through conflict whenever there is
a clash of cultures. Many researchers (Reynolds, 1978; Tung, 1984; Peterson and
Shimada, 1978) extensively studied the influence of culture on the success and failure of
Japanese American JVs. Peterson and Shimada (1978) concluded that much of the
instability of U.S.-Japanese JVs was a result of the inability of the Japanese and American
managers to understand the cultural basis of each other's management perspective. These
researchers observed the presence of cultural differences only through observable
differences in institutional arrangements, management philosophies, managerial systems
and management practices. Franko (1971) confirmed these observations when he tried and
failed to establish a direct link between JV performance and cultural differences.
MEASURES OF JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE
Awadzi (1987) highlighted three problem areas associated with the measurement of JV
performance. Firstly there is no general consensus on the definition of JV performance.
Secondly, the researchers used different terms to refer to JV performance. Dang (1977),
Renforth and Raveed (1980), Beamish 1984),Awadzi (1987) and Tillman (1990) used the
term "performance" while Killing (1983), Schaan (1983), Lacraw(1984) and Chowdhury
used the terms "success" and "failure" to refer to JV performance. Franko(1971) and
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Raveed (1980) used the term "survival" to refer to JV performance. Thirdly the measures
used for measuring JV performance also varied significantly among the researchers. These
measures are classified into three categories. Some researchers like Dang (1977) and
Renforth and Raveed (1980) used financial measures to evaluate JV performance. Some
of the financial data studied included a) return on sales; b) return on assets; c) sales
growth; and d) productivity improvements etc. Despite the usage of a large number of
financial ratios, these researchers could not differentiate between good and bad
performance. Killing (1983) also warned against using financial ratios to compare and
rank various JVs, since the policies and accounting standards used in preparing the
financial data by the individual firms may be significantly different.
Researchers like Lacraw (1984), Awadzi (1987) and Tiliman (1990) used a combination
of financial and non-financial measures to judge a JV's performance. Lacraw (1984)
measured success of JV through measuring the profitability of JV and the performance
of JV as rated by the foreign partner. Awadzi (1987) devised a composite performance
index that included both financial and non-financial measures. He used the non-financial
measures such as meeting partners' objectives to measure internal performance and used
the performance index to compare the JV's performance with that of the industry in which
it operates. Tillman (1990) used the same criteria applied by Lacraw and Awadzi to
measure the performance of Japanese-Thai JVs.
The third category of researchers use subjective criteria to measure the performance of
JVs. Franko (1971) tried to use the concept of survival to define JY performance. He
associated poor performance with the change in the ratio of equity contributions of the
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partners over the life of the iv. A JV is considered unstable if one of the partners a)
significantly increased its share of equity; b) significantly reduced its share of equity; or
c) completely exited from the iV. Killing (1983) asked the JV managers to rate the
performance of the JV based on their judgements. He considered a JV to be successful
even if only one partner was satisfied. Schaan (1983) imposed a much stricter criteria for
measuring success and defined JV success as the ability of the JV to meet the
expectations of all partners at the same time. Beamish (1984) agreed with Schaan's
(1983) assessment of iv performance. He considered the iv as a failure if one partner
considers the final outcome from the iv did not meet its original objectives.
The review of literature reveals the difficulties in defining and measuring JV perfonnance.
Schaan (1983) identified three problem areas related to defining and measuring v
performance. First, the partners of the iv choose specific criteria suited to their own
particular JV. The criteria used by one local partner differs from another. There are also
differences from one foreign partner to another. Second, there is no standard definition
available or used to define the specific criteria applied. Third, the assessment criteria used
by the partners changed over the life cycle of the iv.
This study uses the subjective measures for TV performance recommended by Beamish
(1984), Killing (1982) and Schaan (1983). For the purpose of this study, satisfactory iV
performance is recognised if one of the partners considers that he has achieved his
primary objectives. The reasons for choosing this approach is explained in the next
chapter on Research Method.
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FINAL NOTE ON LITERATURE REVIEW
It is evident from the literature review that the factors that influence JV performance can
be divided into two groups. Geringer (1987) identified the two groups as task related and
partner related factors. In his study of these factors, Geringer found that JV partners
focused mainly on task-related factors and largely pushed partner-related factors to the
background. However, he found that partner related factors such as compatible goals,
commitment and trust, cooperation or conflict, national and corporate culture had a much
more significant influence on the performance of a JV than task related factors such as
local government influence/persuasion, market access and the need for the other partner's
resources. He observed that lack of significant research on partner related factors has
made many researchers to conclude that the high rate of failure of JV is a natural
phenomenon. He also concluded that only longitudinal studies of joint ventures from
feasibility stage to termination stage can provide meaningful conclusions about the level
of influence of various partner related factors on JV performance.
The current researcher has noted that very few studies on JV has attempted to take this
approach. Majority of the research reviewed relied on various statistical techniques to
establish a correlation between the factors chosen as independent variable and the JV
performance, the dependent variable (Harrigan (1984, 1986), Awadzi, (1987). ). None of
the researchers studied the relationship between the various factors identified in this
review and JV performance concurrently. Hyder (1989) was the only known researcher
to have used the case study approach to study the performance of three JVs formed
between three Swedish firms with partners in the Indian sub-continent.
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The current research, to the best of the knowled ge of the researcher, will be the first
attempt to study the relationship between the various factors identified in this literature
review and their influence on JV performance in the construction industry usin g a case-
study approach. The study may also enable the researcher to establish whether the
factors identified to influence the performance of JVs in the manufacturing and services
industries are equally applicable to the construction industry.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH MODEL, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
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RESEARCH MODEL
Based on the review of the literature in the previous chapter, a research model is
presented in this section (Figure 3.1). The relationships depicted in the model form the
basis of the research hypotheses to be developed in the next section. The model is an
attempt to explain the dynamic nature of JVs..
Outline of the Model
Partners' Objectives
From the foreign finn's perspective,a JV is not the preferred option to enter a new market
as it involves dilution of its control and the potential dissipation of knowledge advantage
to its competitors. A search of the literature reveals that host government regulations and
attitudes often leave little choice for the foreign firm but to form a iv with a local firm
if it is interested in entering the local market. The foreign firm is also motivated to form
a iv even without the insistence of the host government if the size of the project is too
large for the foreign firm to carry all the resultant risks all on its own or the project
requires skills and technology beyond its capabilities.
The local partner, on the other hand, usually enters a i_V because it provides access to
technology which it would otherwise be difficult to develop on its own. Transfer of
technology probably constitutes the single most important reason why local firms seek JVs
with foreign firms (Dutta, 1988). Another motive is the ability to access large and
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sophisticated project market sector.
An analysis of the objectives for forming a JV is not complete without giving due
consideration to the motives of the host government. Host governments may want JVs as
a way of ensuring minimisation of foreign control of the local construction industry,
enhancing the technological capabilities of local firms, increasing the level of employment
of the local personnel and limiting the outflow of foreign exchange.
The three groups involved in the JV formation process (i.e. the foreign firm, local firm
and the host government) often have divergent objectives. Any JY analysis will have to
closely study how these divergent objectives are addressed during the JV negotiation and
the formation of the conditions of the IV agreement.
Partner Selection and JV Formation
The search for a suitable partner is usually initiated by the foreign firm who is interested
in entering the local market. It is also possible for the local finns to find a foreign partner
to give it access to large and complex projects. The selection process adopted by the
respective firms often provides clues to the potential direction the JV will take after its
formation. Foreign firms that possess unique firm- specific advantages which are strongly
desired by the local government and local firms, are in a position to negotiate an
agreement from a position of strength. They are also presented with a wide choice of local
partners. The negotiation process may involve compromises beyond what was originally
intended by both partners. In a few cases, host governments may force foreign firms to
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choose partners from a limited pooi of local government-owned firms.
The analysis of the selection process can help to identify the selection criteria used by the
partners, the bargaining power exercised by the foreign firms during negotiations and the
direct or indirect influence of the host government on the partner selection process. The
partner selection and JV formation processes set the basis of the relationship between the
partners during the operation of the JV. This is depicted in the next stage of the model,
and described in the next section.
JV Relationship
During the JV negotiation and formation stage, the potential partners spend considerable
time to identify their common compatible interests in the task-related areas. Depending
upon the bargaining power exercised, the level of equity and resource contributions are
determined, responsibilities of each partner are allocated, and lines of formal
communications between the partners and with outside parties are established.
The smooth operation of the JV after the initial honeymoon period is mainly dependent
on the interaction between the partners in making strategic and operational decisions. The
agreements and expectations may not develop as anticipated and this may lead to
conificts. The partner-related behaviourial and cultural factors come to the surface at this
stage and over time may have a significant influence on the performance of the JV.
It is rare to fmd a JV that experiences minimal problems during its operational life. Many
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of the problems can be traced to the cultural differences that exist at both the national and
organisational level (Dutta, 1988). Cultural differences can often lead to a breakdown of
communications, create mistrust, and sometimes result in eventual dismemberment of the
JV (Peterson and Shimada, 1978). Cultural differences can also determine the development
of mutual trust between the partners as well as determine the level of control the partners
want to exercise over the operations of the JV. This critical problem inherent in any JV
between different nationalities can only be overcome through cooperation and the will to
resolve conflicts through patient negotiations. Such co-operative strategies in turn may
require firms to give up some control over certain strategic considerations or activities
(Harrigan, 1986).
Along with cultural issues, differences in management styles of the two partners can cause
problems. It is common in developing countries to find JVs that have large MNCs
partnering small local firms. In such combinations, the partners can have different
perceptions of risk. The MNC may be quite willing to take on high risks and may even
be prepared to incur short-term losses in order to gain a foothold in, and increase its share
of the local market. The smaller local firm may fear that the potential losses may threaten
the survival of the parent firm itself. There can be differences in management styles too.
The smaller firm may prefer a participative style while the larger MNC may insist on an
autocratic style of management. The outcome of such differences can result in conflict and
non-resolution of such conflicts will eventually affect the performance of the JV.
Differences in perceptions regarding the strategic importance of the JV project can also
cause problems. The conmutment of each partner is a function of the importance that the
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partner attaches to the project and, when such commitments differ significantly,
management of the JV can be fraught with problems ( Dutta, 1988).
Using this model, it is possible to show how the interactions between the partners in
contribution of resources, exercising formal and informal control and cooperation/conflict
over time affects the performance of the JV.
Measurement of Performance
The literature review on measuring JV performance shows no consensus among
researchers on the methodology for assessing JV performance. The performance measures
suggested can be grouped into three categories. Researchers like Dang (1977), Renforth
and Raveed (1980) recommended using financial measures to examine performance. While
this may be possible for manufacturing JVs, collecting such information from construction
JVs is not feasible. Contractors are very reluctant to provide sensitive financial
information on a project by project basis. Even if such information is available, the
information provided may be misleading because of adjustments made, for tax, political
and strategic reasons. Furthermore the JV may not have been formed with the primary
objective of earning a profit. Hence the financial measures are found inappropriate for
measuring the performance of construction JVs.
Franko (1971) recommended measuring the performance of a JV using stability as the
criteria. A JV is considered successful if the equity mix remained unchanged and the
partners continued their association for a number of years. This type of measurement has
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its limitations. First, the JVs may continue in business despite severe difficulties because
of the prohibitive cost of breakup. Second, some JVs may have been designed to terminate
after certain objectives have been met. Third, one of the partners may decide to withdraw
from the JV for other strategic reasons. This measure is not appropriate for measuring the
performance of construction JVs as many JVs in this industry are formed to satisfy short-
term objectives and designed to dissolve at the end of achieving that objectives.
Some researchers (Lacraw, 1984; Awadzi, 1987; Tilman, 1990) used multiple measures
to measure JV performance. They used a combination of financial and non-financial
measures. Lacraw (1944) used three measures of success: management assessment of
success; financial success, and industry-coTrelated success rate. Artisian and Buckley
(1983) used four measures of success: profitability, growth, export performance, and
fulfilment of expectations. The main difficulty in using such measures for measuring the
performance of construction JVs is the generally short life span of construction JVs
compared to that of manufacturing JYs for which these composite measures were
suggested.
Other researchers such as Killing (1982), Schaan (1983), Beamish (1984; 1988) have used
subjective measures to assess the performance of JVs. They mainly considered the level
of overall satisfaction of the parents with the JV as a measure of JV performance. Their
arguments in support of this approach is that the JV partners, at the time of formation of
the JV, have specific expectations and the realisation of those objectives or expectations
can be used to measure the performance of the JV.
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This study is in favour of using this method although the partners are asked to make
subjective assessment of overall performance. For the purpose of this research study, JV's
performance is defined in terms of realisation of primary objectives or expectations of
the partners to a JV arrangement. In this study, both the partners were required to
identify their key initial objectives for forming the JV. They were then asked to rate the
level of achievement of those objectives on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 representing least
satisfaction and 7 representing most satisfaction). Based on the scores for each objective,
they were then asked to give an overall rating of JV performance. A score below 3.5 is
considered as the partner's inability to achieve its objectives indicating unsatisfactory iv
performance. A score above 3.5 is considered as satisfactory performance.
During the interview process, the present researcher found that only the local partners
were willing to assess their respective JV's perfonnance. Some of the former employees
of the foreign firms, who provided other data for this research, were unwilling to assess
the JV's performance on behalf of their former employers. This research study hence
considers that the iv is successful if the local partner is generally satisfied with the
overall outcome of his iv association. In order to minimise any possible bias in the
assessments made by the local partner on JV performance, the researcher sought the help
of the Project Manager of MRT, who supervised all the iVs' works on behalf the client,
to provide his independent assessment of the JVs' performances. This method of
independent verification has not been previously used in other researchers' work reviewed
by this researcher.
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HYPOTHESES
The hypotheses proposed in this section are based on the literature review and the
research model depicted in Fig 3.1 and described in the previous section. They depict the
possible relationship between JV performance and various factors that may influence the
performance of the JY. The hypotheses are presented in the same order they appear in the
research model. All hypotheses are considered equally important for this research.
Hypothesis 1
JV's performance is enhanced when the partners work together to achieve their mutual
compatible objectives.
This hypothesis is based on the research findings of Tomlinson (1970), Reynolds (1984),
Tung (1984) and Simiar (1982) who all found that success of a iv depends on the
compatibility of parents' goals.
In general, goals of parents represent the benefits they expect to derive from the JV.
Achievements of those goals is expected to enhance the performance of a IV.
Hypothesis 2
The performance of the JV is enhanced when partners are selected to provide
complimentary resources and skills.
This hypothesis is in line with the research findings of Geringer (1986) and Beamish
(1988). Their research work on JVs formed in both developed and developing countries
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indicate the need for compatible objectives and complementarity of resources between
partners as pre-requisites for JV success and stability.
One of the major reasons for the formation of JVs is for firms to pool resources. It is
natural to expect the JVs to succeed when the partners make available resources or skills
that the other partners do not have or possess.
Hypothesis 3
The performance of the JV is better when the partners forming the JV have had a
favourable past association.
Tomlinson (1970) found that previous successful association between partners enabled the
partners to understand each other's needs and contribute to a positive working
relationship, thereby increasing the chances of the survival of the JV. Geringer (1987)
confirmed this in his research on JV partner selection.
Hypothesis 4
The performance of the JV in which one partner holds dominant equity share would be
better than that of a JV in which both partners equally share the ownership.
This hypothesis is derived from the research findings of Killing (1982), Schaan (1983),
Lacraw (1984) and Awadzi (1987) who have all found that good JV performance is
achieved when one partners holds a dominant share in the JV. They also noted that equal
partnership resulted in poor performance.
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Hypothesis 5
The performance of the JY is enhanced when only one partner exercises management
control over the operation of the JV.
This hypothesis is based on the findings of Freidman and Kolmanoff (1961), Killing
(1982) and Schaan (1983). They found positive relationship between good JV performance
and one partner control of JV operations. It has to be noted here that other researchers
such as Tomlinson (1970) and Beamish (1984) have a found a negative relationship
between dominant management by the foreign partner and JV performance. The present
researcher is keen to find out whose findings the current research will support.
Hypothesis 6
The performance of the JV increases when the JV partners trust each other, have mutual
need and commitment and are willing to cooperate.
Beamish and Lane (1983) and Beamish (1988) established that inter-partner trust, mutual
need and commitment and the desire to cooperate are all essential pre-requisites for
successful JV operation.
Hypothesis 7
The performance of the JY is adversely affected when the level of conflict between
partners increases.
Killing (1982), Simiar (1983) and Awadzi (1987) have all noted that conflict has a
negative influence on JV performance. Conflict if left unresolved can lead to the
dissolution of the JV itself.
70
Hypothesis 8
JVs formed between partners with similar cultural attributes are likely to perform better
than JVs formed between partners coming from diverse cultural backgrounds.
Hofstede (1983) observed that each nationality has its own unique culture. Cultural
differences are bound to surface when partners from different nationalities join together
to perform a single or group of tasks. Unless serious efforts are made to overcome the
differences in the interest of group harmony by both the partners, cultural differences
would result in irreconcilable conflict and significantly impair the normal operations of
the JV.
RESEARCH METHOD
This section describes the research method used in this research study. It is presented in
three parts. The first part describes the choice of research method. The second part
explains the reasons for selecting the subject matter for detailed study and analysis and
the third part describes the data collection process.
Choice of Research Method
The majority of research studies on JVs reviewed by the current researcher relied on
statistical techniques to derive a correlation between the dependent variable, performance
of the JV and specific independent variables (Harrigan, 1986; Geringer, 1987; Awadzi,
1987; Chowdury, 1989; Tilman, 1990).
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The results derived from such methods show the relationship between the two variables
at a single point in time. Such methods, to a large extent, rely on quantity of information
rather than quality for establishing a relationship between the dependent and independent
variables. Geringer (1987) who used several univariate and multivariate statistical
techniques in his research on criteria for partner selection, lists a number of potential bias
that can creep into the sample data. Some of them are: sample composition; interviewer
bias; recording of data; statistical conclusion validity; and interpretation of results. In his
recommendation for future research on JVs, Geringer (1987) suggests:
"A potentially interesting study would be for a researcher to use
a longitudinal field study design to examine one or, better yet,
several proposed joint ventures from their initial study through
formation.. .A longitudinal study could be a particularly suitable
methodology for accomplishing that end, due to its potentially
greater ability for capturing the dynamic, as well as the static,
element of interrelationships between partners" (p 524)
The current researcher agrees with Geringer' s (1987) recommendation that a meaningful
study of JY performance can only be carried out through intense study of the interactions
between partners. A case study approach is most suitable to achieve this objective. Bennet
(1984) defines "case study" as a fairly intensive examination of a single unit, such as a
person, a small group of people or indeed a single company. Case studies involve
measuring and studying what is there and how it got there. They can enable the researcher
to explore, unravel and understand problems, issues and relationships (Bennett, 1984). The
case study method is preferable to other methods for the reasons discussed below.
First: the case study approach is intensive in nature. It studies a unit in its entirety. It is
very helpful when one is seeking help on a problem in which interrelationships of a
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number of factors are involved, and in which it is difficult to understand the individual
factors without considering their relationships with each other (Rao, 1993).
Second: a case study is a description of a real event or situation, unlike other studies
which may involve abstraction from real situations. As a result of the longer intimate
association of the researcher and respondents, it may be possible to probe deeper into the
issues that are under investigation.
Third: inferences are obtained from the study of an entire situation over a period of time.
As one researcher remarked, "I can hardly think of any method more suitable than case
study, in the construction of historical processes."
This method, like other research methods, is not without its limitations. The conclusions
reached by these methods cannot be statistically verified. As case studies involve detailed
description of complex situations, it is difficult to develop formal methods of observation
and recording. Informal methods tend to become subjective rather than objective. Despite
the shortcomings of this method, it is the only method that can penetrate complex issues
such as human relationships, the emergence and resolutions of conflict, unexpressed
feelings and expectations which require intensive observation to avoid neglect of
significant details (Hyder, 1988).
The present researcher has taken enough precautions to prevent individual bias creeping
into the cases presented in this research. Wherever possible, separate interviews were held
with all the partners involved in the JVs studied. Their responses were cross-checked to
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eliminate any biased opinions of the interviewees. The researcher had access to the
archives of records of the client and a thorough search of documents were made to
establish independent verification of facts presented in this research. Further verifications
were sought through a search of published articles in the local newspapers and regional
journals.
Case Selection
The cases presented in this research are about the international JVs formed between
Singapore construction firms and foreign firms, who worked together, on the construction
of the Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Project. This project was built between 1983 and
1990 at a cost of S$ 5 billion involving 38 civil contracts (The project details are
presented in the next chapter). Out of these 38 civil contracts, 25 were awarded to JVs.
Since the main aim of the study is to analyse the factors that affect the performance of
international JVs, all JVs having only local partners or JVs consisting of only foreign
firms were not considered in this study. This reduced the number of JVs available for
detailed analysis to 16.
All the firms involved in the case study projects worked for the same client, the Mass
Rapid Transit Corporation of Singapore. They all worked to the same General Conditions
of Contract and the work was carried out in the same city. Most of the construction work
by these contractors took place around the same time, between 1984 and 1989. The host
Government, Singapore did not impose any restrictions on the foreign contractors to work
in Singapore. The foreign contractors were free to bid for the project on their own merit
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and there was no direct pressure from the host government to take local firms as partners.
The government of Singapore only encouraged the foreigners to form JVs with local
partners through certain incentive schemes.(These are discussed in the next chapter.)
Perhaps the unique feature of this project is the diversity of nationalities of the foreign
firms who successfully tendered for the various contracts as JVs with local partners. This
provided an unique opportunity to study the JVs in groups instead of individual cases.
From the available number of JVs it was possible to divide the JVs into European-
Singapore JVs, Japanese-Singapore JVs and Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs)-
Singaporean JVs. Such grouping also enabled the researcher to minimise the impact of
individual biases. More importantly it became possible to study the influence of culture
on JV performance in a meaningful fashion. To the best of the knowledge of the
researcher, no such study has been undertaken by any previous research.
Data Collection
The present researcher worked as part of the management team of the client between 1985
and 1990, on the case study project and has had direct exposure to the issues discussed
in this research. The senior management staff of the contractors and the client, who have
all contributed to this research, have worked with this researcher in the case study
project before this research was undertaken. This made the data collection process
relatively simple.
The present researcher started the data collection process by spending nearly six months
at the MRT archives to build the case history of the various JYs involved in the project.
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The senior management of MRT were kind enough to allow the researcher to copy
documents, that were not of confidential in nature, for future use in the research. This
process continued along with literature review. A further source of information available
to the researcher were the articles published in the local and regional newspapers and
journals. Since this was the largest project ever built in Singapore, the National
University of Singapore Library separately catalogued all the articles. These sources
enabled the researcher to gather sufficient background information on the project before
proceeding with data collection from the participants in the various JVs involved in the
project.
Data specific to the present research, was collected through face to face interviews with
the senior management and board members of the local and foreign contractors where
ever possible. Some of the foreign contractors had left Singapore and in such cases
attempts were made to reach their head offices through telephone and fax. Because of the
researcher's close association with fellow construction professionals, he was able to trace
and interview a few of the former project managers and senior staff who chose to stay and
work in Singapore for other firms even though their former employers left Singapore at
the completion of the case study project. The interviews were semi-structured and the
interviewees were encouraged to talk freely. In order not to waste time during the
interview, the researcher reached every interviewee by phone and explained to them the
objectives of the research before fixing the time for the interview. This was followed by
mailing a questionnaire to the interviewees so they could have an idea of what was
required from them. The actual interviews took place approximately two weeks later. This
practice differed from the normal practice of mailing survey forms to as many potential
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respondents as possible and hoping to get a reasonable percentage of replies. In this case
study, questionnaires were sent out only after the candidate identified for the interview,
confirmed that he would participate in the interview. The questionnaire was used as the
agenda for the meeting and the discussions with the interviewees centred on the issues
raised in the questionnaire. In most cases, the reply to the questionnaire was handed over
to the researcher at the end of the meeting. In a few cases, a second and even third
meetings were held to seek clarifications and better understanding of the issues discussed
in the first meeting. A total of 38 interviews were carried out each lasting nearly two
to three hours.
The questionnaire (Presented in Appendix A) used in this research consisted of seven
sections. The first section sought general information about the joint venture and about
the person who was interviewed. The second section tried to identify the key
objectives of the firm. The third section addressed a series of issues related to partner
selection. Questions raised in this section were also designed to address the issues of
partner need and commitment to the JV. The fourth section dealt with questions related
to JV control. This was divided into three parts. The first part was regarding equity
contributions. The second part addressed the issues related to resources contribution by
each partner and the third part dealt with management control. The fifth section dealt
with mutual contribution of resources by the partners to the JV. The sixth section
addressed the issue of conflict. Questions were raised to determine the intensity level and
types of conflict. The interviewee was also asked to identify conflicts that can be
attributed to cultural differences. The seventh and last section dealt with measurement
of JV performance.
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Presentation of Results
The results from the data collection are presented in the form of case studies in the next
four chapters. Chapter 4 provides a short history of the MRT project. In Chapter 5, the
interaction between European and Singaporean partners and the resultant outcome are
presented. In Chapter 6, interaction between Japanese and Singaporean partners and their
JVs' performance are presented. In Chapter 7, the behaviour of contractors from MC and
Singaporean contractors and the resultant outcome are presented. In Chapter 8 the reasons
for the possible differences in performance of JVs formed with the European, Japanese
and NIC contractors are analysed and the hypotheses presented in this chapter are tested.
In Chapter 9 a list of recommendations for practitioners, academics and future researchers
on JVs are presented.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY PROJECT
SINGAPORE MASS RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM
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INTRODUCTION'
In 1967, a team of experts from the United Nations Development Program and the City
Planning Department began to assess land use and transportation needs of Singapore as
part of the overall development policies being formulated by the newly independent
Government of Singapore. The four year study forecast the need for a rail transit system
by 1992 and predicted that it would not only be environmentally unacceptable but
physically impossible to build all the roads demanded by the unchecked growth of private
automobiles.
The Government decided to conduct a three-phase Mass Transit Study(MTS) between
1972 and 1980 in order to further evaluate the issues raised in the previous study. The
first phase (MTS Phase I) evaluated the cost and benefits of five alternate mass transit
systems including an all bus system. The study team recommended that Singapore's
overall objective would be best served by a rail-based system combined with a
complementary bus network. MTS Phase II confirmed that a rail system operating through
the most densely populated areas would be economically and technically feasible. Further
investigations were carried out in MTS Phase ifi. This study identified the station
locations and established a preliminary budget for building and operating the system. The
government simultaneously engaged an independent team of academics from Harvard
University to review the assumptions made in the previous study.
Many of the technical details presented in this chapter are derived from the paper
written by Hulme, Chapman and Pok entitled, Singapore Mass Transit System: Planning and
Implementation." This paper was published in the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil
Engineers, Part 1, August,1989, 86, pp. 627-665.
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The Harvard team rejected the rail alternative and instead recommended an all-bus
network. This prompted the Government to conduct a Comprehensive Traffic study of
"rail versus bus" in 1981. This study confirmed that the rail system was crucial to the
Republic's anticipated transportation needs and an all-bus system would impose severe
restrictions on other road users.
The government gave the green light to build the project in May 1982 and established
a budget of S$ 5 billion and set a deadline of 1992 for completion. A new government
statutory board named Mass Transit Corporation was established with full authority to
implement the approved plan.
THE ROUTE
By the time the decision to construct the MRT system was taken, the land along the route
of the system was relatively well developed and the centre of the city was very heavily
populated with commercial and financial centres. The idea of building an all-viaduct
system through the business and commercial centres of Singapore was not acceptable due
to environmental reasons and the uneconomical usage of scarce and valuable land by
stations and viaduct supports. With these factors in mind, the planners of the system
decided to build the railway underground throughout the central area, emerging above
ground at the earliest opportunity.
Outside the central area, the line was based on the "string of pearls" philosophy, linking
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the various new towns and industrial park developments. Many of the stations in the outer
areas were located in the new town centres with convenient bus interchange facilities to
widen the catchment area. The final shape of the system assumed that of an inverted "T"
(Figure 4.1).
The system is 67 kilometres long with 20 kilometres built underground and the balance
built at grade or above ground level. There are forty-two stations in the system, fifteen
of them built underground. Nine of these stations are also built to serve as defence
shelters in case of national emergencies. The railway is served by one main depot in the
north-south line and by two sidings for overnight storage with minor repair facilities near
the east and west ends of the railway.
IMPLEMENTATION
Staged Construction and Opening
The master plan divided the construction of the railway into five phases. The first phase
of the system encompassed Bishan depot and joined the new town of Ang Mo Kio to the
central business district. Outram Park Station, where permanent reversing facilities were
required, conveniently formed the terminal station for this phase. The north-south and
east-west lines were constructed between City-Hall and Raffles Place stations. The next
phase, namely Phase 1A, was to quickly follow to enable the commuter flow from north
to the industrial town of Jurong in the west.
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The original plan called for the construction of Phase 2 after the completion of Phase 1.
Encouraged by the very competitive nature of the bidding by international contractors for
Phases 1 and 1A, the government decided to advance the construction of Phase 2 in 1985.
This phase was sub-divided into three Phases namely, Phase 2A,2B,and 2C. Phase 2A
comprised the completion of the southern extension of the north-south line to Marina Bay
and the completion of the eastern arm of the east-west line to Pasir Ris , with provision
for extension to Changi Airport. Changi sub-depot was included as part of this line. Phase
2B comprised the extension of the east-west line to Lakeside, with a branch line to Choa
Chu Kang from Jurong and the northern termination of the north-south line to Yishun.
Phase 2C is the final extension of east-west line to Boon Lay from Lakeside.
The entire construction of the railway was completed by July 1990, a full two years ahead
of the originally programmed completion date of 1992.
Construction Methods Used
Nearly one-third of the system had to be built underground. The tunnels were built using
both bored tunnelling and cut-and-cover methods to take into consideration the
geologically variable nature of the Singapore soil. Bored tunnelling, the least disruptive
to roads and traffic, includes anything from shovels and picks to state-of-the-art shields
designed for use in a particular type of soil. Whenever possible, a shield was used to
directly carve into the face of the tunnel.The shield jacked itself forward on powerful
hydraulic rains and passed debris back through conveyor belts. As the work progressed,
precast concrete segments were placed behind.
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Where high water tables and soft ground conditions were met along the way of the shield
machine, compressed air was used or the ground treated. In Phase 1, very difficult ground
conditions were encountered in the busy central business district. Jet grouting was
extensively used to stabilise soil along the busy Robinson Road. Up to 5000 holes were
drilled to inject a mixture of cement and water under extremely high pressure to solidify
the oozing soft clay.
Where the ground was obstruction free, the cut-and-cover method of tunnelling was used.
This method involved digging a trench, constructing the tunnel within and recovering the
surface. Diaphragm walls were built to limit the settlement of nearby structures and to
support sides. In more stable areas soldier pile walls were used. All the underground
stations were built using this method.
The crossing of the Singapore river was also undertaken using the cut-and-cover method.
The work was divided into two stages so that the flow of the river was not disrupted.
Using a double sheet-pile wall cofferdam to hold back the river, sections of the bed were
transformed to dry land. After the tunnel was dug and the structure laid in the trench, a
solid metre of concrete was poured to seal and protect it from the river above.
The elevated viaducts were built along some of the Singapore's most congested roads. In
order to avoid disrupting the traffic, precast concrete beams weighing up to 165 tons were
raised from the casting yard by cranes and transported by a gantry along the already
constructed parts of the viaduct, and were dropped into place on pre-positioned cross
heads. Up to 56 beams a month were launched without affecting the traffic below.
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While describing a construction of a project of this size, a listing of some of the statistics
is irresistible. To build the MRT, 4.2 million cubic metres of earth were removed. Nearly
2.2 million cubic metres of concrete were poured and 500,000 tons of steel were used. At
the peak of the project, work progressed at the rate of nearly 2.5 million man hours a
month- a figure that translates into 15000 workers.
When the first section of the railway was opened, the Chairman of MRTC, Mr. Michael
Fam observed,"It was a tremendous physical effort on the part of those who built this
system to turn every noisy pit into a beautiful station, every underground passage into a
solid tunnel and every overhead beam into a functional viaduct."
CONTRACTUAL ASPECTS
Contract Arrangements
When the Singapore government approved the construction of the project, the Corporation
wanted the earliest possible start of the revenue service compatible with a technologically
advanced and aesthetically pleasing railway system. The prospect of a turnkey contract
for the whole project was initially considered. This idea was not further pursued as such
an arrangement would have put the corporation at the mercy of a single contractor.
Moreover such an arrangement need not have resulted in reduced price or reduction in
project duration.
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The corporation instead chose a multi-contract arrangement. The corporation awarded 15
contracts to construct Phase 1 of the project consisting of 14 kms of tunnels,six kms of
viaduct, fourteen stations (11 underground, one at grade and two above ground)and the
main depot at Bishan. Five contracts were awarded in Phase 1A to build 1.5 kms of
tunnels and 7.5 kms of viaduct, six stations (one underground and five above ground). and
an earthworks contract at Ulu Pandan depot. Phase 2A and 2B comprised 19 overhead and
three underground stations. Fourteen Phase 2 civil engineering contracts were awarded to
build these two phases of work, one of which was an advanced earthworks contract at
Changi Depot. The track works contract was awarded on a system wide basis to cover
nearly 200 kms of track works in the railway.
The Government was quick to recognise that the Singapore contractors possessed neither
the specialist expertise nor adequate resources to undertake MRT construction works
without the support of international contractors. Few major tunnels were driven in
Singapore till that time and the varying ground conditions was also of particular concern
to the corporation. The need to attract qualified overseas contractors was considered as
critical by the corporation for the successful execution of the project.
Fortunately, the construction industry in South-East Asia was in recession in 1983 and the
decision to proceed with the early award of construction contracts provided a great
opportunity to get very competitive prices from the international contractors, who were
at that time, completing their work on the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway.
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Government Incentives
The local contractors were seriously concerned that they would be totally shut out of the
lucrative MRT contracts because of their lack of experience in building a railway system.
They wanted the Government to provide appropriate incentives to encourage the foreign
firms to take local contractors as joint venture partners so that they can learn from their
experience and bid on their own for the later phases of the project. The government up
to that time was providing only a 2.5 percent preferential margin to all bids made by
local-foreign joint ventures in which the local partner held at least a 51 percent share. The
President of the Singapore Contractors' Association was of the opinion that this scheme
was a failure as the foreign firms were ieluctant to be minority shareholders in a joint
venture (Straits Times, 12 Oct.,1982). The government, as a means of ensuring that the
local contractors were given an equal opportunity to compete and participate, modified
the preferential margin scheme (Straits Times,30 Nov, 1982). A preferential margin of up
to 5 percent was offered to tenderers who could show a 50 percent local equity
participation and maintain this throughout the contract period. The local participation can
be provided by more than one local company. The government also increased the ceiling
for the preferential margin from $2.5 million to $5 million. Such preferential treatment
was not unconditional. All the JVs who specifically requested MRTC to include their
tender for consideration under the preferential margin scheme were required to submit a
detailed proposals of their technology transfer programme. If such tenders were successful,
the proposed technology transfer programmes were incorporated into the contracts. The
general conditions of contract authorised MRTC to supervise the implementation of the
proposed programmes and empowered the Corporation to recover from the venture the
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preferential margin given to the joint venture in the event the foreign partner reneged on
his commitment. The procedure for qualifying under the preferential margin scheme is
outlined in Appendix B.
Pre-qualification Of Contractors.
The invitation to pre-qualify for the first phase of the project went out in early December
1982. The rush for picking up the pre-qualification documents was unprecedented in the
history of Singapore. Two hundred and seventy six documents were picked up on the first
day of issue by the Corporation(Straits times, 6th Dec.1982). These brochures advised the
contractors to register their interest in pre-qualification by submitting the details of their
relevant experience, current technical and managerial expertise, financial standing, etc.
Prospective tenderers were also advised of the preferential margin schemes, thus
encouraging liaison between local and foreign contractors. As many of the contracts were
to be awarded on a design and build basis, contractors seeking pre-qualification for these
contracts were also required to demonstrate their design ability.
The rush to form joint ventures by various international contractors were also widely
reported by the local press. Lim Kah Nam Pte.Ltd., was the first local company to form
a joint venture with a Japanese partner, Aoki Corporation to tender for the MRT
project.(Straits Times, 8th Dec 1982,) . Reportedly fourteen French Contractors vied for
MRT deals through joint ventures.(Straits Times 23th Dec,1982,). Mr.David Howell, the
then British Secretary of State for Transport visited Singapore to drum up support for the
British firms bidding for the MRT contracts. He declared that the British government
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would provide for the companies that were successful in bidding for the civil engineering
contracts extensive credit guarantees and match whatever credit facilities were offered by
other countries, (Straits Times, 6th Jan. 1983). The Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre
Trudeau visited Singapore a few days after the visit of Mr.Howell and declared his
unqualified support to Canadian firms bidding for the MRT project (Straits times, 8th Jan.
1983). The local newspaper Straits Times described the rush for forming joint ventures
with the headlines, "Contractors play Musical Chairs: Last-Minute Rush to form joint
ventures to vie for MRT." (Straits Times,18th Jan. 1983). Foreign contractors as far as
from Mexico, who had never been involved in any construction work in the east, were
forming joint ventures with local partners. At the final count, three hundred and seventy
groups of contractors from twenty three countries had submitted applications for eleven
contracts to be awarded for building the first phase of the project. (Straits Times, 21st Jan.
1983). More than one-third of these applications were from joint ventures having at least
one local partner. The final list of pre-qualified firms for bidding for the MRT contracts
is presented in Appendix C. It came as no surprise that nearly seventy percent of the firms
that pre-qualified were joint ventures between local and foreign firms.
TENDER EVALUATION AND CONTRACT AWARD
Design and Construct Contracts
Pre-qualified tenderers were invited to attend a briefing during which tender requirements
and contractors' queries were explained. The tenderers were given four months to prepare
the bid. In this period they were encouraged to carry out additional soil investigations and
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prepare an outline design. The bidders submitted lump sum bids along with a cost loaded
activities programme. The lump sum bids were then converted to a net present value
which took due account of the cash flow and eliminated any cash advantage which might
have been gained by a tenderer who submitted a low, but front-end loaded tender sum.
Acceptance of the design and construct tenders was deemed to be an acceptance of the
contractors' design concept only. The successful contractor was required to develop his
detailed design and drawings for client's approval before proceeding with actual
construction. Since the architectural details of the contracts were not fully developed at
the time of tender, the Corporation provided provisional sums in the tender. The tenderers
were asked to quote a percentage of the architectural sub-contract as management fees to
be added to the sub-contract tender sums. This provision enabled the Corporation to
scrutinise and evaluate all sub-contractor documentation before the appointment by the
main contractor. In several cases, the main contractor in a joint venture wanted to bid for
the sub-contract works. The Corporation's agreement to accept the main contractor in the
list of sub-contract tenderers was given on the understanding that financial assessment of
the tenders was to be carried out solely by the Corporation. The Corporation took
approximately six weeks to evaluate the tenders before awarding the contracts.
Construct Only Contracts
Bidders were given two months to submit their tenders after receiving the tender
documents. The tenders were priced on the basis of bill of quantities prepared by the
Corporation's design consultants who were responsible for the detailed design and
preparation of contract drawings and design specifications. The quantities were variable
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but the unit rates were fixed. There were no provisions for price fluctuations and this risk
was carried by the contractors. The contractors were encouraged to submit alternative
designs and offer corresponding reduction in tender price in addition to their tender on
standard design package. Alternatives were submitted as the time period provided for bid
preparation was very short.
The tenderers in both types of packages were encouraged to submit financing offers with
their tenders. This was not a mandatory requirement as the Corporation had sufficient
funds available to build the entire system. Several international contractors offered very
attractive terms in the form of mixed credit, deferred payments and payments in mixed
currencies. These were taken into account in calculating the net present value of the tender
sum. Many of the design and build contracts were awarded to tenderers who submitted
attractive financial packages.
Contract Awards
The tendering period for the first phase started on 28 February 1983 with the invitation
to tender for the contracts covering the stretch from Toa Payoh to Novena. The first
contract was won by a joint venture consisting of two Japanese contractors, Tobishima
Corporation and Takenaka Group. The last contract for constructing the Boon Lay station
and the viaduct from Chinese Garden Station to Boon Lay station was awarded to a joint
venture consisting of a Taiwanese firm RSEA International and a Singaporean firm Hock
Lian Seng Engineering Private Ltd. on 9th May 1988. During a period of little over five
years, MRT Corporation awarded thirty eight major civil contracts valued at S$2.55
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billion. Twenty nine of them were awarded to international joint ventures out of which
twenty five went to joint ventures between Singapore and foreign firms. The full list of
contracts awarded is presented in Appendix D. Figure No.4.2 shows the percentage share
of the contracts won by various groups. Only three contracts were awarded to joint
ventures on the basis of Preferential Margin Scheme(PMS). This was mainly due to very
stiff competition among the international contractors and the resultant low bids received.
The Project Manager for Civil & Structures remarked at the end of the award of Phase
1 contracts that the awarded value was nearly thirty percent lower than that of the
Engineer's estimates.
MRT ORGANISATION
Figure No.4.3 shows the MRT Corporation's organisational chart of the Projects Division.
This Division under the leadership of a Project Director was directly responsible for the
planning, design and construction supervision, contracts administration and cost control
of all MRT civil and Electrical and Mechanical works. The Project Director was assisted
by two Project Managers. The Project Manager for Civil & Structures was assisted by six
Construction Managers, one Chief Civil Engineer and one Chief Architect. At the peak
of the project , the projects Division employed 1100 staff. The Project Director was
assisted by a Planning & Programming Manager, Cost Control and Contracts Manager and
a Technology Transfer Manager (MT1').
The MTT had the specific responsibility to supervise the implementation of the specific
conditions of contract related to technology transfer in the contracts signed between the
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Corporation and the contractors. During the tender period the tenderers were asked to
submit a detailed identification of the participation by the local joint venture partner or
partners. The Corporation asked the tenderers to submit an organisation chart reflecting
the following areas of responsibility:
Overall Project Management
ii. Design
iii. Site Management
iv. Programming
v. Budgetary Control
vi. Contract Administration
The Corporation also required the tenderer to indicate the level of staffing to be provided
by the local partner together with a general indication of the nature of work of various
key personnel to be deployed on the project. The proposed technology transfer programme
over the life of the contract was also required. The Manager of Technology Transfer
(MTT) evaluated the proposals submitted by the tenderers and his input was a key
element in the selection of the successful tenderer.
He had the responsibility to submit a monthly report to MRTC Board of Directors on the
performance of various contractors with respect to technology transfer. There were no
special provisions in the contract to enforce the technology transfer programme proposal
submitted by the successful bidder with his winning tender. However based on the
recommendation submitted by the MTT, the corporation had the right to withhold the
Preferential Margin given to contractors who failed to implement an effective transfer
programme. The appointment of a separate manager to supervise the implementation of
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technology transfer programme of various contractors indicated the importance placed by
the government on this important aspect of joint venture process.
The project was successfully completed on 6th July, 1990 and is recognised in the region
as one of the most successful construction projects and is serving as a model to the
development of transit systems in other Asian cities. While the project itself is an
unqualified success story, the performance of the various participating joint ventures
varied significantly. This research examines the reasons for such variances. The next
Chapter examines the performance of European-Local JVs followed by Chapters 6 and
7 in which the performance of Japanese-Local JVs and NIC-Local JVs will be analysed
respectively.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDIES OF EUROPEAN-SINGAPOREAN JOINT VENTURES
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter reports on the interactions between Singaporean and European construction
contractors who formed JVs to build some sections of the transit railway for the Mass
Rapid Transit Corporation (MRTC) of Singapore. The analysis is presented in the form
of a case study in order to identify and fully understand the dynamic process of joint
venture (JV) formation and operation and the specific factors that influence their
performance. The case study starts with the background information on the partners
engaged in the JV process. This is followed by an analysis of the motives for forming a
JV and the selection criteria used for selecting a particular partner. This is followed by
an analysis of the interaction between partners and their efforts to control the operation
of the JV through their mutual contribution of resources. The impact of trust and
cooperation is also studied in this section. The resultant conflict between the two partners
is analysed next. The overall impact of cultural differences on various aspects of JV
management is also explored. Some conclusions drawn from these analyses is presented
at the end of the chapter. The reason for choosing this approach is fully explained in
Chapter 3 on Research Methodology.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
MRTC awarded a total of thirty eight major civil contracts for the construction of the 67
kilometre route. Out of these, 10 civil contracts were awarded to Singapore-European joint
ventures. The list of contractors and their awarded value is presented in Table 5.1.
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TABLE 5.1
LIST OF AWARDS TO SINGAPORE-EUROPEAN JOINT VENTURES
No	 Name of Joint Venture	 No. of	 Life of JVs Value of
contracts	 Contract
awarded	 ($ Million)
1	 Sinbelco Construction	 2	 Dec 83 -	 90.9
Pte.Ltd.*	 April 87
2	 Bocotra Construction	 3	 Oct 83 -	 154.3
Pte. Ltd.*	 Nov 87
3	 Dragage Et Travaux 	 Jan 84 -
Sembawang Shipyard	 1	 June 87
	
43.5
Joint Venture
4	 Campenon Bernard-	 Oct 83 -
Singapore Piling Civil	 1	 June 87	 59.6
Contractors
Joint Venture*
5	 Lee Kim Tah-Societee	 Nov 85 -
Generale	 1	 Sept 89	 59.5
D' Enterprise Joint Venture
Henry Boot-Gammon-	 Jan 85 -
6	 Singa Pte. Ltd.	 2	 Dec 88	 274.2
Joint Venture
	
10	 682.00
Total
Legend: * - Contracts awarded on the basis of Preferential Margin
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Profile of European Contractors
Sinbelco Construction (P) Ltd. was a joint venture formed between two Belgian
contractors and a Singaporean firm which itself was a joint venture comprising five
Singaporean firms. The two Belgian firms involved in the joint venture were Companie
d'Enterprise CFE and S.A. Franki NV. Both were listed as two of the top three
contracting firms in Belgium in 1987 with an annual turnover of $600 million and $480
million (Spencer Chapman, 1991). The Singapore MRT contracts were the first contracts
they had won in South East Asia and set up their office in Singapore in late 1982.
Bocotra Construction (P) Ltd. was a joint venture between Italian, French, American and
Singaporean companies. The Italian firm in the joint venture was Cogefar Construzioni
Genarali SpA (Cogefar). They had an annual turnover of $900 million in 1987 and was
rated the second largest among the Italian contractors (Spencer Chapman, 1991). Cogefar
had extensive experience in rock tunnelling through Alps. The French Partner in the joint
venture was Borie-Sae a subsidiary of Socie'te' Auxiliaire d'Entreprises (SAE) who was
rated the second largest French contractor with an annual turnover of $10.5 billion
(Spencer Chapman, 1991). SAE had extensive experience in tunnelling works on the Paris
and Nice metros. Traylor Brothers Inc. was a specialist tunnelling contractor from United
States with extensive experience in tunnelling under built up areas. The three companies
have not worked in Singapore before the award of MRT contracts nor were they
associated with each other in other parts of the world.
Dragage et Travaux was one of the top ten contractors in France with an annual turnover
of S$ 1 billion (Straits Times, 23 Dec 1982). They had worked on the Hong Kong metro
but had no previous experience in Singapore.
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Campenon Bernard was also a French contractor with a turnover of S$ 1 billion and had
extensive tunnelling experience in building the subways of Paris and Marseilles(Straits
Times, 23 Dec 1982). They had no prior experience in working in Singapore.
Societie Genarale D'Enterprise(SGE) was another French contractor with an annual
turnover of well over S$ 1.7 billion (Straits Times, 23 Dec 1982,) and had experience in
building metros in Lyon, Caracas, Mexico, Cairo and Lagos. SGE moved to Singapore in
1981 when they were awarded a S$ 223 million contract to build 7000 units of Housing
Development Board flats on a joint venture (JY) basis with their local partner on the MRT
project, Lee Kim Tah (P) Ltd..
Henry Boot International was a specialist tracklaying contractor from Britain with
extensive experience on tracidaying for the Hong Kong Metro Authority. They were
associated with Gammon (HK) Pte. Ltd. as a joint venture partner in laying the track for
all the three lines of the Hong Kong MTR system - the modified initial system, Tsuen
Wan Extension and the island line. They had no prior experience in Singapore.
Profile of the Singaporean Contractors.
When MRTC outlined the requirements for pre-qualification for the MRTC contracts,
many of the small firms knew that they had very little chance of pre-qualifying for the
highly technical and complex underground contracts. Five small but ambitious local
contractors realised this and formed a joint venture company called Hytech Builders Pte.
Ltd in late 1982. Their combined annual turnover was $80 million. MRT contract No 103
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was the first contract for the newly formed joint venture.
Sembawang Construction (P) Ltd. was established in early 1983 as a construction
subsidiary by Sembawang Shipyard which was very keen to diversify from its traditional
ship repairing work. The ship repair industry was undergoing its third straight year of
slump. Sembawang shipyard recorded a thirty four percent drop in turnover in 1983
(Straits Times, 25 April, 1984) and experienced their worst loss in their operational
history. MRT Contract No. 105A was their first construction work.
Indeco Consulting Engineers is a hundred percent government owned company . It
decided in 1979 to enter the construction market and formed Singa Development (P) Ltd
to undertake civil engineering and building works. They had undertaken a few small
contracts before the award of MRT contract No. 110 to them. Their annual turnover was
less than $30 million.
Ong Chew Kou Building Contractors (P) Ltd. (OCK Builders) and Lee Kim Tah (P) Ltd.
were well established private firms with nearly twenty five years of experience in the
construction Industry.00K Builders was established in 1960 and Lee Kim Tah in 1971.
Both had extensive experience in building high-rise flats for Housing Development Board.
OCK Builders had an annual turnover of $55 million and Lee Kim Tah had an annual
turnover of $90 million.
Some interesting observations can be made through a closer comparison of the two groups
of contractors. The European firms were quite large in size and most of them were leaders
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in the industry in their own respective countries. SGE was the only company to have had
any prior experience in Singapore. Most of them had a few thousand employees and their
average turnover was well over $500 million. The local firms had revenues about one
tenth the size of their European counterparts and employed less than 100 technical staff.
Lee Kim Tah (P) Ltd. was the only local company to have had prior experience in joint
venturing with foreign partners. All the local companies were privately owned. Some of
them like Sembawang Shipyard, Singa Development were government linked finns.
Previous research has pointed out that firms of different sizes forming a JV are likely to
face operational difficulties. This is discussed later in the chapter.
MOTIVATIONS FOR FORMING A JOINT VENTURE
Many researchers have observed that joint ventures that have performed satisfactorily,
usually have partners with compatible objectives. In order to determine the compatibility
of their mutual objectives, the two groups were asked to assess on a scale of 1 to 7, the
importance of each objective from a pre-prepared list. If the objective received a score
of 1, it was considered least important. If it received a score of 7 it was considered as
most important. The average score received by each objective was then calculated on the
basis of the responses received from the respective firm. These average scores were then
used to rank the objectives. These results are presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively.
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Objectives of the European Firms
The important objectives, as identified by the European firms who participated in this case
study are presented below in Table 5.2. These are listed in the order of their importance
to the Europeans.
Table 5.2
Key Motives of European Firms
Rank	 Key motives for forming JV 	 Average
Score
1	 Government Incentives 	 5.3
2	 Avail of Partner's Local Knowledge	 5.1
3	 Protect International market share	 4.9
4	 Match Competition	 4.7
5	 Enter New Market	 4.5
6	 Effective Resource Utilisation	 4.3
7	 Spread Commercial Risk 	 4.1
When the Singapore government announced that a five percent preferential margin would
be given to joint ventures having fifty percent local participation, the European contractors
were keen to take advantage of the incentives provided. Hence not surprisingly that this
was considered as the most important reason for forming JV with a local partner. Most
of the local contractors also felt that an association with a foreign partner was critical for
securing MRT contracts and the government's incentives through preferential margin was
instrumental in enticing the foreign firms to team up with them. This confirms the
findings of Beamish (1984) who observed that 57 percent of joint ventures in developing
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countries were formed due to host government's persuasion and legislation. In a study
of 168 joint ventures in developed and least developed countries, Janger (1980) also found
that about fifty percent of JVs were formed due to government incentives.
Many of the European contractors who were coming to work in Singapore for the first
time needed a local partner to help them with the local rules and regulations. This was
considered the second most important reason for forming the iv.
Some of the European firms initially planned to bid for the MRTC tenders on their own
but soon realised that the world wide recession in the construction industry was attracting
most of the major contractors to the MRT project. They particularly feared intense
competition from Japanese and Korean contractors who were forming joint ventures with
both Singaporean firms and firms from their own countries. Matching competitors'
strategy became a necessity for some of these firms.
Contractors like Henry Boot and Compenon Bernard were completing their assignment
in Hong Kong and looked to Singapore MRT projects for utilising their spare resources.
The Belgian contractors were looking for new markets in order to maintain their
international market share. Commercial risks were not a factor in forming a v with a
local firm. Henry Boot and SGE valued their past association and continued to bid on a
joint venture basis with Gammon(HK) and Lee Kim Tah respectively.
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Objectives of Local Firms
The local firms' motives for forming the JV with European firms are presented in Table
5.3. These are presented in the order of their importance to the local firms.
Table 5.3
Key Motives of Singaporean Firms
Rank	 Key motives for forming JV	 Average
Score
1	 Technology Transfer	 5.5
2	 Government Incentives 	 5.3
3	 Share Commercial risk	 5.1
4	 Enhance local image	 4.6
5	 Access to new financial resources	 4.4
6	 Enter New Market	 4.1
7	 Match competition	 3.7
The Singaporean contractors rated technology transfer as the primary motive for forming
the joint venture. They expected the foreign partner to train them in areas of project
planning, cost control, contract administration, site management and construction
techniques.
Sharing commercial risks was a very important factor for many local firms and this
ranked third in their calculations. They also felt that their local knowledge in sourcing
materials and recommending suitable sub-contractors would be valued by the potential
foreign partners. Sembawang Shipyard and Indeco Engineers were using the joint venture
process as a diversification strategy. Many local contractors like Hytech and OCK
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Builders wanted to boost their local image through partnering with reputed international
firms.
The two groups of partners had divergent motives in the area of technology transfer and
the treatment of commercial risks. These two divergent motives were causes for conflict.
Their impact on the performance of the European-Local JVs are discussed further under
the section on conflicts.
PARTNER SELECTION PROCESS
The two groups of partners were asked to rank the importance of various factors that
made them choose a particular partner. The results are presented in Table 5.4
Table 5.4
Reasons for selecting a particular partner
	
Description	 European	 Local
Rank	 Rank
Government Link	 1	 N.A.
Local Knowledge	 2	 N.A
Size/Reputation	 3	 4
Construction Resources 	 4	 5
Past Association	 5	 6
Plant & Equipment	 6	 3
Management Skills	 7	 2
Access to Local	 8	 N.A.
	
Materials/Supplies 	 __________ __________
	
Technology	 9	 1
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A review of the selection process revealed a few interesting patterns in the selection
process of the two groups.
The European firms were interested in linking with small firms with good government
links and sound local knowledge. They were looking for local firms who would provide
them with a "local identity" which was needed for qualifying for the preferential margin
scheme. They were not expecting the local partner to provide any financial or managerial
resources. However they did check whether the potential local partner had access to
construction labour and adequate site supervisory staff.
The local firms on the other hand were looking for foreign firms that were large in size
and who had an international reputation for building transit railway systems. Many of the
interviewees did not have any particular preference to the nationality of the partner. The
reports in the local news paper suggested that many local firms rushed into negotiating
with the first available foreign contractor who had responded to their calls for forming a
joint venture in order to beat the deadline for pre-qualification. An examination of the list
of pre-qualified contractors show that Sembawang Construction initially pre-qualified with
George Wimpey of Britain and Keppel Shipyard pre-qualified with Henry Boot for
contract 101. Singa Development associated itself initially with BES Engineering of
Korea on contract 102 and OCK builders partnered Mancini Construction of Italy on
contract 104. The Straits times (Jan 18, 1983) referred to this frantic search among foreign
and local contractors as a "game of musical chairs". The article observed that European
contractors were particularly aggressive in seeking local partners and as much as six joint
ventures were announced on the last day of submission of pre-qualification documents.
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This clearly shows that most of the European-Local joint ventures were "marriages of
convenience" and had no real conunitment. Some of the local contractors when they found
out that they were not awarded the early contracts immediately aligned themselves with
other available foreign contractors. This was clearly the case with OCK Builders and
Singa Developments. The partner selection process indicates that getting the MRT
contract was the primary concern for both the groups. In other words both the groups
would partner any firm that would give them a chance to pre-qualify for the MRT
contracts. The above discussion clearly shows that selecting a compatible partner was not
a serious consideration for both the groups.
This is contrary to many researchers' findings that the partner selection process is critical
to the perfonnance of the joint venture and sufficient time should be spent in selecting a
suitable partner (Geringer (1988), Contractor (1989).
Many authors have suggested that past association as a primary motive for selecting a
particular partner (Tomlinson (1970), Artisien and Buckley (1985). This was also not true
in the cases examined. SGE-LKT JV was the only exception.
The literature also suggests that there is a strong relationship between motives for forming
the joint venture and partner selection (Tomlinson,1970) and the motives are often
complimentary. This aspect is also not visible in our case study projects. As already noted,
the European firms' primary objective was to find a local partner who was willing to lend
a "local identity" in order to take advantage of the government incentives but would be
happy to play a peripheral role in the operation of the joint venture. On the other hand,
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the local partners were looking for a foreign partner who would be willing to impart
technical know-how and develop and upgrade his technical and managerial skills. This
fundamental difference in perception of each others' motives was ignored initially by both
parties. But this proved later to be one of the major causes for failures of these JVs.
JOINT VENTURE NEGOTIATION AND FORMATION
The partner selection and negotiation process for most of the European-Local joint
ventures on an average took only three months. This is very short compared to 12-18
months period experienced by Beamish (1984) in his case studies on manufacturing JYs.
A review of the joint venture agreements revealed that commercial and legal issues were
dominant issues addressed in the documents. For example, the joint venture agreement
between Henry Boot-Gammon(HK) and Singa Development had twenty articles out of
which two were devoted to the duties of project manager and site management
respectively. The rest of the articles dealt with commercial, financial and administrative
issues. The joint venture agreement between OCK Builders and its foreign partners
revealed similar characteristics. Many of the local directors of the local firms admitted
that the joint venture agreements were drafted by the lawyers of their foreign partners
and vetted by their own lawyers. Andrews (1965) recommended that organisational and
management issues should be resolved before financial legal commitments were made.
Many of the European - Singaporean JVs apparently have neglected to take this simple
precaution. The technical and managerial aspects of the operation of the joint venture
received very skimpy attention during the negotiations.
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Furthermore, the joint venture agreements did not include some of the crucial objectives
identified by the local partners. For example none of the documents indicated how
technology transfer was going to be implemented. The local directors placed heavy trust
on their foreign partners' ability to run the project smoothly and implement all necessary
project controls to complete the project within the required time and cost. The joint
ventures ran into difficulties when this implicit trust was lost during the operational stage
of the joint venture.
Bocotra Construction (P) Ltd. was the only joint venture in this group that was
incorporated as a limited liability company and was formed as a separate legal entity. The
partners were expecting to continue their association beyond MRT contracts. The
chairman of OCK builders, the local partner in Bocotra, proudly announced to the press,
the day after the award of the first contract, that the partners of Bocotra had agreed to
extend their scope of operation to whole of South East Asia. All other joint ventures were
registered as partnerships with the Registrar of Companies in Singapore. Their joint
venture agreements were for a specific project only and the joint venture would be
dissolved at the end of the maintenance period of the MRT contract.
Apart from the legal form of the joint venture, the partners had to consider the operational
arrangements. All the European-Local joint ventures used the integrated style of joint
venture arrangement. In this style the parties essentially agree to perform their work as
if it were performed by a single corporation. The employees of the partners work together
under the supervision of one or more co-venturers in accomplishing the project objectives.
All monies received from the client would go into a joint venture bank account, and the
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parties would share profits and losses on a particular project in accordance with a
previously agreed upon sharing ratio (Garb, 1988). The European partners preferred this
arrangement over the non-integrated arrangement wherein the parties undertake their
respective portions of work separately. Often this type of arrangement is entered into by
co-venturers who have specialised areas of expertise or assigned work responsibilities. All
monies received will be disbursed to each of the joint venturers based on the invoices they
submit, and there will be minimal sharing, if any, of profits or losses(Garb, 1988). The
local partners also preferred the integrated arrangement since it would provide ample
opportunities for their own employees to learn from the foreign experts . Moreover the
non-integrated arrangement would have forced them to take responsibility for independent
work packages such as the construction of an underground station structure . They did not
have sufficient experience or financial backing to assume such increased risks. For the
foreign partner, the integrated style was ideal as this enabled him to have total control
over the operation of the project.
CONTROL, CO-OPERATION AND TRUST
Schaan (1983) examined ten JVs in Mexico and found that partners could influence
specific activities or decisions of the joint venture through the joint venture contract,
appointment to the board of directors, appointment of JV managers, planning of work,
administrative systems and a development of a working relationship with the partner. His
research findings indicated a positive relationship between control and JV success. Hyder
(1988) after studying three joint ventures between Swedish and Indian firms concluded
that a partner can exercise significant control through exchange of resources. The validity
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of these findings will be examined in the following sections.
Ownership Control
The distribution of the equity ownership in the European-Local joint ventures is presented
in Table 5.5
Table 5.5
Distribution of Equity Ownership
Equity contribution
Name of joint venture
______________________ Foreign	 Local
Sinbelco Construction	 50	 50
Bocotra Construction	 75	 25
Pte.Ltd.
Dragage - Sembawang	 68	 32
Campenon-Singapore	 51	 49
Piling JV
SGE-Lee Kim Tah JV	 70	 30
Henry Boot-Gammon-	 73	 27
Singa JV
As the table indicates, most of the foreign partners preferred to hold a majority share in
the joint venture. Four of them kept the local share very close to the minimum of 25
percentage required to qualify for the preferential margin scheme. Campenon Bernard and
the Belgian contractors in the Sinbelco joint venture were the only ones willing to give
almost equal equity control to local partners in order to take full advantage of the 5
percent preferential margin offered by the government. This happened to be the right
strategy for both the companies. Campenon Bernard-Singapore Piling bid was 4 percent
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higher than that of the lowest bidder. If Campenon Bernard had insisted on only a 25
percent equity contribution from their local partner they would not have been awarded the
contract at all, since this would have entitled them to receive a maximum preferential
margin of 2.5 percent. The same was true for Sinbelco joint venture whose bid was 3
percent higher than that of the lowest bidder. Bocotra just managed to squeeze in to get
contract No. 105 by a margin of a few thousand dollars from their nearest competitor,
only because of 2.5 percent preferential margin awarded to them.
It was rather surprising that the joint ventures did not consider setting up 50-50 equity
joint ventures to ensure that they fully take advantage of the preferential margin scheme.
Many researchers have observed that there is no significant relationship between level
equity ownership and the degree of influence exerted by the parent on the joint
venture(Dang (1977); Lacraw (1984)). Freidman and Beguin (1971) studying joint
ventures in developing countries found that a partner can influence the activities of the
joint venture without having a majority stake. Other researchers have clearly distinguished
the difference between equity control and managerial control. Janger (1980) and Schaan
(1983)) and have shown that managerial control is more important as an influencing factor
on the performance of joint venture than ownership control. This issue is addressed in the
next section.
Management Control
The European contractors tried to exercise control over the joint ventures in three areas.
They are: strategic control through the joint venture board, operational control through
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appointment of key managerial and technical personnel and resource control through
supply and purchase of plant and equipment and materials.
Strategic Control
In the cases studied in this group, the joint venture board had total control over all the
decisions made by the venture. Its board members were appointed on the basis of the
equity contribution by each partner. Most of the cases observed in this group of joint
ventures had four members appointed to the board with the member from the sponsoring
company acting as the chairman. The board was mainly responsible for the following
matters:
a. Provision of funds for the execution of the JV agreement.
b. The nature and extent of plant, equipment and materials to be provided by each
party.
c. Recommendation of payment of dividends to the shareholders.
d. Accepting modifications, omissions or alterations to the conditions of joint
venture agreements.
e. Entry of joint venture into new business.
f. Recommendations to the shareholders on any increase in the authorised or issued
capital.
g. Approval of all key managerial appointments.
The joint venture boards normally met once a month and reviewed the progress of the
project. In order to protect the interest of minority shareholders the board's decisions, in
principle, were expected to be unanimous. In case unanimity could not be reached, the
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Board of Directors normally adjourned for a period of 24 hours. If even after reconvening,
the directors could not reach unanimity, the decision was passed, based on a majority
vote. In case of a tie, the Chairman of the board was allowed to exercise a tie breaking
vote if the subject matter of the decision was of an urgent and important nature.
The boards' meetings went very smoothly in the early stages. They were quite excited
in getting the contracts and the key personnel and construction plant and equipment
required for commencing the work were quickly approved. But as the project progressed,
difference of opinions started to emerge in some of the contracts. Hytech and their
Belgian partners very quickly found themselves disputing over the quality of the project
manager appointed to the project. OCK Builders' relationship with Borie-Sae ran into
difficulty when they demanded an active role in the management of the project.
Campenon Bernard and their partners started falling out over the aggressive attitude of
some of the French Engineers towards their local counterparts. Contractors like
Sembawang, Singa Development decided to be passive and let their foreign partners make
all the key decisions. They decided to use the JV experience mainly as a learning
exercise. Only SGE-LKT, among all the European Local joint ventures, had a smooth
relationship throughout the project. They attributed this to their earlier association on the
Housing Board project. This supports Tomlinson's (1970) findings that past association
is a very crucial factor in satisfactory functioning of the JV. The problems encountered
by both the partners are discussed later in this chapter.
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Operational Control
Table 5.6 shows the average contribution of each partner to the JV in percentage.
Table 5.6
Mutual contribution of resources
	
Description of Resource	 Foreign	 Local
Project Manager
	 100	 0
	
Key Project personnel	 90	 10
Field Staff
	 25	 75
Administration & Personnel
	 35	 65
Plant & Equipment	 75	 25
Materials	 65	 35
Financing	 90	 10
As the table indicates, the European partners contributed most of the key resources
required for the operation of the JV. This section discusses the impact of each resource
on the performance of the JVs.
Project Manager
Beamish (1988) considers the appointment of a good general manager is most critical for
the success or failure of the JV. He observed that the challenge facing the general
manager was not only that the parent organisation might have different expectations but
those expectations were seldom communicated clearly to the general managers. To make
matters worse they also changed over time. A good project manager should give his
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undivided loyalty to the JV rather than to his parent organisation. This is often very
difficult to do in construction JVs since most of them exist for a single project. The bias
of the project manager towards his parent organisation has often resulted as a source of
conflict between the partners. All the six JVs studied in this group had expatriate Project
Managers appointed by the respective European partner. Hytech Builders had a very
difficult time initially with the Project Manager appointed by its Belgian partners. He was
an older gentlemen who apparently treated his responsibilities in a very casual way. One
of the directors of the local partner remarked that the Project Manager was more
interested in planning his holidays than in the project itself! After some heated discussions
at the JV board level he was replaced by a tunnel specialist who was with Franki for
many years. Relationship between the two partners improved considerably after he took
over the management of the project. Relationship between Bocotra's project manager and
the local partner was never smooth and the General Manager of Bocotra who was a local,
often had to intervene to resolve disputes. In one incident, the local partner objected to
the Project Manager transferring a large amount of funds from the JY account to that of
the foreign partner for payment of expenses related to relocation of expatriates from
France without submitting proper records.
Such incidents created an atmosphere of mistrust which was detrimental to the
performance of the JV.
Key Personnel
The organisation charts for the JVs called for key functional management positions to be
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initially filled by expatriate staff to be later replaced by local staff after they received
sufficient training. The Sinbelco JV were reasonably successful in achieving this objective.
From the beginning local deputies were appointed to work alongside the expatriate heads
of sections. The Deputy Project Manager position was assumed by the General Manager
of Hytech. Towards the end of the project only two expatriates were left on the project.
Hytech management were quite satisfied with the cooperation of their partner in achieving
this goal . Lee Kim Tah-SGE JV did not have any problem in placing the local staff in
key positions due to their earlier association.
OCK Builders had continuous problems in placing their staff in key positions. A review
of correspondence reveals serious rifts between the two partners and a lack of cooperation
and trust between the partners. OCK Builders wanted to place their staff in key technical
positions and recommended a few candidates. These candidates were rejected by Bocotra's
Project Manager. OCK was frustrated and at one stage appealed to MRTC to help them
place their candidates in middle management positions. The mistrust between the two
partners continued throughout the life of the JV.
The local partners in the other three joint ventures did not have sufficient local staff to
second to their respective JVs. This resulted in expensive expatriate staff staying
throughout the project. The General Manager of Campenon Bernard remarked that keeping
their expatriate staff beyond the planned period seriously reduced their profitability.
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Procurement of Other Resources
The JV board was responsible for approving any major purchases of construction plant
and equipment and sourcing of expensive materials. The European partners preferred to
use their own sources in their home countries for these purposes. When the mutual trust
was very high between the partners this process went very smoothly. When disputes in
other areas started to emerge, doubts about the motives for procuring materials from
preferred sources began to surface in the board meetings. A few local contractors felt that
transfer prices charged to the JV account might have been inflated by the foreign partner
in order to artificially lower the profit margin affecting the share of profits for the local
partner.
Another source of problem was related to the value of older assets such as plant and
equipment brought to the site from other projects and shown as the partner's contribution
to the equity. It was very difficult to verify the appropriate value for such items and
doubts were expressed about the valuation.
Problems associated with mutual trust surfaced with regard to appointment of sub-
contractors. The local contractors felt they had developed good working relationship with
selected group of sub-contractors and wanted them to be appointed as sub-contractors on
the JV project. Some foreign contractors feared collusion between his local partner and
the recommended sub-contractor resulting in high sub-contract prices. Instead they wanted
to follow the traditional method of selection through competitive bidding.
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Buckley and Casson (1987) suggested that trust is a true mechanism of cooperation and
trust generates loyalty. Some of the JVs in this case study seemed to be missing this
important factor in their association. Some of the JY problems can also be traced to the
partners' inability to differentiate between policy decisions and operational decisions.
Andrews (1984) suggested that policy decisions should be taken jointly at board level and
operating decisions taken at project level, within delegated limits. In most of the ventures
in this group, the board members were also making operating decisions, often resulting
in conflict.
CONFLICTS IN EUROPEAN-LOCAL JOINT VENTURES
Conflicts are a major source of irritation to the partners of a JV. Tillman (1990) observed
that they cause partners to spend a lot of time and resource resolving disputes and
disagreements. Awadzi (1987) suggested that conflict could be due to pursuit of divergent
goals, interference and goal blocking and withholding of resources. Killing (1983)
suggested that conflict could be caused by national cultures. These two main causes of
conflict, pursuance of divergent goals and cultural differences had significant influences
on the performance of the European-Local JVs. Some examples are presented in this
section.
Pursuance of Divergent Goals
The European-Local JVs were presented a list of possible issues over which they could
have disagreements with their partners during the formation and operation of the JVs.
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They were asked to identify in a scale of 1 to 7, the level of their conflicts over these
issues. A score of one indicated total agreement and a score of 7 indicated total
disagreement. The list presented in Table 5.7 represents areas in which the partners had
clashed frequently over the life of the joint venture (An average score of 4.0 or more).
Table 5.7
Conflicts among Partners
Average
Score
No	 Description
Strategic and Operational issues
1. Technology Transfer
2. Interpretation of JV agreement
3. Organisation structure
4. Selection of Subcontractors
5. Procurement of Materials,
Plant & Equipment
Cultural Issues
1. Sensitivity to Partner's Needs
2. Interaction among partners
3. Interaction with the Client
4. Behaviour of Expatriate
Managers
5. Language Barriers
5.0
4.8
4.7
4.6
4.4
4.6
4.4
4.3
4.2
4.1
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Simkoko (1991) defined technology transfer as the planned conveyance and acquisition
of technical knowledge and techniques. This implies that it is a two way process and can
only succeed when both the donor and the recipient work together in deciding what needs
to be transferred and implement a well organised transfer of technology programme to
achieve the objectives of the program. The European partners felt that the project duration
was very tight leaving them with very little time to attend to lower priority objectives
such as technology transfer. Lack of long term commitment to the local partner also acted
as a deterrent. The local partner during the negotiation stage spent his efforts in ensuring
that his commercial interests were well protected in JV agreements. The JV agreements
made no reference to the technology transfer process nor were any training budgets
allotted. Effective technology transfer did take place in a few JVs where the two partners
had good working relations.
MRTC appointed a separate Technology Transfer Manager (MTT) to monitor the
implementation of technology transfer in all the MRT contracts. He was responsible for
closely monitoring the implementation of technology transfer in the contracts that were
awarded on the basis of Preferential Margin and report to the MRTC Board every month.
The contracts that were awarded on the basis of PMS are Contract 103 (Sinbelco
Construction Pvt.Ltd.), Contract 105 (Bocotra Construction Pvt.Ltd.) and Contract 106
(Campenon-Bernard-Singapore Piling JV). Following is the summary of reports prepared
by MY!' on these three joint ventures:
Sinbelco JV undertook to send their local partner's professional and technical staff for
training in Belgium, both at various construction sites and as well at the main offices of
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the Belgian partners. Special emphasis was to be placed on project management, site
organisation and construction methods such as diaphragm walling, underpinning etc. In
addition, the expatriate managers were to give in-house lectures to local technical staff
during project execution time. The MTF was very positive about the Belgian Partners'
efforts to share their knowledge with local staff. He was particularly pleased with the
second Project manager appointed by Sinbelco who took time to talk to local junior staff
and conduct regular lunch hour talk on various construction processes. This view was also
shared by the management of Hytech. Hytech attributed this to one of their local directors
becoming the Chairman of the JV Board and the sensitiveness shown by both CFE and
Franki. A number of Hytech's senior staff went to Belgium for periods of two to three
weeks. A large number of local staff were also sent to courses organised by University
of London, the local Universities and professional bodies. Hytech also reported that
during the second half of the project many of the expatriate managers were replaced by
locals. MTT assessed in his final report that Sinbelco-Hytech JV was a successful JV as
far as technology transfer was concerned.
Unfortunately the same could not be said about Bocotra. The original scope of technology
transfer written into the contract was probably too ambitious. It called for the use of as
many local senior staff as possible to supervise the works, to have local engineers work
in France and U.S. head offices during the early stages of the works, to send local staff
for a period of three to six months to learn about tunnel excavation, to provide full 18
months training for one local engineer in a French Technical Institute and to arrange for
the progressive handing over of responsibility to local staff. These objectives were only
partially met. Local training was considered quite adequate but no local staff were sent
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abroad for any extensive period. Only one planning engineer went to Switzerland for a
period of three weeks to learn computer planning techniques. The supervision of tunnel
and station works remained with the expatriates through out the contract period. In
response to MRTC's queries on technology transfer, Bocotra explained that the three
contracts awarded to them kept them very busy and hence had to abandon some of their
technology transfer objectives. MTT did recommend to MRTC Board that the technology
transfer goals were not met in contract 105 and the preferential margin of S 1,770,875
given to Bocotra, being the difference between their tender sum and that of the lowest
acceptable tender sum should be recovered.
According to MTT's reports, the third contract awarded on preferential margin basis,
Campenon-Bernard-Singapore Piling JV started badly but soon managed to sort out their
differences. The number of expatriate staff were limited to key personnel and specialists
were brought in to deal with specific problems. The training was confined to the
supervisory level and staff were sent to local training courses. Towards the second half
of the project the Technical and administrative managers were replaced by local staff.
MTT was only able to monitor the technology transfer process in the other contracts and
the success or otherwise was entirely dependent on the efforts of the two partners
themselves. He noted that both Sembawang Shipyard and Singa Development had very
little or no civil engineering background. They had hardly any civil engineers to second
to the JY nor did they appear willing to recruit any from the local market. Hence it was
difficult to pass the entire blame on the foreign contractors for lack of transfer. MTT also
noted that SGE-LKT JVs got along smoothly due to their past association on HDB
projects and received little or no complaints from the local partner regarding technology
transfer.
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Cultural Issues
This research study uses the four cultural dimensions (power distance, uncertainty
avoidance, masculinity, and individualism) identified by Hofstede (1980) to explain the
differences among European and Singapore cultures in resolving conflict.
Hofstede's model on culture identifies the Europeans as having a small power distance
( believes in equality), high on individualism ( preference for individual judgement,
spontaneous decisions, task before relationship and universalistic), and strong uncertainty
avoidance (low tolerance, insists on rules) and highly masculine (believes in success,
performance and achievement). Singapore was described as a nation that is low on
individualism, has a large power distance, is more tolerant of uncertainty and is highly
masculine.
Comparing the cultural orientation of the two groups, one can notice the large cultural
distance between the two groups. The highly masculine nature of both the groups indicate
that both groups are keen on achieving the results they want. If the two groups had the
same set of objectives, all the JVs would have reported very little serious conflict.
Unfortunately the two groups had different sets of agenda to pursue through the JVs. This
caused considerable difficulties in the relationship between the two groups. Some of these
differences are highlighted below.
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The French contractors in particular were more focused on rules than relationships. They
were of the opinion that the JV agreement represented a formal business document and
all actions should relate to that agreement. They were quite willing to perform any task
that was specified in the agreement and reluctant to accommodate any requests outside
the written agreement. The local contractors placed more emphasis on personal
relationships than on the wordings in the JV agreement. Even though none of the JV
agreements specifically referred to technology transfer, the local partners expected their
foreign partners to provide this service as part of their ongoing relationship. The foreign
partners did not feel the same way. One of Bocotra's expatriate managers observed that
technology transfer did not take place effectively because they were not written into the
iv agreement. Bocotra's general manager who was a Singaporean observed, " In the
process of technology transfer, technology is the easy part. The process of transfer from
one culture to another is the difficult part."
In Eastern culture decisions are made collectively, however small they are, and joint
responsibility is assumed for the outcome. In Western culture such decisions are made by
individuals and they assume personal responsibility for the results. Bone-Sea, the
sponsoring French partner in Bocotra considered the JV as if it was its own wholly owned
subsidiary and recruited local staff for the iv without consulting their local partners. This
came as a shock to the local partner who was preparing to second his own staff to the JV.
He considered the behaviour of the French as selfish, high handed and domineering. On
the other hand, shared decision making process helped SGE-LKT and Sinbelco Board of
directors to trust each other which led to a smoother relationship between the partners.
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In individual cultures(e.g., French and Italians) emotions are expressed immediately either
verbally or non-verbally. In collective cultures(e.g., Singapore and Japan), emotions are
not openly expressed. Asians are easily embarrassed when colleagues from a different
culture exhibit public display of emotions. The employees of Singapore Piling were
shocked when the first batch of French supervisors expressed their displeasure through
high emotional outbursts. Some of the local staff strongly protested to their management
at what they perceived as "arrogant and unruly behaviour" of their supervisors. The local
partner applied strong pressure on their foreign partner and had the unsatisfactory staff
sent back to France.
Some of the local partners of French companies were sometimes embarrassed by the
emotional outbursts shown by their partners in meetings with the clients on such sensitive
issues as claims. In private meetings with the client, some of the local firms offered their
apologies for the "unruly" behaviour of their partners.
Apart from cultural problems there were a few minor issues that affected the relationship.
Language barrier was one of them. For example, Compenon-Bemard had issued the
manual for project management software written in French which the local planning
engineer could not readily use. Some of the training classes in France were conducted in
French and the local staff who were sent for training found it impossible to understand
the instructors.
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It was also observed that none of the European firms conducted any orientation
programmes for their staff or their families relocating to Singapore. Some of the engineers
who were new recruits and sent to Singapore within a few days after joining their parent
firms in Europe found it difficult to adjust to local working habits and customs. This often
resulted in friction between local and expatriate staff.
The cost of these cultural conflicts are not quantifiable. But they increased the strain in
the relationship between the JV partners.
PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN-LOCAL JOINT VENTURES
Subjective Assessment of JV Performance by Local Partners
The local partners were presented a list of objectives they set for themselves when they
formed the JV and were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the extent to which they
attained their targets at the completion of the projects. A score of 1 indicated low level
of attainment and score of 7 indicated very high level of attaining their objectives. The
average score for each objective is presented in Table 5.8. An average of 3.5 is considered
satisfactory.
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Table 5.8
Assessment of Achievement of Key Objectives
No	 Key Objectives	 Avg. Score
1	 Acquisition of New Technology	 3.0
2	 Improved ProjectlSite Management 	 3.2
Skills
3	 Effective Utilisation of Resources 	 2.8
4	 Enhanced local image	 4.0
5	 Return on Investment	 2.0
The results suggest that the local partners were not at all satisfied with the technology
transfer process. They were ready to admit that the association with international partners
improved the project management skills and taught them how to utilise the available
resources. They also felt that the experience enhanced their local image and gave them
confidence to venture overseas. Most of them felt that their experience left them
financially poorer and would not prefer to go on a joint venture with European partners
again. They felt the cultural gap between the two groups was too wide to be bridged over
a short period of association. Among the six JVs in the group, only Sinbelco JV and SGE-
Lee Kim Tah JVs expressed satisfaction with the performance of the JVs.
MRTC's Assessment of European-Local JV Performance
MRTC's Project Manager for Civil & Structures gave a general assessment of the
performance of the European-Local JVs. Following are his assessments:
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1.	 The quality of work performed by all the contracts were quite adequate and met
the standards specified. He noted that there was very little local involvement in the
technical supervision and management of works. There was very little participation
by local staff in co-ordination and project meetings with the client.
2. Sub-contractors' management was very messy and the two partners sometimes
ended up fighting openly over the appointment.
3. He noted that many of the European contractors were claim oriented and some
appointed full time claim consultants to prepare and justify their claims. This could
be due to the fear that the client might not give a fair hearing and the low tender
price.
4. Technology transfer took place only when the client threatened to take action.
Mere lip service was paid to technology transfer than any real transfer.
CONCLUSIONS
Beamish and Lane (1990) during their study of JYs in developing countries in Asia
observed that it takes 12-18 months to find and select a good partner. One reason for such
a time consuming process is that the partners in Asian countries want to first develop a
personal relationship before attempting a business relationship. Reverse is true for Western
countries where business relationship may eventually lead to personal relationships. The
European-Local JVs never had the time to fully develop their personal relationships since
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all of them were formed within three months after the initial contact. The lack of time,
gave very little opportunity for the European contractors to study and understand the
sensitive local issues. The local contractors were very small and sometimes could not
comprehend the working habits of larger European firms. The size of the local firms was
also a limiting factor. It prevented them from making any significant contribution to the
venture. The European contractors also "used" the local firms only as a vehicle to get the
MRTC contracts. This lack of commitment on the part of the European contractors to the
joint venture and to his local partner was also a significant contributory factor to the
unsatisfactory performance of the JVs. Cultural differences were also responsible for the
poor performance.
CURRENT STATUS OF EUROPEAN-LOCAL JV PARTNERS
All but one of the European-Local JVs were dissolved after the completion of MRT
contracts. OCK Builders left Bocotra after the completion of the three MRT contracts.
Traylor Brothers, the US partner in Bocotra also terminated their agreement after the
initial contracts. Borie-Sae and Cogefar continued their partnership under the old name
of Bocotra and took three local firms as partners (Lee Kim Tah was one of them) and
formed a company called Expressway Construction Pte. Ltd. (ECPL) to build Central
Expressway Phase H project for Public Works Department. This subsequent project has
been a very unhappy experience for Bocotra. The contract is currently under arbitration
(value of claim $138 million for cost overrun and variations).The local partners and
Bocotra have issued suits and counter-suits against each other, amongst other things,
issuing guarantees (Business Times, 5th Oct., 1994). Campenon-Bernard suffered heavy
losses on the MRT project and left Singapore in 1988. Dragage Et Travaux is still
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executing projects in Singapore but has stopped working on a joint venture basis. Singa
Development pulled out of the Henry Boot-Gammon (HK) JV and is mainly concentrating
in building residential properties. Sembawang Shipyard formed a separate construction
subsidiary which branched out to building power plants and industrial projects. Singapore
Piling decided to go back to its core business of piling and foundations work.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDIES OF JAPANESE-SINGAPOREAN JOINT VENTURES
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter reports on the interaction between Singaporean and Japanese contractors who
formed JVs to build some sections of the Singapore MRT system between 1985 and 1990.
The analysis is presented in the form of a case study in order to identify and fully
understand the dynamic process of joint venture (JV) formation and operation and the
specific factors that influence their performance. The information is presented in the same
format as the previous chapter in order to maintain uniformity and consistency.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
MRTC awarded a total of thirty eight major civil contracts for the construction of the 67
kilometre route. Out of these, 11 civil contracts were awarded to Singapore-Japanese joint
ventures. The list of contractors and their awarded value is presented in Table 6.1.
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TABLE 6.1
LIST OF AWARDS TO SINGAPORE-JAPANESE JOINT VENTURES
No	 Name of Joint Venture 	 No. of	 Life of	 Value of
contracts JVs	 Contract
awarded	 ($ Million)
Nishimatsu-Lum Chang	 May 84 -
1	 JV Ltd.	 3	 Sep 89	 469.19
Oct 83 -
2	 Kajima-Keppel JY	 1	 Jun 87	 35.65
Jan 85 -
3	 Aoki-Lim Kah Nam JV	 3	 Oct 88	 183.90
Dec 85 -
4	 Okumura-Oh Tech Thye	 1	 Sep 89	 60.01
JV
Jan86 -
5	 Obhayashi-RDC JV	 1	 Sep 89	 70.00
Mar 86 -
6	 Sato Kogyo-RDC JV	 1	 Oct 89	 91.89
7	 JDC-Jurong Eng. JV	 1	 Oct 85 -	 79.58
Oct 88
Total	 11	 990.22
Profile of Japanese Contractors
The Japanese contractors showed very keen interest in bidding for the MRT contracts.
Many of them had established their presence in Singapore well before the go-ahead was
given by the Singapore government for the construction of MRT project. During the pre-
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qualifying period for the first phase of MRT in early 1983, the Japanese contractors
resisted the temptation to form joint ventures with local contractors despite the incentives
offered by the government through the preferential margin scheme. The managing director
of Obhayashi remarked that fellow Japanese companies had always been their first choice
for forming JVs. They successfully avoided forming joint ventures with local firms
during the first phase of MRT construction. The choice of a choosing a local partner was
literally forced upon them by the competition from other international finns.
The all-Japanese JVs won four of the fourteen Phase I underground tunnelling contracts.
Takenaka with Tobishima won the first MRT contract that was awarded in September 83
(Straits Times, 16 September 83). Tobhishima, even though new to Singapore had
extensive experience in undertaking three tunnelling contracts in Hong Kong. Takenaka
first came to Singapore in 1969 and was involved in the construction of the Singapore's
Changi Airport Terminal Building and the Sheraton Hotel. This JV's bid price was $15
million lower than the second lowest bidder and nearly half of that of the engineer's
estimates. These results, when announced, stunned many competitors, especially those
from Europe and U.S.A.. Some of them withdrew from the local scene altogether when
similar results were announced for the next few awarded contracts.
Taisei-Shimuzu-Marubeni JV won two major design and build type contracts worth S$
134 million(contract Nos. lO7A and 108). According to the general Manager of Shimuzu,
Marubeni was included in the partnership because of its expertise in arranging project
financing. Another member of the big "five", Obhayashi Corporation combined with
Okumura Construction Ltd. to win contract No. 109 for the design and construction of
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Outram Park station and the tunnels between Tanjong Pagar and Tiong Bharu valued at
S$ 73.85 million. Obhayashi opened an office in Singapore in 1971 and has built major
office buildings such as the DBS building , NOL building and the Treasury building.
Okumura however was a new corner to Singapore.
The other major Japanese contractors who formed joint ventures with fellow Japanese
contractors such as Hazama-Gumi and Japan Development and Construction Company
(JDC) quietly withdrew from bidding for the MRT construction contracts as they felt the
competitors were undercutting prices in order to secure the contracts. JDC continued to
pursue other projects in Singapore and nearly eighteen months after the initially failed
attempt with Hazama-Gumi, successfully won a contract (Contract No. 403) with Jurong
Engineering Limited (JEL) as its JV partner.
Nishimatsu Construction established its presence in Singapore in late 1979 and initially
tried to bid for the jobs on its own but failed to secure any contracts. The MRT project
manager recollected meeting the Managing Director of Nishimatsu in early 1981 who
made a courtesy call on him and made enquiries about possible MRT projects. This was
nearly two years before the decision to go ahead with the MRT projects were made!
They finally decided to take Lum Chang Construction Pvt. Ltd as their local JV partner
and successfully won three MRT contracts (Contract Nos. 101, 107B and 301).
Obayashi Corporation and Okumura Construction who were partners on the design and
build contract No. 109, later split and formed separate joint ventures with local partners
Resource Development Corporation and Oh Teck Thye Pvt. Ltd. respectively. Obhayashi-
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RDC JV won Contract No. 304 and Okumura- Oh Teck Thye won Contract No. 303.
Sato Kogyo established their office in Singapore in 1971 to build the East Coast
Expressway on reclaimed land. They also initially tried to bid for the MRT projects on
their own but did not succeed in winning any contract. After nearly eighteen months and
eight unsuccessful bids, they formed a joint venture with Resource Development
Corporation and successfully bid for contract No. 306 in Phase IIA.
Kajima Corporation was one of the first Japanese contractors to recognise the potentials
of the Singapore construction market. They first came to Singapore in 1964 and built two
major ship repair yards for Keppel Shipyard in 1975 and 1979. When the ship repair
industry went through a major recession for three years starting from 1982, Keppel
shipyard wanted to diversify into construction. Kajima readily took them as their joint
venture partner for the MRT project and successfully secured contract No. 107 for
designing and building the tunnels between City Hall and Raffles Place. This contract also
included the construction of tunnels crossing under the Singapore river.
Aoki Corporation arrived rather late to the MRT bidding scene and could not locate a
suitable fellow Japanese partner. After a thorough selection process which lasted nearly
six months, they formed a joint venture with the local firm, Lim Kah Nam Pvt. Ltd.
(LKN) and pre-qualified to bid for the latter half of the Phase I contracts. After five failed
attempts they managed to secure three MRT contracts (Contract Nos. 203 and 204 in
Phase IA and contract No. 404 in Phase IIB).
140
All the Japanese contractors involved in the MRT project were very large construction
firms. Engineering News Record Magazine in 1991 ranked Shimuzu, Kajima, Taisei and
Takenaka among the top 5 of the international contractors. Their average turnover was
US$ 16 billion. (Levy, 1990). Even in 1982 these four companies averaged a turn over
of US$ 4 billion. Except for Aoki and Okumura all other Japanese contractors were well
established in the local construction market.
Profile of Singaporean Contractors
Lum Chang stands among the leaders of the building industry in Singapore as a prominent
civil engineering and construction firm. It was ranked as the number one local contractor
with the largest turnover by the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) from
1985 to 1993. Its annual turnover in 1984 was S$ 102 million tripling to over S$ 300
million in 1992. (CIDB, 1992). Lum Chang joined with Fletcher Construction and built
the Singapore National University buildings in 1983 and the National University Hospital
in 1984. Lum Chang Holdings, the parent of Lum Chang Builders became a public listed
company in 1984. Lum chang is a diversified group involved in property development,
financial services and management and hotel ownership in the region. It has overseas
offices in Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, China and Mauritius. Lum Chang originally
pre-qualified for the MRT projects with Fletcher construction. Fletcher Construction
decided to withdraw from bidding for MRT projects as it felt that it could not match the
low tender prices quoted by the Japanese firms. This left Lum Chang to look for a
suitable partner. At the same time Nishimatsu which failed to secure any of the early
awards was ready to join with a local partner. Both of them joined together to form one
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of the most successful contracting teams in Singapore.
LKN Construction Pvt. Ltd started business as a privately owned construction firm in the
mid fifties and built its first contract in 1958. It specialised in building high-rise buildings
and became a public listed company in 1983. It was the third largest construction firm in
Singapore in 1984 (CIDB Review, November 1985).
Keppel Corporation is a government linked firm which owns and operates the largest
shipyards in Singapore. It is a well diversified conglomerate involved in banking,
engineering, investment banking, insurance and ship repairing. It is rated as one of the top
ten companies in terms of market capitalisation by the Stock Exchange of Singapore (
SES annual report, 1985). It was not involved in construction before its participation in
the MRT project.
Resources Development Corporation was started as a fully owned government company
in 1976 to operate and manage granite quarries in Singapore. It was the biggest
manufacturer of ready-mixed concrete and asphalt and was involved in road building for
the Public Works Department before its involvement on the MRT project. It became a
public listed company in 1986.
Jurong Engineering Limited was established in 1971, by Ishikawajima Harima Heavy
Industries of Japan and Jurong Shipyard of Singapore with equal share holding. Jurong
Engineering is the only contractor in Singapore which has its own design division. It is
also one of the first companies in Singapore that ventured into the Middle-East
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construction market in the late seventies. It has branch offices in Malaysia, Indonesia,
China, India and U.A.E.
Oh Teck Thye was a family owned construction firm that was mainly in building
construction and was one of the sub contractors for the Obhayashi-Okumura JV on the
Phase I MRT contract.
Many of the local firms who partnered the Japanese had prior exposure to working with
foreign firms either as JV partners or as sub-contractors. Many of them were either public
listed firms or government linked firms. Even though the size of these firms compared to
their Japanese partners was quite small, they represented the cream of the available local
talent.
MOTIVATIONS FOR FORMING A JOINT VENTURE
Many researchers have observed that joint ventures that have performed satisfactorily,
usually have partners with compatible objectives. In order to determine the compatibility
of their mutual objectives, the two groups were asked to assess on a scale of 1 to 7, the
importance of each objective from a pre-prepared list. If the objective received a score
of 1, it was considered least important. If it received a score of 7 it was considered as
most important. The average score received by each objective was then calculated on the
basis of the responses received from the respective firm. These average scores were then
used to rank the objectives. These results are presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 respectively.
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Objectives of Japanese firms
The important objectives, as identified by the Japanese firms who participated in this cae
study are presented below in Table 6.2. These are listed in the order of their importance
to the Japanese.
Table 6.2
Key Motives of Japanese Firms
Rank	 Key motives for forming JV 	 Average
Score
1	 Establish IEnhance Local Image	 5.3
2	 Effective resource utilisation	 5.1
3	 Protect International market share 	 4.7
4	 Match competition	 4.6
5	 Government Incentives	 4.4
6	 Avail of partner's local knowledge 	 4.3
7	 Enter New Market 	 4.1
Many of the Japanese firms were well established in Singapore before the announcement
of the construction of Singapore MRT system. They recognised that the local firms did
not have any expertise or experience in the construction of underground tunnelling work
and would not be able to make any useful contribution. Hence most of them concentrated
on forming JVs with partners from Japan and did succeed in winning a fair share of the
underground work contracts in the first phase of MRT construction.
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Nishimatsu, Aoki and JDC which were new corners to the Singapore market, after a few
failed attempts to win contracts on their own, formed joint ventures with local firms. They
came to Singapore to establish a long term presence and win and maintain a decent
market share. Hence it was no surprise that the Japanese firms rated establishing a local
image as the main motive for forming a joint venture.
They were also concerned about the shrinking work load in the world construction market
at that time and the MRT project provided an ideal opportunity to utilise their idle
resources and maintain their world market share. These motives were ranked two and
three respectively.
The Japanese contractors were not initially persuaded by the government incentives,
offered through preferential margin scheme, as sufficient reason for forming JVs with
local firms. Only when the bidding became very intense for the second phase of the
project, some of the Japanese firms started considering forming a JV with local firms as
a worthwhile alternative and as a way to match the competitors' strategies. New corners
like Aoki felt that his local partner would be able to provide them with the local
knowledge. Commercial risks were not a factor in forming a JV with a local firm.
Local contractors' motives for forming a Joint Venture
The local firms' motives for forming the JV with Japanese is presented in Table 6.3.
These are presented in the order of their importance to the local firms.
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Table 6.3
Key Motives of Singaporean Firms
Rank	 Key motives for forming	 JV	 Average
Score
1	 Technology Transfer	 5.7
2	 Government Incentives 	 5.4
3	 Share Commercial risk 	 5.1
4	 Enhance local image	 4.8
5	 Enter new market	 4.4
6	 Access to new financial resources	 4.3
7	 Match competition	 4.0
The Singaporean contractors rated technology transfer as the primary motive for forming
the joint venture. They expected their Japanese partners to train them in areas of project
planning, cost control, contract administration, site management and construction
techniques.
The local firms were fully aware that without government incentives foreign firms would
not be interested in forming JVs with them. They rated government incentives as the
second most important motive for forming the JVs. Sharing commercial risks was a very
important factor for many local firms and this was ranked third. Keppel Shipyard was
motivated to form a JV as part of its diversification strategy into construction business.
Many local contractors like Lum Chang, Lim Kah Nam and Resources Development
Corporation wanted to boost their local image through partnering with reputed Japanese
firms.
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It can be observed from Table 6.2 and 6.3 that the two groups of partners had different
sets of criteria for forming the joint venture. This itself posed certain difficulties in
operating the joint venture. The impact of these differences on JV performance are
addressed later in this chapter.
PARTNER SELECTION PROCESS
The representatives from the Japanese firms and the local finns were requested during the
interview to rank the importance of various factors that made them choose a particular
partner from a pre-prepared list. The results of their responses are presented in Table 6.4
Table 6.4
Reasons for selecting a particular partner
Description	 Japanese	 Local
Rank	 Rank
SizefReputation	 1	 4
Past association	 2	 5
Government Link	 3	 N.A.
Local Knowledge	 4	 N.A.
Construction resources	 5	 6
Technology	 6	 1
Management Skills	 7	 2
Plant &Equipment	 8	 3
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The Japanese firms which formed JVs with local contractors were interested only in local
construction firms that were leaders in the industry . Lum Chang, Jurong Engineering and
Lim Kah Nam were the top five contractors in Singapore at the time forming the JVs.
The Japanese contractors were also interested in forming JVs with companies that were
publicly listed or were in the process of being listed in the Singapore Stock Exchange. All
the local partners with the exception of Oh Teck Thye were public owned companies. One
of the Japanese directors explained that the size of the firm and their ability to borrow
funds for financing the construction were very important considerations in choosing a
particular partner. Past associations were also considered as a very important factor.
Kajima chose Keppel as a partner in order to oblige a client with whom they were
associated for more than ten years. Okumura chose Oh Teck Thye as a partner because
they worked as their sub-contractors on their previous projects. Sato Kogyo and
Obhayashi chose RDC as a partner because RDC was fully owned by the Singapore
government. RDC was also the largest supplier of ready-mix concrete and gravel for
concrete in Singapore. The directors of these firms anticipated serious shortage of
construction materials during the construction of the last phase of MRT and hence
preferred a local partner who could supply these materials without serious interruption to
the construction.
The Japanese contractors were not concerned about contributions from their partners with
respect to plant and equipment or technology. But they were interested in the partners'
contribution towards providing quality local professionals for supervisory positions in the
JV as bringing them from Japan would have been very expensive. Some of the Japanese
firms like Nishimatsu and Aoki were new to Singapore and chose reputable local firms
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as partners in order to acquire a local identity.
The local firms such as Lum Chang and LKN were looking for foreign firms that were
large in size and which had an international reputation for building transit railway
systems. The local directors of the firms during the interviews preferred Japanese as
partners due to their reputation for high quality work and their ability to complete projects
within the specified time and budget. The Japanese firms' reputation for their superior
construction technology and site management skills also attracted the big Singaporean
firms to choose Japanese as JV partners.
Jurong Engineering was a subsidiary of a Japanese firm and it was natural for it to choose
a Japanese partner. Keppel shipyard wanted to diversify into construction related business
and Kajima was willing to help them achieve that objective. RDC was one of the few
local firms that did not have any preference for the nationality of the partner. The director
of RDC reported that it was the Japanese firms who made the first approach to form a JV
with them. RDC who was mainly a materials supplier till that time, was also very eager
to get involved in construction projects through joint ventures with Japanese firms.
Japanese were very methodical in their approach to selecting their partners. Their years
of experience in JV formation and operation with fellow Japanese partners made them to
go mainly for similar partnerships with fellow Japanese for the MRT project. Once they
had no choice but to choose a local partner they established clear criteria for selection.
Williams and Lilly (1993) identified that companies who choose partners based on
strategic compatibility, complementary skills and resources, relative company size,
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financial capability, compatible operating policies and management teams and mutual
dependency were likely to perform well. The above discussions indicate that Japanese
had taken these factors into consideration in choosing their local partners.
JOINT VENTURE NEGOTIATION AND FORMATION
The partner selection and negotiation process for most of the Japanese-Local joint
ventures on an average took six to nine months. This is shorter than the 12-18 months
period experienced by Beamish (1984) in his case studies on manufacturing JVs. When
the researcher pointed out this to one of the Japanese directors, he remarked that the time
available for construction firms to select a partner was mainly dictated by the potential
client's tendering dates.
A review of the JV agreements revealed that the JV agreements were not as detailed as
that of the European-Singapore JV agreements on commercial and legal issues. Some of
the agreements were only 5 pages long compared to an average length of at least 20 pages
in the case of European-Singapore JV agreements. This is not surprising since the
Standard Form of Agreement for Government Building and Civil Engineering Projects
consists of only one page. (Levy, 1993). Review of the agreements showed very little use
of restrictive clauses. This showed that the JV partners placed more emphasis on mutual
trust than on written clauses in the agreement. Almost all the local partners interviewed
indicated that they relied heavily on their Japanese counterparts' expertise to guide them
through the JV formation and implementation process. The Japanese were equally
committed to meeting their client's and partners' expectations without worrying too much
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about the contractual obligations spelt out in the written documents. This implicit trust and
commitment helped the partners to perform as a unified team.
The Japanese contractors like Nishimatsu and Aoki who found their partners compatible
decided to form a separate JV company and registered their new companies with the
Registrar of Companies in Singapore. This is not a common practice in the construction
industry. Perhaps this strategy was in line with Nishimatsu and Aoki's objectives to
establish a long-term presence in Singapore with a distinctive local identity. Obhyashi,
Kajima, Sato-Kogyo and Okumura preferred to have joint venture agreements with their
partners for a specific project only.
The Japanese Government classified the joint ventures into two types: a consolidated type
and an unconsolidated type. The consolidated type (kyod o kigyotai) which is very similar
to integrated JV all partners contribute capital, personnel,materials, ecuipment and work
together in an undivided way and all profits and losses shared. Japanese contractors
preferred to use this style only with fellow Japanese contractors. Instead they preferred
to use the unconsolidated type (Otsu-gata Kyod o kigyotai) which is similar to non-
integrated JV in which the whole contract is divided into two or more parts and each
partner undertakes to complete his portion of the work at his own responsibility and costs
(Matsushita, 1993). In either case, the JV is ultimately managed by a management board.
The Japanese contractors were of the opinion that the unconsolidated type would be more
suitable when they worked with partners from a different nationality. Such arrangements,
they felt, would minimise operational conflicts between the partners. Aoki and Nishimatsu
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used the unconsolidated version for their initial contract with MRT. They later used a
modified version of the unconsolidated type of JY in their subsequent projects. In this
version, they employed directly their partners' personnel in middle management and
supervisory levels. This was done at the specific request of their partners to provide them
with on-the-job training. These local employees later returned to their parent companies
to assume senior management positions.
CONTROL, CO-OPERATION AND TRUST
Ownership Control
The distribution of the equity ownership in the Japanese-Local joint ventures is presented
in Table 6.5
Table 6.5
Distribution of equity ownership
Name of joint venture	 Equity contribution
_____________________ Foreign 	 Local
Kajima-Keppel	 50	 50
Nishimatsu-Lum	 50	 50
Chang JV
Okumura-Oh Teck	 60	 40
Aoki-LKN JV	 50	 50
Obhayashi-RDC JV	 51	 49
Sato-Kogyo-RDC iv	 51	 49
JDC-Jurong Eng. JV
	 50	 50
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The Japanese contractors were happy to share equal equity with partners with whom they
had previous association or with partners with whom they intended to have a long term
association. This is apparent in the case of Nishimatsu, Kajima, JDC and Aoki. They
insisted on having a majority ownership only with partners with whom they did not have
any previous association. This pattern can be seen in the Sato-Kogyo and Obhayashi's
association with RDC. The Japanese directors interviewed did not feel the need to have
a majority ownership as the joint ventures mostly operated on a non-integrated basis and
each partner was responsible for his own efforts and subsequent results.
Management Control
The Japanese contractors were more concerned with having control over the overall
management and operation of the JV than with equity control. The Japanese contractors
were very keen to maintain their reputation as contractors who could be trusted to deliver
a quality product on time and within the budget to their clients. They recognised that this
could be done only by controlling critical elements of the JV. Like the European
contractors, the Japanese also exercised control over the joint ventures in three areas. They
were: strategic control through the joint venture board, operational control through
appointment of key managerial and technical personnel and resource control through
supply and purchase of plant and equipment and materials.
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Strategic Control
In the cases studied in this group, the joint venture board had total control over all the
decisions made by the venture. Its board members were appointed on the basis of the
equity contribution by each partner. Most of the cases observed in this group of joint
ventures had four members appointed to the board with the Japanese member acting as
the chairman and the local partner's member acting as vice-chairman. The Japanese
nominees were the resident representative of the local branch office and the Project
Manager of the Project. The Directors of the local firms represented the local firms'
interests in the JV Board.
The joint venture boards normally met once a month and reviewed the progress of the
project. The main thrust of the review was on the physical progress achieved by each
partner on their respective scope of works. The Japanese were very concerned whenever
their local partners had difficulties in keeping to their schedule. In such situations, they
seconded their own experts to advise the local partner on ways to overcome the problems.
The local partners interviewed could not recall any serious differences with their Japanese
partners on strategic issues. Some local directors were initially irritated with the slow
response they had from their Japanese counterparts on any joint decisions. They noticed
that the local representatives of the Japanese firms had to refer all issues to their head
offices for clearance and approval. The local directors complained about this to the top
management at the respective head quarters (HQ) of the Japanese firms. The Japanese
firms overcame this problem by asking the local representatives to discuss potentially
contentious issues simultaneously with their local partners and the HQ, well before the
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formal meetings so that consensus could be achieved at the formal meetings. Many of the
local directors felt this process very cumbersome and time consuming but decided to go
along with their Japanese partners' wishes.
Operational Control
Table 6.6 shows the average contribution of key resources by each partner to the JV.
Table 6.6
Mutual contribution of resources
	
Description of Resource 	 Foreign	 Local
Project Manager	 100	 0
	
Key Project personnel	 70	 30
Field Staff	 25	 75
Administration & Personnel 	 20	 80
Plant & Equipment	 70	 30
Materials	 65	 35
Financing	 90	 10
As the table indicates, the Japanese partners contributed most of the key personnel
required for the operation of the JV. Since the JVs operated as non-integrated JVs, the
local partners had to provide for their own plant and equipment and materials. The high
value of yen prevented Japanese contractors from bringing administrative and personnel
staff from Japan. They depended on their local partners to provide these resources. This
section discusses the impact of each resource on the performance of the JVs.
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Project Manager
All the seven JVs studied in this group had Japanese Project Managers appointed by the
respective Japanese partners. The Project Managers on an average had at least fifteen
years working experience and some of them had spent more than ten years working
overseas. They were all fiercely loyal to their parent companies and highly skilled in
group management and human relations, steadfastly pursuing their companies' goals and
objectives. They were assisted by deputy project managers who were seconded to the JV
by the local partners. Many of them were young Singaporeans with three to five years
experience after their graduation. The Japanese Project Manager had the overall
responsibility for the project and was the sole point of contact with the client. The local
Deputy Project Manager was an understudy under the Project Manager and was
responsible for completing the work allotted to his firm under the terms of the joint
venture agreement. A typical Japanese Project Manager worked twelve hours a day and
at times seven days a week and also spent quite a fair share of the day at the job site.
Sometimes their project progress meetings extended late in the evening. Many of the local
Deputy Project Managers found this style of working very taxing and stressful. This at
times resulted in resignations and staff changes in the middle of the project. To some
extent this also affected the progress of work of the local partners. In order to mitigate
this, even though they were directly not responsible for their partners' work, the Japanese
Project Managers took active interest in their partners' work and monitored their progress
very closely. This unselfish attitude earned the respect, admiration and trust of their local
partners.
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Key Personnel
The key technical positions in the JVs were filled by Japanese expatriates. Most of the
Japanese project engineers were well versed in design and build projects and were very
familiar with checking designs for buildability. The Japanese-Local JVs that were included
in this study, were responsible only for the construction. Despite this, the Japanese
engineers reviewed all the drawings and in some cases questioned the conservative nature
of some of the consultants' designs. For this reason their organisation structure remained
top heavy with expatriates in the early stages of the project. Even though these positions
were shown to be filled by local engineers during the latter half of the project, the
Japanese contractors were reluctant to replace them with the local personnel due to the
high turnover of local staff. Since the JVs worked on a non-integrated basis, the local
partners were not really concerned about this issue. Tatsuo Kimbara (1991) in his study
on "Localisation and Performance of Japanese Operations in Malaysia and Singapore"
noted that the degree of localisation in terms of positions transferred was relatively low
in Japanese operations in Singapore than in Malaysia and Thailand. This he attributed to
the free market policies of Singapore which gave a high degree of freedom to the foreign
firms in managing their internal operations.
In some of the Hong Kong railway contracts in which the Japanese acted as contractors,
they had great difficulty in preparing and submitting formal claims and lost a good deal
of money. In order to overcome their weakness in this area, some Japanese contractors
appointed British nationals as contracts managers.
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Procurement of Other Resources
The JV Board was responsible for approving only those plant and equipment, materials
and sub-contractors which were jointly used by both the partners. However they were
constantly worried about the quality of materials and sub-contractors used on the project.
They offered to the local partners the services of their procurement network in Japan to
procure materials for their portion of the work. But they never forced their local partners
to use only their recommended sources. Similarly they advised the local partners to use
the sub-contractors whom they have cultivated over a long period. These group of sub-
contractors were well trained by the Japanese contractors on their previous projects to
meet their time and quality control requirements. To retain their loyalty, the Japanese
contractors paid them very promptly and at times helped them with advance payment
when ever they ran into financial difficulties. They rarely went for competitive bids for
the appointment of sub-contractors. Many of the local contractors initially went for their
own sub-contractors. Soon they realised that the sub-contractors were unable to meet the
strict quality standards set by the Japanese and decided to accept the recommendations of
their partners.
CONFLICTS IN JAPANESE-LOCAL JOINT VENTURES
Japanese contractors meticulously planned to avoid conflict with their partners by taking
the following measures. They mainly chose as partners only those firms with whom they
had prior associations. They also chose specifically the non-integrated form of P/ so that
the contacts with the partners during the operational period of the P1 were kept to a
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minimum, which in turn, would reduce potential for conflict.
The local partners also reported that they did not experience any major disagreements with
their Japanese partners. This is reflected in their answers to the questionnaire on a list
of possible issues over which they could have had disagreements with their partners
during the formation and operation of the JVs. They were asked to identify in a scale of
1 to 7, the level of their conflicts over these issues. A score of one indicated total
agreement and a score of 7 indicated total disagreement between the partners. The list
presented in Table 6.7 represents possible areas in which the partners had disagreements
and their intensity over the life of the joint venture (An average score of 4.0 or more
represents serious conflicts and a score of 3.5 or less represents minor disagreements.)
Table 6.7
Conflicts among Partners
No	 Description	 Average
Score
Strategic and Operational issues
1. Technology Transfer	 3.0
2. Interpretation of JV agreement 	 2.0
3. Organisation structure	 2.0
4. Selection of Subcontractors 	 2.0
5. Procurement of Materials,
Plant & Equipment	 2.2
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Cultural Issues
1. Sensitivity to Partner's Needs	 2.5
2. Interaction among partners	 2.6
3. Interaction with the Client 	 2.3
4. Behaviour of Expatriate
Managers	 2.7
5. Language Barriers	 3.0
Strategic and Operational Issues
The Japanese partners tried very hard to avoid conflicts but their efforts to do so did not
always succeed. For example, the choice of using the non-integrated style of JV
management which was supposed to minimise conflict, proved to be a source of conflict
between the partners on the issue of technology transfer. The local partners who ranked
technology transfer as their number one objective found that the non-integrated
arrangement was not conducive to technology transfer process. This arrangement in which
the two partners managed their own portions of the project, provided no opportunities for
the employees of the local partner to work directly under the Japanese experts and learn
from them the appropriate project management tools. Both Lum Chang and LKN
recognised this problem during the very early stages of the JV formation and discussed
various ways of overcoming this difficulty with their respective Japanese partners.
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The Japanese always believed that on-the-job training was the best method of technology
transfer( Yamashita, 1991). The Japanese agreed to the secondment of their partners'
engineers as their under studies for a limited period of time and train them on various
aspects of construction and site management through job rotation. Some senior engineers
who had been with the local firms for a few years were also sent to Japan for further
specialised training. This arrangement suited the two local partners and they expressed full
satisfaction with the process of technology transfer. The Manager of Technology Transfer
also was of the opinion that reasonable technology transfer did take place in these two
JVs. He also noted that the transfer process did not stop at the completion of the first
contract with MRT. He noted that the Japanese continued to train newly recruited local
engineers of their partners in their subsequent contracts with MRTC. He also observed
that since the contracts awarded to Japanese-Local JVs were mainly elevated structures
designed by MRTC appointed design consultants, there was not a great deal of technology
to be transferred from the Japanese to local contractors except in the area of site
management, project financing and safety. The managing director of LKN shared the
MTT's observations. He noted that their company learnt a lot from the Japanese in these
areas. His firm adopted the Japanese formal site management system whereby checks and
problem solving meetings were conducted on a regular thrice weekly basis imposing
greater work discipline, in all their work. The local contractors, who had no exposure to
sourcing funds for large projects, learnt about financing packages coupled with deferred
payment arrangements (The Contractor, 1987).
The local contractors were initially amused by the Japanese obsession for project safety.
Later this turned into admiration as the Japanese contractors started bagging safety awards
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awarded by the client every three months. The first safety award was given to Kajima-
Keppel for their emphasis on the safety of workers, a good accident-free record of zero
lost time on the job-site during the first sixteen months of the project and a clean
site.(Straits Times, 1 March,1985). Keppel attributed the key factor for their success to
the support given by the top management of the JV to their safety officer Mr. Soh in fully
implementing his educational training programmes. The next three awards also went to
Japanese contractors. Local contractors, like LKN and Lum Chang learnt from the
Japanese good site safety habits and later implemented them in their own portions of the
JV contract.
The MTF felt that companies like Keppel did not appear to be exerting themselves and
the Japanese partners were having full control of the JV operations. He regretted that
Government linked companies such as Keppel and RDC failed to attract and keep
qualified staff and thereby missed a great opportunity to learn from their Japanese
partners. For example, Keppel who agreed to appoint a suitable deputy Project Manager
did not find any one suitable and surrendered the position to Kajima after six months.
Similarly RDC declared that they never intended to participate in the actual construction
but remain as the concrete and materials supplier for the entire contract. Any judgement
about Oh Teck Tye could not be formed since they left the project after only nine months
into the project due to bankruptcy.
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Cultural Issues
Hofstede's extensive study endeavours to describe differences among cultures using four
dimensions (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and individualism).
Hofstede's dimensions of culture are particularly relevant in explaining conflicts that result
due to cultural differences.
Looking at Hofstede's (1983) comparison of some Asian cultures, Japan is characterised
as being in the middle of the range of the individual and collective dimensions and power
distance, but high in uncertainty avoidance. It is the most "masculine" of all Asian
cultures. Singapore has been characterised as a nation that is low in individualism, has a
large power distance, is more tolerant of uncertainty and is highly achievement oriented
(masculine).
Even though Hofstede's cultural dimensions indicated possible conflicts between the two
cultures, the Japanese managed to avoid serious conificts through their "win-win" style
of conflict management. This is perhaps due to a special characteristics of Asian cultures
identified by Hofstede as Confucian dynamism (Hofstede, 1988). The Confucian
dynamism emphasises the importance of persistence, thrift, ordering relationship on the
basis of status and a sense of shame. Another reason for low cultural conflicts could also
be the concept of "face"(self image and social image) which is very important in the
Asian cultures. Face is a measure of social value without which a person cannot function
in society. Loss of face happens when an individual, either through personal action or the
action of people close to him, fails to meet the essential requirements of the social
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position he occupies (Steers et. all, 1989). Because of the need to maintain a positive-face,
Japanese and Singapore contractors valued interdependence and reciprocal obligations. The
Japanese's traditional values such as a strong respect for hierarchy, homogenous values
rooted in collective accomplishments, pride in their work and a strong commitment to the
JV helped them to establish very good rapport with their local partners.
The Japanese, however experienced minor cultural shocks during the execution of the
MRT projects. They found that strict application of Japanese style management such as
life time employment and seniority wage system were not practical in the Singaporean
context. In the early eighties, even the Singapore Government seriously considered the
possibility of introducing Japanese style managerial system to Singapore and launched
a comprehensive feasibility study. It gave up the idea after recognising the serious
differences between Singaporean and Japanese cultures (Yamashita, 1991). Some of the
reasons cited by Yamashita are:
First: Singapore is a society strongly influenced by Western culture. Job-hopping for better
renumeration and career advancement are very common. Hence a life-time employment
system is therefore impractical.
Second: Singapore is a heterogeneous society, with a population of 76 percent Chinese,
15 percent Malay and 7 percent Indians and 2 percent others. Japan, on the other hand,
is a homogeneous society where culture systems such as life time employment and
seniority wage system are easily accepted.
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Third: there are a very large number of multinationals who are very eager to attract
Japanese trained employees with better pay and working conditions.
Some of the Japanese managers were appalled at the lack of loyalty shown by the local
employees to their employers. This encouraged them to bring more Japanese staff to fill
the key positions. Studies by MRT showed that the Japanese had the highest number of
expatriates among all the foreign-local JVs.
The local partners had also a few minor complaints against the Japanese. They observed
that the Japanese engineers rarely mixed with the local staff socially. One reason could
be their lack of command of English language. Many of the local directors were annoyed
by the fact that their counterparts from Japan who exhibited very good knowledge of the
English language in social gatherings used interpreters to communicate with them in
official meetings. When asked about this, one Japanese Project Manager explained that
he mainly used this technique to buy more time to formulate an appropriate response to
his partners' queries. He also argued that the usage of the interpreter as "go between",
enabled them to mitigate the effects of any highly charged arguments between the partners
thereby reducing the chances of direct confrontation.
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PERFORMANCE OF JAPANESE-LOCAL JOINT VENTURES
Subjective Assessment of JV Performance by Local Partners
The local partners were presented a list of objectives they set for themselves when they
formed the JV and were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the extent to which they
attained their targets at the completion of the projects. A score of 1 indicated low level
of attainment and score of 7 indicated very high level of attaining their objectives. An
average of 3.5 is considered satisfactory. The average score for each objective is presented
in Table 6.8.
Table 6.8
Assessment of Achievement of Key Project Objectives
No	 Key Objectives	 Avg. Score
1	 Acquisition of New Technology	 3.5
2	 Improved ProjectlSite Management	 4.5
Skills
3	 Effective Utilisation of Resources 	 4.8
4	 Enhanced local image	 4.8
5	 Return on Investment	 2.5
The results suggest that the local partners were reasonably satisfied in achieving their
original objectives. Lum Chang and LKN have established long term joint ventures with
their partners. Many of them agreed that their association with the Japanese improved
their site and project management skills and enhanced their local image significantly.
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MRTC Project Manager's Assessment of JV Performance
MRTC's Project Manager for Civil & Structures gave a general assessment of the
performance of the Japanese-Local JVs. Following are his assessments:
1. The quality of work performed by the Japanese-Local JVs were quite satisfactory
and superior to that of contractors from other nationalities. He observed that the
construction sites of most of the Japanese contractors were organised in a standard manner
and tended to use similar styles of construction management. He noted that the Japanese
insistence on delivering a good quality product had a positive influence on the local
partners.
2. Their sub-contractor management was quite efficient and he rarely received
complaints from the sub-contractors.
3. Both the Japanese and their local partners preferred to settle their claims through
negotiations. Most of the contract claims were settled through commercial settlements. By
this process he observed that the Japanese-Local JVs realised a greater percentage of their
claims than others involved in the MRT project.
4. He was satisfied that the Japanese contractors made genuine attempts to help their
partners to improve their managerial and technical skills and a few local partners such as
LKN and Lum Chang greatly benefited from their association with their respective
Japanese partners.
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He agreed with the overall assessment of the local contractors on the performance of
Japanese-Local JVs.
CONCLUSIONS
The performance of Japanese-Local joint ventures offers some valuable lessons. The
Japanese contractors exhibited considerable skills in the selection of local partners. They
first identified what types of local partners they were looking for and spent up to six
months in negotiating the agreements with their preferred partners. They placed significant
emphasis on developing personal relationship with their potential partners before sitting
down for final negotiations. They also exhibited considerable diplomatic skills in avoiding
conflicts and acted very quickly to resolve any contentious issues. Their choice of non-
integrated style of JV operation was also responsible in minimising potential areas for
conflict. Despite choosing this style they kept a very close watch on their partners'
progress and helped them along whenever they were in trouble. Their ability to be flexible
and adapt to the local conditions were mainly responsible for the achievement of their
long-term objective of establishing a significant presence in the Singapore construction
industry.
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CURRENT STATUS OF JAPANESE-LOCAL JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS
Nishimatsu-Lum Chang and Aoki-LKN joint ventures have continued their association
after the completion of the MRT projects. Nishimatsu-Lum Chang JV has jointly won six
contracts in the last four years worth nearly S$ 2 billion. Some of the contracts they won
include, UOB Plaza, the tallest structure in Singapore, the piling and foundation works for
Suntec City, the largest Exhibition and Convention Centre to be built in Asia. They have
established their name as one of the dynamic and reliable contractors in the Singapore
market. Aoki and LKN have continued to bid as partners without much of a success. The
directors of the joint venture are optimistic about the chances of getting future MRT
projects.
JDC and Sato-Kogyo have continued to win new public works contracts with other local
partners. JDC joined with a local firm, Ever Great Construction, to build a 400 bed
hospital. Sato-Kogyo joined with Sembawang Construction to construct the Singapore
Aerospace Centre building. The directors of these Japanese firms informed the researcher
that the high value of yen had forced them to seek reputable local firms as partners to win
local projects. For the same reason, companies such as Kajima and JDC have diversified
into developing and marketing residential properties in Singapore and Malaysia.
Okumura was the only Japanese company that left Singapore after the completion of the
MRT project. Their local partner Oh Teck Thye unfortunately declared bankruptcy in Dec
1986 (Straits Times, 12 Feb 1987) leaving Okumura to carry the entire workload.
Okumura incurred heavy losses in the project. This unfortunate experience convinced them
to return to Japan.
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Keppel Shipyard which made an half-hearted attempt at diversifying into construction
business decided to branch out into banking, insurance and stock broking. RDC has been
bought out by Sembawang Construction, another government linked company. Jurong
Engineering decided to concentrate on Electrical and Mechanical works instead of civil
engineering works. They are currently the largest E & M contractors in Singapore.
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CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDIES OF NIC-SINGAPOREAN JOINT VENTURES
171
INTRODUCTION
This chapter reports on the interaction between Singaporean contractors and contractors
from the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) who formed JVs to build some sections
of the Singapore MRT system between 1985 and 1990. The analysis is presented in the
form of a case study in order to identify and fully understand the dynamic process of joint
venture (JV) formation and operation and the specific factors that influence their
performance. The information is presented in the same format as the previous two
chapters in order to maintain uniformity and consistency.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
MRTC awarded a total of thirty eight major civil contracts for the construction of the 67
kilometre route. Out of these, 4 civil contracts were awarded to Singapore-NIC joint
ventures. The list of contractors and their awarded value is presented in Table 7.1.
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TABLE 7.1
LIST OF AWARDS TO SINGAPORE-NIC JOINT VENTURES
No Name of Joint Venture No. of	 Life of Value of
contracts JVs	 Contract
awarded _________ ($ Million)
1 Wah Chang-Hyundai 	 1	 Jan 86-	 69.0
Joint Venture	 Oct 89
2 Antarah Koh -	 1	 Dec 86-
Gammon (HK) Joint	 Oct 89	 96.3
Venture
3 Hock Lian Seng - 	 Jan 86 -
RSEA International 	 2	 Jun 90	 133.8
Joint Venture
4	 299.1
Total
Profile of NIC Contractors
Hyundai Construction is part of Hyundai Group, an industrial conglomerate, based in
South Korea, with interests in construction/engineering, general trading, ship building &
plants, vehicles & rolling stock, machinery & electrical equipment, steel & metal products,
construction materials & furniture, shipping & services, an engineering college, and
financing. (Chang, 1987). Hyundai was a major contractor in Saudi Arabia where it
successfully built the US $ 1 billion Jubail Industrial Harbour in July 1980. The recession
in the Middle-East in early 80's forced Hyundai to look for construction markets closer
to home. It opened its representative office in Singapore in 1981 and immediately won
a major reclamation project for the Port of Singapore Authority worth $ 222 million. It
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was followed by another major award to build the Marina Square Super structure contract
worth $ 538 million. By the time the MRT projects came up for tendering, Hyundai was
well established in Singapore. It was rated as the fourth largest contractor in the world,
based on its on annual turnover of US$ 2.5 billion in 1984, by the Engineering News
Record Magazine. It had extensive railway construction experience on the Seoul sub-way
system.
It initially pre-qualified for tendering for the MRT projects on its own. After a few failed
attempts to win any awards during the first phase of MRT construction, Hyundai withdrew
from any further bidding. In early 1985 Hyundai again got interested in MRT construction
work as it was running low on construction works in Singapore. It teamed up with Wah-
Chang Construction (Pvt) Ltd. to bid for Phase II MRT contracts.
Gammon (HK) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Gammon (SEA), based in Hong Kong.
It opened its office in Singapore in 1980 and by 1983 became a well established building
works contractor in Singapore. It won a $50 million contract to build a high-rise
condominium in 1982 (Straits Times, 28 March 1984). It was also involved in geo-
technical, piling and earthworks. Gammon (HK) won the track-works contract in Hong
Kong in association with Henry Boot and also won successfully with them, the MRT
track-works contract for the entire project (This was reported in Chapter 4).
They also won a few sub-contracts works on the MRT project. They were the sub-
contractors to Nishimatsu-Lum Chang JV to carry out the excavation works for the City
Hall underground station.
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RSEA International is the subsidiary of Retired Services Engineering Agency (RSEA), a
Taiwanese government owned construction contractor. It was established in Taiwan in
1956 and was the largest civil engineering contractor in Taiwan. It established its presence
in Singapore in 1966 and was involved in the construction of several public sector
construction projects (Business Times, March 16th, 1987). It won several roadwork
projects including the construction of flyovers and sections of Expressways. It had no
prior experience in railway construction.
Profile of the Singaporean Contractors.
Wah Chang International is a diversified family owned private company established in the
early 70s. It had traditionally been involved in offshore fabrication work, refineries and
power stations(Strait times, Jan 6th 1986). It was interested in diversifying into building
and civil engineering work and the MRT contract No. 305 was its first railway related
work.
Antarah Koh Pte. Ltd. was established in 1970 by two professional engineers as a
partnership. The company originally concentrated on marine piling and land piling works
and worked as a specialist sub-contractor in these two areas. It built a dock mooring
facility and a jetty for Caltex Petroleum in 1982. It was classified as a medium sized
contractor by the Construction Industry Development Board (CJDB). It had no prior
experience in railway work.
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Hock Lian Seng Engineering Pvt. Ltd. was formed in 1969 with an authorise capitol of
$10 million. It was authorised by CIDB to undertake public works contracts above $10
million but less than $30 million. It had mainly undertaken public road works contracts
such as building a portion of the Central Expressway including flyovers and interchanges.
It had no prior railway construction experience.
MOTIVATIONS FOR FORMING A JOINT VENTURE
Many researchers have observed that joint ventures that have performed satisfactorily,
usually have partners with compatible objectives. In order to determine the compatibility
of their mutual objectives, the two groups were asked to assess on a scale of 1 to 7, the
importance of each objective from a pre-prepared list. If the objective received a score
of 1, it was considered least important. If it received a score of 7 it was considered as
most important. The average score received by each objective was then calculated on the
basis of the responses received from the respective firm. These average scores were then
used to rank the objectives. These results are presented in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 respectively.
Objectives of NIC Firms
The important objectives as identified by the MC firms are presented below in Table 7.2.
These are listed in the order of importance to these firms.
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Table 7.2
Key Motives of NIC Firms
Rank	 Key motives for forming JV
	
Average
Score
1	 Government Incentives 	 5.7
2	 Match Competition 	 5.4
3	 Protect International market share	 5.2
4	 Spread Commercial Risk 	 4.7
5	 Local Image	 4.6
6	 Avail of partner's local knowledge	 4.3
7	 Enter New Market	 4.1
The three NIC contractors were well established in Singapore before the announcement
of the construction of the MRT project. Initially none of them wanted to combine with
local firms and tried to win the contracts on their own or in collaboration with other
foreign firms. They soon recognised that this strategy did not work at all as they were
losing out by narrow margins despite very low bids.
The need for forming joint ventures with local partners became very apparent since JVs
with local partners would qualify them for the preferential margin scheme. All the three
firms identified the government incentive through the PMS as the primary motive for
forming the JV with local partners. This was also matching the competitors' strategies.
Hyundai was seriously concerned about its drop in construction orders from its Middle
East market and wanted to maintain its international market share by winning new
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contracts in Singapore. Both Gammon and RSEA considered the advantage of forming a
JV as a vehicle for sharing commercial risks as very important.
RSEA wanted desperately to get the experience of working on the MRT project in order
to improve its chances of winning the major share of the construction contracts on the
Taipei Rapid Transit Project to be built in the late eighties. Since it tried four times
unsuccessfully to win a MRT contract on its own, RSEA felt that a JV with a local
partner might be the only way to improve its chances of winning a MRT construction
contract. All the three firms also wanted to enhance their local image.
Local Contractors' Motives for Forming a Joint Venture
The motives of the local firms in forming a JV are presented below in Table 7.3 in the
order of their importance to the local firms.
Table 7.3
Key Motives of Singaporean Firms
Rank	 Key motives for forming 	 JV	 Average
Score
1	 Technology Transfer	 6.0
2	 Government Incentives 	 5.7
3	 Share Commercial risk	 5.5
4	 Enter new market	 5.1
5	 Enhance local image	 4.7
6	 Access to new financial resources	 4.4
7	 Match competition	 4.3
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The three Singaporean contractors rated technology transfer as the primary motive for
forming the joint venture. Their expectations of technology to be transferred were similar
to that of other local contractors. They expected the foreign partner to train them in areas
of project planning, cost control, contract administration, site management and
construction techniques.
Sharing commercial risks was also a very important consideration for all the three local
firms. The joint venture also provided them with an opportunity to enhance their local
image and elevate their status in the local construction industry. All the three contractors
in this group had no prior experience in working on a railway project. Participation in the
MRT construction, these firms hoped, would enable them to diversify into new areas of
business. But without forming a JV with reputable firms,they knew they did not have a
chance to achieve this objective.
The two partners had different motives for forming the JV. The local contractors were
intent on using the JV to upgrade their skills. The foreign partners were mainly interested
in using the JV as a vehicle to maintain or increase their respective firms' work load.
PARTNER SELECTION PROCESS
The two groups of partners were asked to rank the importance of various factors that
made them choose a particular partner. The results are presented in Table 7.4
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Table 7.4
Reasons for selecting a particular partner
Description	 NIC	 Local
Rank	 Rank
Government Link	 1	 N.A.
Local Knowledge	 2	 N.A.
Size/Reputation	 3	 5
Construction resources
	
4	 4
Plant and Equipment 	 5	 3
Technology	 6	 1
Management Skills	 7	 2
All the three foreign firms had different sets of reasons for choosing a particular local
partner. Hyundai was not at all interested in forming a joint venture with local companies.
Once they came to the conclusion that JV with a local partner was the only alternative
available to improve their chances of success in winning a MRT construction contract,
they decided to look for a local partner who had diversified business interest like
themselves. Wah Chang International was one of the very few local firms that met this
criteron. They expected very little from the local partner in terms of resources
contribution. They were mainly looking for the local partner to provide a local identity.
Gammon (HK) tried initially to secure MRT projects through JV with European partners.
They formed a JV with Hocktief of Germany and Skanska of Sweden and bid for quite
a few first phase contracts without success. Hocktief and Skanska withdrew from the JV
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in early 1984 leaving Gammon (HK) to look for new partners. Gammon then tried its luck
with Reliance Contractors(A Singaporean building contractor) as their JV partner again
with no success. They ultimately chose Antarah Koh as their partner to bid for MRT
contract no. 310 which called for building a tunnel across the Telok Ayer Basin involving
specialised marine work. Antarah Koh has had extensive experience in off-shore structures
and sheet piling. They were keen to use Antarah Koh's specialised plant and equipment.
Gammon was also attracted by the fact that Mr. Jimmy Koh, Managing Director of
Antarah Koh was also the President of Singapore Contractors' Association.
RSEA also tried its luck on its own to win MRT contracts four times and failed. It finally
decided to form JV with a local firm and chose Hock Lian Seng as its JV partner. The
two had worked together on building some of the over-bridges for Public Works
Department. Like Hyundai, RSEA also did not expect any technical, financial or
managerial contributions from their local partner.
Both Wah Chang and Hock Lian Seng initially showed very little interest in working on
MRT projects. The executives of the two firms stated that their foreign partners were the
ones who initially approached them to form JVs and bid for the MRT contracts. On the
other hand, Antarah Koh was very keen to get the MRT experience from the very early
days of the project. They tried without success with several foreign partners. They initially
formed a JV with Fougerolle of France and then later with Lilley Construction and Kier
International. They then tried for the overhead section with Samwhan Corporation of
Korea . They finally found a winning combination with Gammon (HK) and won the bid
for MRT contract no. 310.
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The above discussions clearly show that both local and foreign partners did not employ
any systematic selection process in finding a compatible partner. Companies like Antarah
Koh and Gammon switched partners several times in order to somehow win a MRT
contract. Many researchers have pointed out that selecting a partner without evaluating the
mutual compatibilities can lead to conflicts during the operational stages of the JV. This
was true in the case of Antarah Koh - Gammon (HK) JV as explained in the later sections
of this Chapter.
JOINT VENTURE NEGOTIATION AND FORMATION
The partners in this group felt that they had very little time between choosing, negotiating
and signing a joint venture agreement. The negotiations were done at the directors' level
and the drafting of the agreements were done by the foreign partners' lawyers and vetted
by the local partners' lawyers. Considerable attention in the agreement were devoted to
commercial and legal issues. Management and organisational issues received very little
attention. Some of the problems experienced by the JVs in this group can be traced to the
apparent neglect of these crucial elements in N negotiations and subsequent agreements
(Andrews, 1984).
Apart from these critical issues, the partners also made very little efforts to verify whether
the their key objectives were included in the joint venture agreements. For example, the
joint venture agreements did not include some of the crucial objectives identified by the
local partners. None of the documents indicated how technology transfer was going to be
implemented. Since the foreign partners assumed the role of the sponsors for the JVs, the
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local partners left the preparation of the contractual details of the JV agreement to their
foreign partners.
Apart from the legal form of the joint venture, the partners had to consider the operational
arrangements. Gammon-Antarah Koh JV and RSEA-Hock Lian Seng JVs used integrated
style of JV arrangement while Hyundai-Wah Chang JV used the non-integrated style.
Gammon preferred the integrated style as it wanted total control on the operation of the
JV. RSEA preferred the integrated style for the same reason. More over, Hock Lian Seng
was a very small firm and did not want to run the risk of managing a portion of the
project independently. They preferred to work jointly and were more than happy to let
RSEA lead them. Antarah-Koh who have had very little experience working in a iv
environment, agreed to the integrated arrangement without fully understanding its
implications. Antarah-Koh was also keen on acquiring new managerial and technical skills
from its foreign partner and felt that the integrated style was better suited for this purpose.
The profit or loss under this style of arrangement was to be shared in accordance with the
equity contributions of the partners and this aspect of the integrated style resulted in
serious conflicts between the two partners.
Hyundai, like the Japanese contractors, wanted to avoid direct contact, and thereby,
conflicts with its local partner. They chose the non-integrated style and allocated specific
work to their local partner to manage. Under this arrangement, each partner was
responsible for his own portion of work and the profit or loss generated from their
respective work.
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CONTROL, CO-OPERATION AND TRUST
Ownership Control
The distribution of the equity ownership in the NIC-Local joint ventures is presented in
Table 7.5
Table 7.5
Distribution of equity ownership
Name of joint venture 	 Equity contribution
Foreign	 Local
Hyundai-Wah Chang JV	 73	 27
Gammon (HK)-Antarah Koh N
Initial	 50	 50
Final	 70	 30
RSEA-Hock Lian Seng JV	 50	 50
Hyundai was of the opinion that majority equity control was essential for the smooth
operation of the JV. Since their venture was formed on a non-integrated basis, the 27
percent equity share of Wah Chang also represented their portion of the work in the
project.
Gammon-Antarah Koh JV started off with equal contribution from both the partners with
Gammon as the sponsor for the iv. Mid way through the project, Antarah-Koh was
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frustrated with Gammon's style of management and proposed to sell part of its equity to
Gammon. Gammon accepted the offer and increased its stake to 70 percent.
RSEA-Hock Lian Seng contributed equally to the JV and agreed to manage the JV jointly.
Through a separate arrangement, RSEA guaranteed Hock Lian Seng from any losses. In
return, Hock Lian Seng agreed to hand over the overall management of the JV to RSEA.
The three NIC firms had different views about equity control and its influence over the
affairs of the JV. Hyundai equated majority equity stake with management control.
Gammon felt that it would control the JV through its contribution of key resources. RSEA
negotiated a separate agreement with its partner to get full control over the managing the
Jv.
Managerial Control
Strategic Control
In all the three cases studied in this group, the joint venture board had total control over
all the decisions made by the venture. Its board members were appointed on the basis of
the equity contribution by each partner. Most of the cases observed in this group of joint
ventures had four members appointed to the board with the member from the sponsoring
company acting as the chairman. The joint venture boards normally met once a month and
reviewed the progress of the project. In order to protect the interest of minority
shareholders the board's decisions, in principle, were expected to be unanimous.
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Hyundai-Wah Chang JV did not report any serious problems at the board level. Each
partner followed their own style of operation and reported their general progress at each
board meeting.
Gammon-Antarah Koh's board meetings initially started off very well. Soon after the
commencement of the project itself differences started emerging in staffing the key
positions. Antarah-Koh management felt that its senior staff were being ignored for key
positions in the JV. Mutual trust and co-operation, the two key elements necessary for the
smooth functioning of the JV board, were soon replaced by mis-trust and confrontation.
Differences in the selection process of sub-contractors, material procurement and
construction procedures started to emerge. One Antarah-Koh director described that the
relationship between the two partners became so acrimonious that the board meetings
became nothing but shouting matches. Ultimately the two partners sought MRT's help to
resolve their differences. Some of these problems can be attributed to the obsession the
Gammon's directors had in having total control over all aspects of the project. they failed
to differentiate between policy issues and operating issues and were involved in making
every decision on behalf of the JV. Some of the conflicts experienced by this JV is a
direct result of too much intervention by one partner into the affairs of the JV.
RSEA as the main sponsor of the JV controlled the functioning of the JV board by
appointing three directors to the board. Hock Lian Seng had one member appointed to the
board. The directors of Hock Lian Seng were not too much worried about the decisions
made by RSEA as they were protected against potential losses.
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Operational Control
Table 7.6 shows the average contribution of key resources by each partner to the JV in
terms of percentage.
Table 7.6
Mutual Contribution of Resources
Description of Resource	 Foreign	 Local
Project Manager 	 100	 0
Key Project personnel	 90	 10
Field Staff	 40	 60
Administration & Personnel	 35	 65
Plant & Equipment 	 75	 25
Materials	 75	 25
Financing	 90	 10
As the table indicates, the MC partners contributed most of the key resources required for
the operation of the JV. This section discusses the impact of each resource on the
performance of the JVs.
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Project Manager
All the three JVs employed expatriate project managers. Hyundai's project manager was
a Korean with more than fifteen years of experience on international projects. He was the
deputy project manager on the Marina Square project in Singapore from 1981. He knew
the Singapore construction industry practices very well. He however had very limited
authority. He had to continuously seek and get his head office's permission in Seoul
before implementing any of his decisions. Fortunately this time consuming approval cycle
did not directly affect the partner, since the JV was formed on a non-integrated basis.
Hyundai took the responsibility for building the viaduct structure in the contract and
allocated Wah-Chang the responsibility to construct the station. Under apparent directions
from his head-office, the project manager cared mostly about Hyundai's portion of work
and allowed the deputy project manager, who was an employee of Wah-Chang to
independently manage his portion of work. MRT had to remind Hyundai quite a few
times that they were jointly liable for any delays to the project caused by their partner's
actions. This was necessary to get Hyundai to help its partner in fulfilling his
commitments.
Gammon's senior management mainly consisted of British expatriates. The chairman and
the local director were British and the first project manager appointed on the project was
a Hong Kong national. He left the project three months after the award of the contract due
to serious differences with the JV board. He was replaced by a British national as the
project manager. He was in charge of the project for the rest of the duration of the
contract. He was technically well qualified and tried his best to smooth out any
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differences between the two partners without much success. The contract involved cut and
cover tunnelling for nearly 700 metres under the backwaters of the sea. The JV won the
contract under very severe competition and hence the profit margins were very low. The
project manager in order to control the cost wanted to establish a supervisory team
consisting of personnel from his own organisation and tended to reject nominees from the
local partner. This upset the local partner and contributed to mistrust and mis-
understanding.
RSEA-Hock Lian Seng JV's project manager was a Taiwanese national with many years
of management experience in Singapore on earlier RSEA projects. Since Hock Lian Seng
delegated all managerial responsibilities to RSEA his task was relatively easy. The deputy
project manager was a young engineer appointed by the local partner who did not have
much authority but was appointed mainly to gain experience as an understudy to the
project manager.
Key Personnel
The organisation charts for the all the JVs called for key functional management positions
to be initially filled by expatriate staff to be later replaced by local staff after they
received sufficient training. In case of Hyundai-Wah Chang JV, the key personnel were
appointed by the two partners to look after their respective portions of work. Gammon
mainly brought their own employees from Hong Kong to fill most of the technical
positions. They argued that due to the tight labour market in Singapore at that time they
could not recruit suitably qualified local personnel. On the other hand the local partner
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felt that Gammon purposely rejected his employees so that all key positions could be
filled by Gammon staff. In case of RSEA-Hock Lian Seng JV, the local partner
contributed very little resources to the project team.
Procurement of Other Resources
Hyundai brought its own plant and equipment from other projects in Singapore. Wah-
Chang did the same for its own portion of work. The two partners appointed their own
individual sub-contractors.
Gammon and Antarah Koh had very little difficulty in agreeing to the initial set of plants
and equipment to be contributed by each partner. Antarah Koh fabricated the sheet piles
and took the responsibility for driving them. However differences emerged in appointing
sub-contractors. Antarah Koh felt that Gammon would utilise its local knowledge about
sub-contractors and accept its recommendations. Even though Gammon patiently listened
to their partners' suggestions, they did not accept all the candidates recommended. In a
few cases, the performance of Gammon appointed sub-contractors did not perform well
leading to further deterioration of the relationship between the two partners. There were
also arguments over the procurement of materials. RSEA took the overall responsibility
for all procurement activities. But they showed their lack of experience in handling a $100
million dollar project. They continuously went for sub-contractors who bid the lowest
tender. This resulted in poor quality of workmanship and delays. For piling work alone,
they had sixteen contractors working on the project. At the time of award of contract
RSEA's Managing Director in a press release stated that they selected Hock Lian Seng
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as their local partner in order to gainfully utilise their local knowledge of sub-contractors,
local customs and regulations. Apparently this perceived local knowledge of the local
partner seems to have been hardly utilised.
CONFLICTS IN NIC-LOCAL JOINT VENTURES
The NIC-Local JVs were presented a list of possible issues over which they could have
disagreements with their partners during the formation and operation of the JYs. They
were asked to identify in a scale of 1 to 7, the evel of their conflicts over these issues.
A score of one indicated total agreement and a score of 7 indicated total disagreement.
The list presented in Table 7.7 represents areas in which the partners had clashed
frequently over the life of the joint venture (An average score of 3.5 or more).
Table 7.6
Conflicts among Partners
No	 Description	 Average
Score
Strategic and Operational Issues
1. Technology Transfer
	
4.5
2. Interpretation of JV agreement	 4.4
3. Organisation structure	 4.7
4. Selection of Subcontractors	 4.5
5. Procurement of Materials,
Plant & Equipment	 4.0
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Cultural Issues
1. Sensitivity to Partner's Needs 	 4.5
2. Interaction among partners 	 4.4
3. Interaction with the Client	 3.5
4. Behaviour of Expatriate
Managers	 4.0
5. Language Barriers	 2.5
Strategic and Operational Issues
All the three local finns declared technology transfer as one of the prime objectives for
forming the JVs. All three of them expressed disappointment that such transfer did not
take place. Wah-Chang and Hyundai did not share any of the work they performed and
as such did not have any opportunities for technology transfer to take place. The
relationship between Antarah-Koh and Gammon was never smooth. The personality
conflicts between Antarah-Koh's and Gammon's top management prevented the two
partners from drawing up any technology transfer programme. Hock Lian Seng hardly had
any of its professional staff employed by the JV. Furthermore, this JV heavily depended
on sub-contractors to complete the various work packages (Nearly 80 percent of the work
was awarded to sub-contractors).
As none of these contracts were awarded on a preferential margin basis, the Manager of
Technology Transfer(MT]T) was only able to monitor the technology transfer process in
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these contracts. The success or otherwise of any Technology Transfer Programme was
entirely dependent on the efforts of the two partners themselves. He noted in his reports
that all three JVs made vely little efforts to implement a formal technology transfer
programme. He also observed that among the three groups of JVs, the least amount of
technology transfer took place in joint ventures between local firms and NICs.
Antarah-Koh also experienced organisational conflicts with Gammon. For example,
Antarah-Koh was assigned the position of Assistant Project Manager. Antarah-Koh to their
shock found that the person whom they assigned to that position was actually designated
as Assistant to the Project Manager in the JV's organisation chart. This did not amuse the
directors of Antarah-Koh. The issue was finally resolved when Antarah-Koh's nominee
was redesignated as Production Manager. The whole process resulted in the loss of mutual
trust between the two partners. There was also no clear responsibilities and authorities
assigned to various positions in the organisation chart of the JV. The person who was
assigned the production management had four site agents reporting to him. The same chart
also indicated that the person who was assigned the production manager's role was also
functioning as a planning engineer. The planning engineer was shown in the chart
reporting to the site agents! This not only confused the partner, it also confused the client.
Antarah-Koh also complained that their partner did not select any of their recommended
sub-contractors for the project. During the JV negotiations, the two partners agreed to
delegate the authority of running the project to the Project Manager. This included
selection of sub-contractors. Since the Project Manager was from Gammon's organisation,
Antarah-Koh believed that he followed Gammon's instructions only. There were
193
significant delays in the early stages of the project. Antarah-Koh believed that these delays
were entirely due to mismanagement by Gammon's staff. As the JV was an integrated
arrangement, both partners were to share the profits or losses from the project. Antarah-
Koh was concerned that the losses could be beyond its financial capability and wanted to
reduce its exposure to losses by disposing of some of its equity. Gammon readily agreed
to buy the twenty percent equity that was offered for sale and raised its own equity share
to seventy percent.
The confrontation between the two partners was not over, even after the completion of the
project and termination of the JV. Gammon sued Antarah-Koh for not contributing its
share of the losses incurred in the project.
RSEA-Hock Lian Seng JV had very few major conflicts to report as most of the conflicts
were all minor. This was mainly due to RSEA taking full responsibility for the project as
well as protecting Hock Lian Seng against any potential losses from the project.
Cultural Issues
Song Young Hack (1990) who has extensively studied Korean culture has made the
following observations about their culture. The Korean world view and social relations
have been influenced by both the indigenous Shamaistic religion and the ancient religious
and philosophical traditions of China. Hence the Confucian philosophy and values had
influence over Korea's culture for centuries. They have therefore a lot in common with
other Asian Chinese cultures. They have a strong and homogenous cultural orientation
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which emphasises the collective or group over the individual and therefore the need for
the maintenance of harmony in social relations. Hence Koreans tend to solve problems or
the conflicts within themselves rather than by expressing their opinion openly. In a group-
oriented society the most desirable form of relationship between the individual and the
group is not for them to oppose each other but for the two to become one. This intricate
vertical relationship within the Korean organisation makes it difficult for them to admit
any one from outside their culture into their group. This explains why Hyundai was at
first reluctant to form a JV. When they were forced to form a JV in order to improve their
chances of winning a contract, they chose the non-integrated form of JV that so that
potential for conflict could be minimised. But it was not possible to find an explanation
for Hyundai's lack of concern for his partner from Song Young Hock's work. On the
contrary, Japanese contractors who also have a similar cultural background to that of the
Koreans made sure that the progress of their local partner was in line with the overall
program established for the contract. An answer to this behavioural pattern can be found
in Shuji Hayashi's work on "Culture and Management in Japan" (1988). He conducted a
survey among Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese companies to find out their attitude to rule
compliance. He found that only 7.4 percent of the Japanese favoured rule compliance
while 52.7 percent Koreans and 29.7 percent Taiwanese preferred adherence to written
agreements. In other words, Japanese management style emphasized completion of a task
and attainment of objectives over strict adherence to established rules. This apparent
preference to rule adherence by the Koreans might have resulted in their reluctance to get
involved in their partner's affairs.
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Even though Gammon was a Hong Kong based company its management team was totally
British and naturally had a British biased cultural attitude. According to Hofstede's model
of cultural dimensions, British are very high on individualism (a score of 89) while the
Singaporeans are very high on collectivism (a score of 20). British manifest a small
power distance(score of 35) while Singaporeans manifest a larger power distance(a score
of 74). These two characteristics in a project management context mean that British are
more inclined favour completion of a task(individualistic nature) ahead of building a
relationship while Singaporeans are more likely to favour building a working relationship
(collective) before worrying about the completion of the task. Antarah-Koh wanted to
work as equal partners with Gammon and adopt a collective approach to decision making.
They expected Gammon to consult them before making the major decisions such as the
appointment of key personnel, sub-contractors and choice of construction methods. In an
integrated JV such expectations were not uncommon. Unfortunately Gammon felt that
they had the capability to make the right decisions and hence politely ignored Antarah-
Koh's suggestions . Gammon, in their earlier JV with Singa Development on the track
works contract (Contract 110) had no difficulty at all in convincing Singa to accept all
their decisions. Perhaps Gammon expected the same response from Antarah-Koh. Antarah-
Koh's management considered Gammon's actions as blatant efforts on the part of
Gammon to make Antarah-Koh lose "face". In the Chinese system of values, a person
loses "face" when his/her set of claims is implicitly or explicitly questioned or denied.
Such a loss of "face" initially creates embarrassment and later anger in the person so
questioned because, with or without justification, it threatens to strip away the role he/she
has been taking with others. This conflict in values was mainly responsible for much of
the mistrust between the two partners.
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The cultural orientation of Taiwanese and Singaporeans are very similar. According to
Hofstede's cultural dimensions both prefer a collective approach to decision making and
manifest large power distance. Both are predominantly Chinese societies brought up in
Confucian philosophy. But the Taiwanese are very high on uncertainty avoidance (score
of 69) compared to Singaporeans who are low on uncertainty avoidance (score of 8). In
order to preserve the harmony and to minimise any uncertainty, RSEA convinced Hock
Lian Seng to hand over all decision making to them. They were able to achieve this
through patient negotiations. They also guaranteed Hock Lian Seng from any losses.
RSEA also appointed a project manager who was a Singaporean permanent resident.
These flexible approaches enabled RSEA to lead the JV very harmoniously. This JV is
a good example where similarity in culture between the partners enabled them to adjust
and play their respective roles for the benefit of the joint venture.
PERFORMANCE OF NIC-LOCAL JOINT VENTURES
Subjective assessment of JV performance by Local partners
The local partners were presented a list of objectives they set for themselves when they
formed the JV and were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the extent to which they
attained their targets at the completion of the projects. A score of 1 indicated low level
of attainment and score of 7 indicated very high level of attaining their objectives. The
average score for each objective is presented in Table 7.8. an average of 3.5 is considered
satisfactory.
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Table 7.8
Joint Venture Performance
No	 Key Objectives	 Avg. Score
1	 Acquisition of New Technology 	 3.0
2	 Improved ProjectlSite Management 	 3.1
Skills
3	 Effective Utilisation of Resources 	 3.0
4	 Enhanced local image	 4.1
5	 Return on Investment	 2.2
The three local contractors had divergent views about the performance of the JVs. Wah-
Chang was dissatisfied with the lack of co-operation and guidance from their senior
partner. They were also disappointed that Hyundai did not make any serious effort to
transfer any technology. While Wah-Chang was positive about the benefits of doing work
on a JV basis, they indicated that they would not form another JV with Hyundai.
Antarah-Koh who is still battling a legal case with Gammon on the issue of sharing the
losses, regretted the decision to get involved in a JV with an unknown partner. The
Managing-Director of Antarah-Koh was philosophical about their experience. He was still
in favour of forming JVs to perform construction related tasks and the lessons he and his
firm learnt from this experience would be of immense use in future JV negotiations.
Hock-Lian Seng-RSEA JV made significant losses on both the contracts. Several reasons
could be attributed for their losses. Some of them are a low tender price, lack of
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experience in planning and coordinating the works of several contractors and sub-
contractors within a very tight time frame and lack of leadership at the board level. RSEA
despite the losses was satisfied with the experience as their primary objective was to gain
exposure to railway construction. Hock Lian Seng was also satisfied with the experience
as it enhanced their local image
MRTC's Assessment of NIC-Local JV Performance
MRTC's Project Manager for Civil & Structures gave a general assessment of the
performance of the NIC-Local JVs. Following are his assessments:
1. The quality of work performed by Hyundai-Wah Chang JV and Gammon-Antarah-
Koh met the standards specified. However RSEA-Hock Lian Seng JV's work was
accepted with a long list of defective work to be rectified during the maintenance period.
He noted that there was very little involvement from Hock Lian Seng in the technical
supervision and management of works. He had similar observations about the involvement
of Antarah-Koh's staff in the co-ordination and management of their contracts.
2. He noted that sub-contractors' management was very unsatisfactory in all the JVs.
In the case of Gammon-Antarah Koh, the two partners sometimes ended up fighting
openly over the appointment.
3. He noted that Gammon was more claim oriented and contractual in his approach
than the other two overseas contractors. The other two JVs preferred informal meetings
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to resolve claims while Gammon preferred to follow the procedures laid out in the
contract. This difference could be due to the different cultural background of the firms.
4.	 He noted that none of the JVs made any serious efforts towards technology
transfer. Mere lip service was paid to technology transfer than any real transfer.
CONCLUSIONS
The three joint ventures studied under this group had a mixed bag of results. Hyundai and
Wah-Chang did very little work together on their contract and Wah-Chang in particular
lost out the opportunity to learn project management techniques from an internationally
reputed firm. Hyundai also treated the JV only as a commercial vehicle for maintaining
its international market share. Both Gammon and Antarah-Koh did not trust each other
and ended up quarrelling over every major issue. Financial losses further fuelled the
conflicts between the two. Their JV is a good example of a JV failing due to fighting
between partners over the control of the operation of the JY. The conflicts between
Antarah-Koh and Gammon confirmed the views expressed by Ascot (1994) in his article
in Business Asia. He observed that conflict between partners started as soon as the
management of the foreign partner began treating the JV as a fully owned subsidiary. The
RSEA-Hock Lian Seng can be considered as a success as both showed flexibility and
exhibited mutual trust. This JV is also a good example of a JV succeeding by delegating
control of the operation of the JV to one partner.
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CURRENT STATUS OF NIC-LOCAL JV PARTNERS
Hyundai Corporation continued its presence in Singapore by winning several large
contracts in association with different JV partners. It won the S$ 1 billion superstructure
construction of the Singapore Convention centre with Ssanyong Corporation a fellow
Korean contractor. Because of the size of the project, the client invited bids only from
JVs. Surprisingly this is the first time that these two firms have worked together. Hyundai
joined with Jurong engineering to build the Singapore Airport Second Terminal Building.
It again won one of the two civil contracts awarded to build the extension of the MRT
line to Woodlands in 1992 in association with a small local firm. In all these cases
Hyundai formed a joint venture on a non-integrated basis only. The General manager of
Hyundai during the interview with the researcher acknowledged that Hyundai's approach
to JV is mainly driven by commercial considerations.
Gammon has considerably reduced its commiitments in Singapore. It joined with Henry-
Boot again to win the track works contract for the MRT extension to Woodlands. Their
previous local partner Singa Development dropped out of the original JV.
RSEA returned to Taiwan to concentrate on the Taipei metro works. It continued to bid
for the Woodlands extension works with Hock Lian Seng without any success. RSEA-
Hock Lian Seng managed to get a major civil works contract on the Taipei Metro
Project.
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Wah-Chang and Antarah-Koh turned into very successful property developers. Wah-Chang
established its presence in the Thailand property market by building Hotels and apartment
complexes in the island of Phuket. Antarah-Koh formed a JV with Hanoi Housing
Development Company to develop a city in Viet Nam.
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CHAPTER 8
COMPARISON OF CASES
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to achieve two objectives. The first objective is to compare
the three group case studies presented in the previous three chapters and analyse the
similarities and/or differences between the three groups of foreign firms in dealing with
their local partners. The second objective is to test the validity of the hypotheses
developed in Chapter 3. The eight hypotheses are listed below for easy reference.
Hypothesis 1 (see p.68): JV's performance is enhanced when the partners work together
to achieve their mutual compatible objectives.
Hypothesis 2 (see p.68): The performance of JV is increased when partners are selected
to provide complimentary resources and skills.
Hypothesis 3 (see p.69): The performance of the JV is enhanced when the partners
forming the JV have had favourable past association.
Hypothesis 4 (see p.69): JV performance is enhanced when one partner holds dominant
equity share in the venture.
Hypothesis 5 (see p.70): The performance of JV is enhanced when one partner exercises
managerial control over the operations of the JV.
Hypothesis 6 (see p.7O): The performance of the JV is enhanced when the partners trust
each other, have mutual need and commitment.
Hypothesis 7 (see p.70): The performance of JV is adversely affected when the level of
conflict increases.
Hypothesis 8 (see p.7!): JVs formed between partners with similar cultural attributes are
likely to perform better than JVs formed between partners coming from different cultural
backgrounds.
204
It is worthwhile repeating here that the hypotheses to be tested in this Chapter, were
derived from the experiences of JVs in industries other than construction. The discussions
and analysis in this chapter will attempt to establish the relevance of these hypotheses to
the construction industry.
The comparison and review of the three group case studies are presented under five major
sections. The first section compares the objectives of foreign and local firms and analyses
their implications on JV performance. The discussions in this section are also used to test
the validity of hypothesis No.1. The second section reviews the partner selection process
employed by the various groups of partners. Based on the review, the validity of
Hypotheses Nos. 2 and 3 are tested. In section three, the JV formation process is
reviewed. In section four, the contributions made by the partners to the JVs are compared
and their implications on the JV performance are analysed. The analysis presented in this
section is used to test the validity of hypothesis No. 4. Partner related interactions are
compared and analysed in section five. In this section, the impact of management control,
trust, need, commitment, cooperation and/or conflict and cultural differences on JV
performance are then reviewed and analysed. The results of these analysis are used to test
the validity of hypotheses Nos. 5 to 8.
As an easy reference for further discussions in this chapter, a summary of the key data
of the JVs analysed in this chapter is presented below in Table 8.1. These are the overall
assessment of the performance of JVs made by the local partners.
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Table 8.1
Summary of JV Performances
JV Name	 Type	 Equity	 JV performance rating
Share	 by the local partner
Sinbe1coHytech*	 Integrated'	 50:50	 Satisfactory3
Bocotra-Ockt	Integrated	 75:25	 Unsatisfactory4
Dragage-Sembawang	 Integrated	 68:32	 Unsatisfactory
Campenon-Singapore	 Integrated	 51:49	 Unsatisfactory
Piling iv
SGE-Lee Kim Tah
	
Integrated	 70:30	 Satisfactory
Henry Boot-Gammon- 	 Integrated	 73:27	 Unsatisfactory
Singa________________ ___________ _____________________
Nishimatsu-Lum Chang Non-Integrated2	 50:50	 Satisfactory
Kajima-Keppel	 Non-Integrated	 50:50	 Satisfactory
Aoki-LKN	 Non-Integrated	 50:50	 Satisfactory
Okumura-Oh Tech Tye
	
Non-Integrated	 60:40	 Not assessed
Obhayashi-RDC	 Non-Integrated	 51:49	 Satisfactory
Sato Kogyo-RDC	 Non-Integrated	 51:49	 Satisfactory
JDC-Jurong Eng.	 Non-Integrated	 50:50	 Satisfactory
Hyundai-Wah Chang	 Non-Integrated	 73:27	 Unsatisfactory
Gammon(HK)-Antarah- Integrated	 70:30	 Unsatisfactory
Koh
RSEA-Hock Lian Seng
	
Integrated	 50:50	 Satisfactory
Legend: * - Contracts awarded on the oasis of preferential margin.
Integrated iv: In this style of iv, the parties essentially agree to perform their work
as if it were performed by a single corporation. All profits or losses to be shared in
accordance with a previously agreed ratio.
2 Non-integrated JV: In this arrangement, the partners carry out their respective portion
of work separately. They are responsible for their own profits or losses derived from
their portion of work.
Satisfactory performance is achieved when the partners'original objectives are largely
met
Unsatisfactory performance is achieved when the partners'onginal objectives are not
met.
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SECTION ONE: PARTNERS' OBJECTIVES
Foreign Partners
The key objectives of the three groups of foreign firms are presented in Table 8.2. The
objectives are presented in the order of importance chosen by the respective groups.
TABLE 8.2
Key Objectives of Foreign Firms
No.	 European	 Japanese	 NIC
Firms	 Firms	 Firms
1	 Government	 Establish Local	 Government
Incentives	 Image	 Incentives
2	 Local Knowledge	 Effective Resource Match Competition
Utilisation
3	 Protect	 Protect	 Protect International
International	 International	 Market Share
Market Share	 Market Share
4	 Match Competition Match Competition Spread Commercial
Risk
5 Enter New Market Government 	 Local Knowledge
Incentives
Even though the order of the key objectives are different for each group, the main
objective of all the foreign firms was to successfully tender for the MRT contracts. The
three groups took slightly different approaches to achieving this main goal.
The incentives provided by the local government through preferential margin scheme and
the intense competition from other foreign firms left the European firms with no other
option but to form JVs with local firms in order to increase the odds of winning a MRT
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tender. Many of the European firms viewed the formation of JV with the local firms as
a temporary but convenient arrangement to satisfy their short-term needs. The NIC firms
had very similar objectives in forming JVs with local firms. They also needed the JVs as
vehicles to achieve their short-term commercial objectives. These two groups of firms
were not looking for association with the locals to extend beyond the MRT project.
Japanese firms, on the other hand, viewed Singapore as a strategic market full of future
potentials. Many of the Japanese firms were well established even before the
announcement of the construction of the Singapore MRT. They were keen to further
increase their existing market share in the local construction market through winning a
fair share of the MRT contracts. The well estb1ished Japanese contractors were so
confident of out pricing any competition that they did not form JVs with local contractors
to take advantage of the preferential margin scheme. They initially however formed JVs
with fellow Japanese contractors to share the commercial risks that are inherent in any
underground works and successfully won a large percentage of the first phase MRT
contracts beating the stiff competition from other foreign firms. But the apparent
underpricing by the Japanese in the early stages of the project, forced other contractors
to tender even more aggressively for the other un-awarded contract packages, forcing even
the Japanese to finally look for local partners to compete on even grounds with the rest.
Even then, the Japanese contractors took their time and chose their partners carefully with
a view to having a long-term association.
None of the foreign firms wanted a local partner to fill any technological gap or to
provide any missing resources they did not possess. The above discussions show that all
the foreign firms wanted the JVs with the local firms mainly to utilise the government
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incentives: only the time frame for the proposed association was different; the Europeans
and NICs wanted short-term relationships while the Japanese preferred long-term
relationships.
Local Firms' Objectives
The key objectives of the local firms in the order of their priorities were:
1. To acquire new technology and management skills.
2. To take advantage of the government incentives to form JVs
with foreign firms and win MRT contracts.
3. To spread commercial risks
4. To effectively utilise available resources.
All the local firms involved in this study were quite eager to upgrade their skills. The
government incentives, they knew, were attractive enough for the foreign firms to seek
them as partners. At the same time, they were also aware that without joining the foreign
partners through a JY, they would not be able to even pre-qualify for the MRT projects
as they had no prior experience in tunnelling and other underground works. They also
needed the foreign partners to share the commercial risks. The local firms also wanted to
enhance their local image through their involvement in the MRT project.
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Discussions on Hypothesis 1:
"JV's performance is enhanced when the partners work together to achieve their mutual
compatible objectives."
It is quite evident from the discussions presented in this section that the local and foreign
firms observed in this study were pursuing different sets of objectives. But the mere
existence of differences in objectives does not mean they are incompatible (Dutta &
Rasheed, 1993). However in order for the JV to succeed, it is critical for the potential
partners to discuss and identify the differences very early in their association (ideally
before the venture is formed) and adjust their expectations so that they may pursue jointly
a set of mutually accepted goals.
Among the three groups of foreign firms, the Japanese firms recognised that their
partners' primary objective was to acquire technology transfer. They helped their partners
to achieve this goal by providing ample opportunities for the local employees to work
with Japanese engineers. Similarly the local partners of Sinbelco and SGE were quite
satisfied with the level of assistance provided by of the two European firms in transferring
technology and management skills. All these JVs received satisfactory rating from the
local partners (Please refer to Table 8.1).
On the other hand, many of the European and Korean firms largely ignored the calls from
their local partners to help them learn modem construction management techniques but
focused all their attention in pursuing their own firms' individual objectives. This self-
centred approach adopted by the European and Korean firms resulted in their local
partners rating their JV performance as failures. Based on the above discussions it can
be concluded that hypothesis No.1 is valid.
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SECTION TWO: PARTNER SELECTION PROCESS
The European firms did not employ any specific strategy in selecting their local partners.
The frantic search for a "suitable" local partner by the European firms was well
documented by the local newspapers. The European firms would partner any local firm
that would give them a chance to first pre-qualify and later win the MRT contracts. None
of the selection criteria recommended by other researchers (Geringer, 1988; Contractor,
1989) were employed by these group of contractors.
The Japanese firms did employ a systematic process of partner selection. They did take
into account the size and reputation of potential local partners. Past association was also
an important consideration in their partner selection process. They also looked for partners
who had access to raw materials and good government links.
The NIC firms like Hyundai and RSEA had very little pool of local contractors left for
selection by the time they decided to form JVs with local firms. None of the contractors
from the NICs seem to have employed any specific partner selection process.
Discussions on Hypotheses 2 and 3
Hypothesis 2
"The performance of the JV is increased when partners are selected to provide
complimentary resources and skills."
The case studies presented in the previous three chapters clearly demonstrate the
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relationship between careful partner selection and JV performance. The Japanese-Local
JVs in general were more successful than the European and NIC contractors because of
their careful selection of local partners. The local partners selected were all well
established firms who could manage their portion of the work allotted to them under the
JV agreement, with minimal help from the Japanese. Some of the local partners helped
the Japanese partners with procurement of local supplies. The Japanese finns' favourable
experience with their local partners strongly supports the validity of the above hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3
"The performance of the JV is enhanced when the partners forming the JV have had
favourable past association."
Two JVs, among the sixteen studied, reported that their venture was formed because of
their favourable past association. Lee Kim Tah which worked with SGE on an earlier
public housing project as JV partners, continued their association on the MRT project. The
JV partners worked well with each other and the local partner expressed complete
satisfaction in attaining his goals. Kajima and Keppel shared a client-contractor
relationship when Kajima built the Keppel Shipyard in the middle 1970s. Kajima
accommodated Keppel's request to form a JV for tendering for the MRT project as part
of Keppel's desire to diversify into the construction market. Keppel's participation in this
venture, unfortunately was very minimal. However the management of Keppel asserted
that they achieved their original objectives. These two samples support the hypothesis that
firms who have had favourable past association would continue to perform well as
partners in new JVs.
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SECTION THREE: JOINT VENTURE NEGOTIATION AND FORMATION
The JVs studied in this research adopted a two stage negotiation process. A memorandum
of understanding was first signed between the potential partners which committed them
to bid together for the MRT project as a JV. Serious negotiations started only after the
award of the MRT contract. The client required the submission of a legal JV contract that
is acceptable to the Singapore legal system before formally signing the MRT contract
documents. This requirement left very little time for the partners to negotiate and agree
on every requirement of the partners. The process described here is quite different from
the normal negotiation practices conducted during the formation of JVs in the
manufacturing and services industries. In these industries it is quite common for partners
to spend several months in negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement.
In this particular study, the foreign firms generally initiated the preparation of the JV
agreements. The JV agreements between European and Local contractors contained
detailed procedures for dealing with all legal, financial and commercial issues related to
the formation, operation and termination of the JVs. The European firms in general
viewed the JV agreement as a master document for detailing the duties, responsibilities,
and obligations of each party to the venture and as a reference guide for resolving all
issues related to the JY. Surprisingly, the review of the JV agreements between European
and local firms did not make any reference pertaining to the original objectives of the
partnering firms. For example, there was no reference to how technology transfer, one
of the prune objectives of the local partner, was going to be implemented.
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The European firms also used the JV agreements as a tool to control the operation and
management of JVs. As a further measure to establish total control, all the European-
Local JVs were organised as integrated JVs.
On the other hand, the JV agreements between the Japanese and Local firms were quite
brief. This is because the Japanese believed that the formal agreements themselves could
not guarantee success of the JV. In some of the JV agreements there was no reference to
arbitration and other dispute resolution clauses. This showed that the Japanese expected
to resolve all differences with the partners only through negotiations. These documents
also showed that the Japanese preferred to respect verbal agreements than rely on written
ones. This in a way encouraged the local partner to trust his Japanese counterpart. The
Japanese, in order to minimise potential conflicts with local partners, decided to use the
non-integrated style of organisation for their JVs. They did not believe that their total
control is essential for the success of the JV.
The NIC contractors did use both the integrated and non-integrated style of JVs. Gammon
(HK), whose management team mainly consisted of British expatriates, established a fully
detailed JV agreement just as the European firms did. They also followed the Europeans
in trying to establish full management control over the JV, by opting for an integrated
style JV. Gammon, not surprisingly, experienced the same difficulties that their European
counterparts had in operating the JV.
The Korean firm, Hyundai, followed the Japanese style of having a short JV agreement
and similarly organised its JV as a non-integrated venture. But the similarities stopped
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here. Unlike the Japanese, Hyundai made no efforts to help its partner to achieve its
objectives. This strict adherence to policy of non-interference resulted in the JV ending
as a failure.
The Taiwanese firm, RSEA, through a separate agreement guaranteed to protect the local
firm from any losses. This allowed the Taiwanese firm to operate the iv as if it was its
own foreign subsidiaiy. The local firm which was very small went along with the
decisions of its foreign partner as it had nothing to lose from its association with its
foreign partner.
In all these cases, the local contractors seem to have played a very passive role in the
drafting of the iv agreements or in the evolution of the iv organisational structure. This
could be attributed to their inexperience in dealing with foreign firms. The interviews with
the local executives indicated the blind trust some of the local firms placed on their
foreign partners to help them achieve their objectives. Serious conflicts arose when this
trust was violated.
The discussions above show that the national culture had an indirect influence over the
JV negotiation and formation. Firms coming from a particular group of countries adopted
similar style of agreements and organisational designs. All European firms adopted the
integrated style iv and preferred majority equity control. The Japanese firms and the
Korean firms on the other hand preferred the non-integrated style JV. The Japanese in
general were not concerned about sharing the equity with local partners.
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SECTION FOUR: TASK RELATED INPUTS FROM PARTNERS
This section discusses the resource contribution of the foreign and local partners for
performing the tasks for which the JVs were formed. The discussions will centre around
how the foreign partners tried to exercise control over the JVs through the use of these
contribution of resources.
Equity Contributions
The discussions on the relationship between the level of equity ownership and JV
performance is presented through the analysis of the hypothesis on this issue.
Discussion on Hypothesis 4
JV performance is enhanced when one partner holds dominant equity share in the
venture".
The relationship between equity ownership and JV performance as observed in the cases
studied in this research is presented below in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3
Relationship between Equity Ownership and JV Performance
Description	 Total	 Performance Rating
No
__________________________ _________ Satisfactory 	 Unsatisfactory
JVs with foreign firms 	 9	 3	 6
holding majority share
JVs with foreign firm	 6	 6	 0
holding equal share
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The results presented in the above table show that JVs with equal contributions from the
partners performed far better than the JVs in which one partner had a dominant stake.
These results do not support the hypothesis that was developed from the experiences of
JY partners in manufacturing and services industries. The following section explores the
reasons why results from this study are not in accordance with the results from earlier
research conducted in other industries.
The primary reason for the difference in results can be traced to the difference between
the construction industiy and other industries in fixing the price of the finished product.
In the manufacturing and service industries, the price of fmished product can be estimated
with reasonable certainty. If the product faces intense competition in the market place, the
firms producing the product can take other measures to reduce the cost of production. In
the construction industry, the price of the fmished product is fixed even before it is
produced. The contractor who won the job under intense competition would have set his
profit margin close to zero in order to win the tender. The construction process itself is
very long and it involves several players outside the contractor's own organisation who
can significantly influence the final cost of the product. These factors introduce a high
level of uncertainty. This level of uncertainty can be reduced if the contractor can
optimise the performance of his own organisation. This requires total command over all
aspects of the project.
The European firms who were forced to underbid because of the intense competition,
firmly believed that they had to have total control over the JV organisation in order to
reduce the level of uncertainty and attain their project objectives. The European firms
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equated equity control with total control over the activities of the venture. The local
partner who had no experience in building railways gladly conceded the leadership and
the equity control. Unfortunately as the time progressed, the work started to fall behind
schedule. In order to overcome the potential delays, the European firms started making
quick fix decisions without consulting their local partners. Such an attitude frustrated the
local partners often resulting in failure of the JVs.
Killing (1983), in his study of the relationship between equity ownership and JV
performance stipulated two conditions for the JVs with a dominant partner to succeed.
First, the JV should be totally dependent on the dominant partner's technology, resources
and or skills. Second, the other partner should be passive and leave the management and
operation of the JV to the dominant partner.
A review of the activities of the JYs that were reported as failures (4 European-Local JVs
and 2 NIC-Local JVs) shows that these two conditions were not met. While the local
firms were dependent on the foreign finns' technology and managerial skills, they were
not willing to remain as passive partners. They wanted their suggestions to be heard in
the board meetings regarding the management of the project. The foreign firms felt that
such interactions would be counter-productive. These differing perceptions often led to
conflict and ultimately to failure.
The Japanese firms who were involved in six of the nine JVs that reported satisfactory
JV performances, had a very relaxed attitude towards equity control. They were not too
worried about making losses in their first projects. Their main interest was to establish a
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good local image through helping their partners and their client achieve their respective
key objectives. The Japanese did not believe that equity control is an essential pre-
requisite for establishing control over the operations of the JVs. Moreover, since all the
JVs were formed on a non-integrated basis there was also no real need to have total
control on all the operations of the JV.
These discussions show that it is difficult to establish a direct relationship between equity
control and JV performance. In other words, the nature of equity ownership alone cannot
cause a JV to fail or succeed. It is the nature of the relationship that develops between the
partners, over a period of time, that ultimately decides the JV performance. It can be
concluded that hypothesis No.4 is not relevant to construction JVs.
Contribution of Technology and Other Resources
The foreign partners mainly contributed all technology related input to the joint ventures.
The local partners were not particularly interested in acquiring the specialised technology
such as underground shield tunnelling methods. In integrated style JVs, the foreign
partners decided on the construction methods to be used for the projects and were readily
accepted by the local partners. In the non-integrated style JVs the local partners and the
foreign partners did not intervene with each others' selection of construction method.
Problems did arise between the two partners, especially in the integrated style JVs
regarding appointment of project managers and other key personnel and sub-contractors.
The human resources related issues are discussed in the following sections.
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SECTION FIVE: PARTNER RELATED INTERACTIONS
Management Control
In all the three groups studied in this research, the key managerial positions were held by
the expatriates appointed by the foreign partners. The local partners readily accepted this
as they had no prior experience in railway work. The foreign partners considered this as
very critical to their hold on the JV's management.
Discussions on Hypothesis 5:
"The performance of JV is enhanced when one partner exercises managerial control over
the operation of the JV."
The foreign partner exercised control in all the JVs studied in this research. Out of the
fifteen JVs studied, nine had satisfactory performances while six did not have. All the
Japanese managed JVs performed satisfactorily. One of the main reasons for their success
can be attributed to their management style. The Japanese Project Managers had years of
experience with their parent firms and were well equipped to handle the international
projects under their control. They tried to control only those areas they felt were critical
to the success of the project. They provided enough leeway to the local partner to manage
his own portion of work independently. They provided help whenever necessary to bring
the local partner in line with his own firm's level of performance.
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On the other hand, four out of the six JVs that reported unsatisfactory performance were
managed by European managers. Some of the project managers were recruited fresh for
the project by these finns. They were experts in their technical field but proved to be very
poor in human relations. Some had to be replaced by the JVs on the insistence of local
partners. Perhaps the most critical reason for failure was the insistence of the European
firms to control all aspects of the JV, leaving very little role for the local partner to play.
Two out of three NIC-Local JVs reported poor performance. In the case of Koreans, they
avoided contact with their local partner as much as possible. The client had to interact
between the two partners to ensure schedule and quality standards were adequately met.
The Hong Kong firm, managed by the British expatriates, behaved very much similar to
the European firms and sought full control over the JV.
The results of the study are very much in line with that of Schaan (1983) who studied the
relationship between JV performance and management control through an in-depth study
of ten Mexican JVs. He noted that,"What managers in parent companies control and how
they control has an impact on JV success" (p. iii).
These discussions show that hypothesis No.5 is only partly valid. These case studies have
demonstrated that dominant management control can only succeed when the dominant
partner gives adequate consideration to the needs and concerns of the other partner.
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Need, Commitment and Inter-Partner Trust
The discussions on these three variables will be presented through the analysis of
Hypothesis 6.
Discussions on Hypothesis 6:
The performance of the JV is enhanced when the partners trust each other, have mutual
need and commitment."
The local partners needed the foreign partners for improving their management skills and
enhancing their local image. The foreign partners needed the locals mainly to take
advantage of the preferential margin scheme. In all the cases studied, the foreign partners
could have performed the tasks required by MRTC without any help from the locals. The
foreigners needed the local partners' help only up to the award stage where as the local
finns needed the foreign firms' assistance throughout the life of the JV. This difference
in need can be narrowed only if there is a firm commitment from the foreign partner first
to the P1 and second to the partner.
The Japanese partners showed their firm commitment to the P1 by ensuring that all
activities of the project were properly planned and evaluated regularly. They further
showed their commitment to the partner by training the local employees. This enabled the
local partner to trust his Japanese counterpart and seek his advice when necessary. This
show of commitment and the resultant trust considerably helped the partners to settle any
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differences smoothly.
The European firms showed their commitment to the JVs but not to the partners' needs.
Firms like Bocotra won their contract on the basis of preferential margin which required
them to train the local partner's employees. But they failed to meet their commitments,
thereby losing the trust of the local partners. The same can be said of Hyundai, who
having won the contract as a JV, did very little to help its partner during the construction
stage. Gammon (HK) lost the trust of its partner when it did not place Antarah-Koh's
employees in the positions it promised to appoint them in the organisation. The
performance of all these JVs were rated as poor.
These examples show that partner need, commitment and inter-partner trust are
interrelated and are important requisites for good JV performance.
EFFECT OF COOPERATION AND/OR CONFLICT ON JV PERFORMANCE
Much of the research on JVs has centred around the impact of cooperation and conflict
on JV performance. The common consensus is that conflict is inevitable in a JV as it
takes two to make a decision. The conflict, in itself is not bad as long as a consensus
emerges at the end. Such a favourable resolution cannot be achieved without inter-partner
cooperation. But an ever increasing list of unresolved conflicts can be detrimental to the
effective operation of the JY. This section analyses how the three groups of foreign firms
approached the resolution of conflicts and the impact of conflict on the JV performance.
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Discussions on Hypothesis 7:
"The performance of JV is adversely affected when the level of conflict increases."
All the JVs studied in the three case studies started with enthusiasm and a spirit of
cooperation. But conflicts soon emerged over the following areas:
1. Achievement of key objectives
2. Staffmg the organisation
3. Project priorities
4	 Interaction between partners and
5	 Interaction with the client
From the description of the cases, one can easily recognise that the European-Local JVs
experienced a very high level of conflict. In these JVs, the partners experienced different
sources of conflict during the life cycle of the JVs. In the early stages of the JY, the
conflicts started with staffing the project organisation. This was a major issue in the JVs
that operated on an integrated style. The foreign partners filled all the top positions and
the locals were left with the semi-skilled positions to fill. In some JVs, the local partners
described incidents in which foreign partners denied positions to their employees that were
earlier promised.
The organisational problems eventually called into question the foreign partners'
commitment to technology transfer. The local partners felt that the foreign partners were
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not doing enough to help their staff to learn managerial skills. The European firms felt
that technology transfer was not a contractual obligation and no budget was specifically
provided for such purposes. They believed that the local staff lacked initiative in engaging
their expatriate colleagues in giving them on-the-job training. Both the parties did not
make any extra efforts to resolve such thorny and fundamental issues. These unresolved
conflicts manifested into the eventual failure of the JV.
The conflicts between the partners can be summarised as below:
lack of clear understanding of project objectives
ambiguity over specific roles of the partners
lack of perceived relationships between JV's overall
objectives and partner's own individual objectives
The intensity of conflict between the partners was low when the partners adopted non-
integrated style JVs. This is due to limited day to day contact between the partners. Even
in this style, the Korean-Local JV reported unsatisfactory performance mainly due to the
Korean's reluctance to provide technology transfer to the locals. In this aspect, the
Japanese cooperated with their local partners and helped them achieve their goals. Such
a cooperative attitude improved the overall performance of these ventures.
These cases provide clear evidence that conflicts that were not resolved to the satisfaction
of all the parties adversely affect JV performance and that cooperation helps to improve
JV performance. It can also be observed in all the case studies that the local firms had
more conflict with Europeans than with the Japanese firms. This can possibly be traced
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to cultural differences. The next section explores the influence of culture on JV
performance.
INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE
The discussions on the influence of culture is presented as part of testing the validity of
hypothesis on cultural issues.
Discussions on Hypothesis 8:
"JVs formed between partners with similar cultural attributes are likely tQperform better
than JVs formed between partners coming from diverse cultural backgrounds."
Hoftstede's model on culture was extensively used in the earlier chapters to bring out the
influence of culture on the interactions between partners. These discussions showed that
when cultural distances are larger, it requires more effort to negotiate and build
understandings between the partners. The relationship between cultural distance between
partners and the efforts needed to close the cultural gap is depicted in Figure 8.1. As the
figure shows, when the cultural distances are larger, there will be more contrasts in the
working habits of the partnering firms and hence will require more effort to understand
each others' requirements.
Unfortunately, the European-Local JVs who had the largest cultural distance among the
three groups neither had the time nor made the effort to close the cultural gap during their
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short period of association. Some of the cultural problems the European firms and the
locals experienced can be also be traced to the integrated structure of the JV organisation.
The integrated structure calls for cross-cultural teamwork. Such teamwork is not possible
if the partners do not share the same assumptions (Lewis, 1990). He also observed that
beyond some cultural distance, partner's differences simply overwhelm their ability to
accept and understand each other ( Figure 8.1 represents this view). It is possible that the
European-Local JVs fall into this category.
The Japanese were successful JV partners perhaps because they managed to reduce
cultural conflict through limiting the number of cross-cultural contacts by adapting the
non-integrated style of JV. It can also be observed in Figure 8.1 that non-integrated style
requires only minimum efforts from the partners to overcome cultural challenges.
The validity of this hypothesis can be further explained through the diagram developed
by Thomas (1976). Figure 8.2 shows the relationship between two important dimensions
of conflict: assertiveness and cooperativeness. In cultural terms, cultures that are assertive
in nature are individualistic, highly competitive, want to limit uncertainty and believe in
using power and generally uncooperative. The cooperative cultures in general are
collective, relationship oriented, tolerant of uncertainty, and relate to low use of power
(Swierczek,1994). Swierczek suggests that conflict between firms participating in a JY
will be minimal if they belong to collaborative or smoothing styles.
Based on their cultural orientations, only the Japanese and the Singaporeans belong to
these styles (Fig. 8.2) and naturally got along with each other very well. The Koreans,
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Figure 8.1: Cultural Distance and JV options
Source: J.D. Lewis, N Partnership for Profit".
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who belonged to the avoidance style, and the Europeans, who belonged to the competitive
style, are by nature uncooperative and hence had increased level of conflict with the
Singaporeans. An increased level of conflict reduces performance and hence the JVs
formed between Singaporean firms with Korean or Europeans firms, did not perform
satisfactorily.
The above discussions fully support the hypothesis that JYs iformed between partners
coming from similar cultures are likely to perform better than those between diverse
cultures.
FINAL NOTE ON THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON INTER-PARTNER
RELATIONS
Hofstede (1983) defined culture as collective mental prograrnnning. He opined that the
national culture which takes decades to develop, is unique for each nation and is the most
difficult one to change. The firms that join together in an alliance such as a JY, bring
with them, their own unique national and corporate cultures to the JV. The influence of
culture is not visible till one firm's assumptions are challenged. The reaction to that
challenge is significantly influenced by the underlying culture of the responding firm.
Culture manifests its presence through the nature of interactions between the partners.
The discussions presented in this chapter have demonstrated, through examples, that the
underlying root cause of problems and misunderstanding between the partners is their
cultural differences. As a concluding note to this chapter, a summary of the cultural
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characteristics that were found to influence the behaviour of European and Japanese firms
in this research study is presented in Table 8.4. The researcher was unable to identify
from these cases, a unique set of cultural characteristics that can be specified as NIC
culture.
TABLE 8.4
CULTURAL VALUES THAT INFLUENCED ThE BEHAVIOUR OF EUROPEAN
AND JAPANESE HRMS
European Culture	 Japanese Culture
Short-term goals. Focus on
	
Long-term goals. Focus on image,
immediate results 	 market share
Believes in total control. Strong 	 Believes in selective control. Manage
uncertainty avoidance	 uncertainty
Focus on rules than on 	 Relationship before rules. Room for
relationship. No room for	 accommodation
compromise.__________________________________
Show immediate reaction to
	 Subtle ways of expressing
opposing views with public 	 disagreement. No public display of
display of emotion.	 emotions.
Confront openly over 	 Seek compromise privately. Settle
disagreements. 	 issues amicably to save "public
face". Seek harmony.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to provide a broad overview of the
research problem, results and findings; and (2) to explore the implications of the findings.
This chapter is divided into six sections. A brief outline of the research problem and its
significance is presented in the first section. In the second section, the research method
and data collection methodology are described. Third section presents a summary of major
fmdings. The fourth section presents the main contribution of this study to JV literature
and make recommendations for the foreign and local firms who may be interested in
forming international construction JYs. The fifth section indicates the limitations of the
study and the last section delineates the future area of study.
RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
Research Problem
International construction JVs are formed by partnering firms to complete specific tasks
and to operate for a limited period. Not all of them succeed in achieving the intended
objectives. What makes them succeed or fail has not been seriously dealt with by past
and current researchers. The JV literature on manufacturing and service industries have
suggested that variables such as partner selection, need, commitment, conflict, control and
cultural differences influence the performance of JVs. The present study focuses on
determining the relevance and applicability of these factors in influencing the
performance of construction JVs. Using a case study approach, this study identifies several
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key factors that influence the performance of construction JVs.
Significance of the study
The seventies and eighties saw a significant growth in the number of international
construction firms searching for new work in the emerging economies. This trend has
continued so far in this decade and the newly industrialising economies of East Asia are
offering exciting new opportunities to these firms, through JVs with local firms, in the
area of infrastructure development.
An international construction JV is a temporary organisation subject to joint
management. Like any other temporary organisation, it is unstable. The relationship
between the partners is subject to further strain by other participants in the project. The
list includes clients, consultants, government regulatory authorities and fellow competitors.
The list of failed JVs reported in the JV literature attests to the difficult challenges that
face these ventures. But the literature also reports that failure is costly and frustrating.
In view of the increased use of JVs by host governments, local and international firms,
on the one hand, and the high failure rate, on the other, one cannot overstate the need
for a comprehensive study to identify the key determinants that influence the performance
of JVs either adversely or favourably.
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHOD
Due to a dearth of literature available related to construction JVs, the present researcher
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did an extensive review of literature written on manufacturing JVs. This search enabled
the identification of the key factors that influence the performance of JVs. Concurrent
with the search of literature, a research model was developed to provide a framework
for analysing the JVs. Based on the research model and available literature eight
hypotheses were developed.
Considering the complexity of relationships among the participants in the JV process, it
was decided to use the case study approach to further explore the inter-relationship
between the variables. This method is found to be superior to statistical methods which
study the inter-relationship between variables at a given point in time. JV relationships
are much more complex and the pattern of relationship evolve and change throughout the
life of the JV.
The Singapore Mass Rapid Transit project was chosen as the case study project for this
research for the following reasons. First, it is one of the first infrastructure mega projects
built in this region. Second, the client awarded the contracts mainly to JVs (25 out of
38). Third, the participating contractors belonged to different nationalities and could be
grouped according to their cultural orientation. This provided an opportunity to study the
influence of culture on JV performance. (This has often been a neglected issue in earlier
works). Fourth, all the contractors were subject to same conditions of contract and worked
in the same geographical area during the same period (1984-89). Most importantly, the
rules and regulations of Singapore government applied equally to all contractors.
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The data for the case studies was collected from several sources. The MRT archives were
used to collect the basic facts on all the JVs. The information on interaction between
partners was collected through interviews with the executives of the parent finns,
questionnaire, and reports in local journals and news papers. The opinion of the managers
of the client were also sought to get independent assessment on the performance of the
JVs. The actual case studies are presented in Chapters 5 to 7 and the analysis in
Chapter 8.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Several important findings come out of this study. They are presented in the same order
as the eight hypotheses tested in the previous chapter. The main focus of this presentation
is to highlight the key issues that determine the outcome of the association between the
JV partners.
Motivations for Forming JYs
	 -
The European and MC firms were primarily interested in forming the JV with locals to
improve their chances of winning a MRT contract by utilising the government incentives.
In most cases the proposed association was for a specific project. The Japanese firms were
motivated to form JVs with the locals for two reasons. First, to match competition and
second, to improve the market share in the long term through enhanced local image. In
the order of importance, access to local markets, the need to develop a local image and
maintaining or improving the global market share are the primary motives for all foreign
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firms to seek a local partner.
The local firms engaged in the JVs were mainly interested in acquiring technology and
management skills through their association with foreign firms. The local firms were
hoping that by providing access to the local market through the JV, the foreign firms
would show their appreciation by transferring appropriate technology and skills. The case
studies show that the JVs that succeeded are those in which the foreign partners
adequately addressed this particular need of the local partners (Hypothesis No 1).
Partner Selection
The European and MC firms did not employ any specific partner selection process to
choose local partners. The Japanese were careful in their screening and selection of local
partners. The results show that the Japanese-Local firms did well as partners and careful
partner selection could be a reason for such an outcome (Hypothesis No.2). The results
also show that JVs in which partners were selected on the basis of favourable past
association perform well (Hypothesis No.3).
JV Agreements
The European firms preferred detailed contracts that can be used as the guideline for
every activity of the JV. These documents addressed all the needs of the European firms
and very little of the local partners' needs. This proved to be an area of major conflict
between the partner. The Japanese and Koreans preferred short contract documents. The
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Japanese relied on mutual trust and verbal agreements to resolve all differences. These
preferences for a particular style of agreement can be part of the cultural attributes of the
respective nationalities.
JV Organisation
The Europeans preferred integrated style JVs in which all employees of the parent
companies are seconded to the JV. All work is performed under one manager and the
profits or losses shared according to respective equity contributions. European firms used
this arrangement in order to have total control over the operation of the JVs. The results
show that this did not work out well as the Europeans were insensitive to local firms'
suggestions and demands for meaningful participation.
The Japanese and Koreans organised the JVs in the non-integrated style. In this style, the
project work is divided into independent work packages and allotted to each partner.
These firms preferred this arrangement as it minimised contact and thereby conflict. This
arrangement worked well for the Japanese because they helped their partners in
completing their tasks. It did not work well for the Koreans because they struck to the
rules of the contract and provided little help to their partners.
The results of the study show that the choice of the organisational style and subsequent
actions during the JV operations is part of foreign firms' national culture.
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Equity Control
The results of the study show that there is no direct relationship between equity control
and JV performance. The European firms who preferred majority equity ownership did
not do well. The Japanese who generally preferred sharing the equity ownership did
perform well. The researcher is of the opinion that the positive results have more to do
with inter-partner relationship than the level of equity ownership (Hypothesis No.4).
Management Control
The case studies show that selective control over critical activities by the senior partner
is preferable to total control. This is the style adopted by the Japanese. The Europeans
who preferred total control or the Koreans who did not exercise any control, did not do
well (Hypothesis No.5).
Need, Commitment and Trust
The case studies show that of the three, commitment and trust are important variables.
The European firms had very little need for the local partner, did show commitment to
the venture and not to the partner. There was also no evidence of any mutual trust. These
factors contributed to the failure of European-Local JVs. The Japanese firms showed total
commitment to the venture and to the partner. The local partner showed his total trust
in his senior partner by listening to his suggestions. These created a conducive atmosphere
for making joint decisions and contributed to the eventual success of the JVs (Hypothesis
No. 6)
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Cooperation and/or Conflict
The European firms in general had more conflicts with their partners than the Japanese
firms. The conflicts were primarily due to lack of clear understanding of objectives, lack
of trust and ambiguity over each partner's role in the JV. The JVs who used integrated
JY structure reported more conflict than the JVs that used non-integrated structure. The
cases clearly demonstrated that conflicts reduce performance and cooperation improves
JV performance (Hypothesis No.7).
Cultural Differences
The cases studied in this research showed that cultural differences is one of the primary
source of failure of JVs. The study also showed that the larger the cultural distance
between partners, the greater will be the efforts needed to overcome the differences. These
cases demonstrated that integrated structure may not be suitable for firms with a large
cultural gap (Hypothesis No.8).
SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY
Exploratory Contribution
The study provides a framework for JV analysis through the research model by indicating
the linkages between various determinants of JV performance and JV performance itself.
Such a framework should be useful for better understanding of JVs.
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Confirmatory Contribution
This study provides confirmatory evidence that many of the factors that influenced the
performance of JVs in the manufacturing and services sectors are equally applicable to
construction JVs.
The most significant contributions of this study is to stress the need for understanding
the important influence of partner related variables on JV performance in general and that
of cultural differences in particular.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations to Foreign Firms
The framework for analysis developed in this study provides a good starting point for
foreign firms who are interested in exploring the opportunities for forming JVs with local
firms as a strategy to enter new construction markets or consolidate and improve their
existing market share in a particular country. Apart from the model, some valuable
guidelines for the international firms can be developed, based on the observations made
from the case studies derived from the Mass Rapid Transit Project. The key
recommendations are presented below. The scope of recommendations made is limited
to issues related to formation and operation of international joint ventures. It does not take
into account legal or financial considerations.
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International construction firms, desirous of using JV as a vehicle for entry into a new
market, should evaluate the cultural gap that exists between their nation and the host
nation. Foreign firms who consider the gap to be too large should seriously consider other
alternative routes of entry such as opening a fully owned subsidiary, licensing
arrangements and through sub-contracting arrangements.
Having decided to use JV arrangement as a mode of entry the foreign firms should go
through a former partner screening process to identify partners with potential fit. Some
of the important considerations in partner selection process should include, strategic
compatibility, complementary skills and resources, relative company size, mutual need and
commitment and national and corporate cultural fit (Williams & Lilly, 1993). The
temptation to select a partner just to fulfil an immediate and short-term need without
going through a formal screening process should be avoided at all costs.
The first step in negotiating an agreement should be the identification and open discussion
of each partner's individual objectives in forming the joint venture. Differences emerging
during this process should be carefully evaluated and resolved before the signing the
agreement. The larger the cultural distance, the more time will it take to resolve the
identified differences.
This study has shown that non-integrated style of joint venture is better suited for partners
who have a large cultural distance to overcome. This limits the number of contacts
between the two partners. But this style of venture will not help a local partner who is
ambitious and who wants to learn from his partner unless there is a separate clause in the
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agreement that makes specific reference to technology transfer.
Integrated style of joint venture is suited to partners who have similar cultural
backgrounds. This arrangement is conducive for effective technology transfer to take
place. If technology transfer is an expected outcome of the formation of the joint venture,
then the procedure for such a transfer should be clearly identified and included in the joint
venture agreement.
The early period in the life of the joint venture should be used to build trust between the
partners. This can be achieved by acknowledging that both partners gain from the
relationship and by developing mutual respect. Partners should be honest and promise only
what can be delivered.
The lines of communications should always be kept open. Unilateral decisions should be
avoided by recognising that most effective decisions are made jointly.
It is important to recognise the distinction between policy decisions and operating
decisions. The policy decisions should be taken jointly at the board level while the
operating decisions, taken within limits, be made at the project level (Andrews, 1965).
The appointment of a responsible Project Manager is very crucial to the success of the
project. Ideally the person who takes over the role of the project manager should have
participated in negotiating joint venture terms and structure. If this is not possible, he
should take time to review the objectives of both partners. It is important for him to
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recognise that he is the Project Manager of the venture and not a representative of his
parent firm. Conflicts among partners, external forces, and lack of sufficient resources to
do the job can make joint venture management extremely difficult. In order to overcome
these challenges he needs the skills of a coach, diplomat and a communicator. Expert
technical knowledge in his specialised field alone is not good enough.
Cultural differences are bound to exist in international JVs. Every effort should be
directed at narrowing the cultural gap. Expatriate staff appointed to the venture should be
provided with cross-cultural training before they are sent to the host country. Orientation
programmes for the families will also help.
Overcoming cultural differences alone cannot assure the success of the joint venture. But
it will surely help the partners to work together as a team in attaining their common and
individual objectives set out when forming the joint venture.
Recommendations to Local Firms
The framework for analysis is equally applicable to local firms. They should be very clear
in outlining their priorities to the foreign firms who may be interested in forming JVs with
them. If the local firms expect technology transfer as an expected outcome they should
ensure that their requirements are addressed through a separate technology transfer
agreement as part of the overall JV agreement. This agreement should specify the type of
technology to be transferred,the mode of transfer and the amount to be reimbursed for
effecting the transfer.
244
The local partner should ensure that the organisation structure of the JV is conducive to
effecting technology transfer. The local partner should ensure that specific positions in the
organisation are designated for receiving technology transfer. These positions should be
filled by capable learners.
Cross-cultural training is equally applicable to the employees of local partners. Employees
identified to receive training should be provided with appropriate foreign language
training.
SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The results of the study should be viewed in the light of following limitations:
1. The results derived from case studies do not lend themselves to statistical
verification and hence are not empirically reliable. This is because of the subjective and
flexible nature of the case study methods. Conclusions are drawn from observations and
the bias of the observer is inherent in the results.
2. One has to be vely careful in generalising the conclusions derived from this study
due to the limited number of cases observed. The case studies included in this research
are all from one single project.
3. The JV performances in these cases are assessed only by the local partners. It may
be desirable, to elicit the opinions of the foreign partners and compare the results.
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AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH
The scope for future research is unlimited as the existing body of literature on
construction JVs is very small. This study can be replicated in other countries in order to
reinforce the relevance and applicability of the findings of the research to other parts of
the world.
This study covers only JVs between local and foreign contractors. Similar studies can be
conducted to study the factors affecting the performance of JVs between consultants and
JVs formed exclusively among local contractors.
Research study is also needed to compare the performance of JVs in one region with that
of JVs in another region. For example, the researcher can find out how different are the
management and operational styles of JVs in East Asia and European community.
Globalisation is becoming popular among international construction firms. What role do
JVs play in this evolving process can be the scope of an exploratory study.
Finally it is hoped that this study would encourage fellow researchers to further research
and add to the body of knowledge on construction joint ventures.
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Appendix A
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
Determinants of Joint Venture Performance in the Construction Industry: Cases from
Mass Rapid Transit Corporation of S ngapore
Please respond to the following questions on the basis your company's involvement
and experience as an International Joint Venture Partner in building the Singapore
Mass Rapid Transit Project.
Govindan Sridharan
Ph.D Student
University College, London
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SECTION A
GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Name of interviewee
2. Designation
3. Experience i) In the Construction Industry 	 years
ii) In Managing Joint Ventures	 years
4. Name of Joint Venture
5. What is the equity distribution?
a. your company __%	 b. partner:	 %
SECTION B
OBJECTIVES
1.	 How important are the following factors in your decision to set up the JV? Please
circle the number that best describes the importance of each factors in your decision.
	
Not	 Somewhat Very
Important	 !mortnt	 Important
a. Spread Commercial risk 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
b. Obtain Technology transfer	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
c. Government incentives	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
d. Match competition	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
e. Enhance local image 	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	 6 7
f. Avail of partner's local knowledge 	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	 6 7
g. Market diversification 	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	 6 7
h. Access to new financial resources 	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	 6 7
i. Match competition strategies 	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	 6 7
j. Protect international market share 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
k. Avoid take over	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	 6 7
I. Hedging against discrimination by
	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	 6 7
host country
m. Pooling of resources 	 1	 2	 34	 67
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SECTION C
SELECTION OF JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS
1.	 Please indicate the importance of following factors in the selection of your partner.
Not	 Somewhat Very
Important	 Important	 Important
a. Plant and Equipment
b. Size/reputation
c. Government link
d. Technology
e. Finance
f. Construction resources
g. Local knowledge
h. Management skills
i. Access to materials/supplies
j. Nationality of potential partner
1 2
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
1	 2
345
345
345
345
345
345
345
345
345
345
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
2.	 Who made the first approach or suggestion regarding the joint venture.
a. your company ( )
	
b. year:
b. your partner ( )
	
b.	 year:
c. other parties (please specify):
3
	
How long did you negotiate with your partner before the joint Venture was formed.
Please circle the period below:
a. less than 3 months
b. 3 - 6 months
c. 6 - 12 months
d. 1-2years
e. 2-3years
f. 3-4years
g. more than 4 years
4.	 Were the negotiation longer/shorter than or normal for your company?
a. longer ( )
	
b. shorter ( ) c. normal ( )
264
	5.	 Were there other potential partners
a. yes( )
	
b. No( )
If yes how many:
	
7.	 To what extent did you negotiate with the other potential partners
12 345 67
did not some what extensively
8. Could your company have undertaken this project without a partner?
12 345 67
no	 may be	 yes
9. Total number of JVs your Company is currently engaged in:
a. Singapore
b. Outside Singapore
SECTION 0
CONTROL
This section contains statements and questions about the operations and management of the
joint venture. Please circle the most appropriate response.
1.	 Please indicate to what extent your partner exercises control over the following
functions.
(1 = extremely low, 2 = very low, 3 = low, 4 = average,
5 = high, 6 = very high, 7 = extremely high)
Strategic Control
a. Selection of members to joint venture 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
board
b. Appointment of project manager	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
c. Organisational structure	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
d. Financing	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
e. Selection of Sub contractor/Supplier 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
f. Methods of dispute settlement	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	
6 7
Managerial Control
a. Capital expenditure	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
b. Budget control policy	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
c. Appointment of key personnel 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
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67
67
67
67
67
67
1	 2
12
1	 2
1	 2
1	 2
1	 2
345
345
345
345
345
345
1 2
	 345	 67
1 2
	
345	 67
d. Accounting/Administration
Operational Control
a. Construction method
b. Planning
C. Purchase of materials
d. Site supervision
e. Quality control
f. Selection and promotion of
site personnel
g. Site safety/security
h. Reporting procedures
1 2	 345	 67
SECTION E
MUTUAL CONTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES
Allocate 100 points between you and your partner to indicate the relative extent to which each
contributed resources to the venture.
Description of Resources
Project Manager
Key Project Personnel
Field Staff
Administration and Personnel
Plant and Equipment
Materials
Financing
Resource contributions
you	 your partner
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22
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
67
67
67
67
67
345
345
345
345
345
SECTION F
Conflict
This section contains statement that best described the nature of your relationship with your
partner. Please indicate the level of agreement or disagreement. You had with your partner
over the following issues. 1 = disagreement, 2 = very rarely disagreed, 3 = rarely disagreed,
4 = sometimes disagreed, 5 = often disagreed, 6 = very often disagreed, 7 = almost always
disagreed)
a. Organisational issues 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
b. Technology transfer	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
c. Selection of sub-contractor 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
d. Procurement of Materials,	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
Plant and Equipment
e. Interpretation of JV agreement	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
f. Choice of construction methods 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
g. Financial issues	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
h. Administrative procedures	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
2.
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
Cultural Issues
Sensitivity to partner's needs
Interaction among partners
Interaction with client
Behaviour of expatriate managers
Language/Communication B
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SECTION G
ASSESSMENT OF JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE
This section contains the objectives you may intended to achieve through the joint
venture. Please indicate by circling to appropriate circle the extent to which you achieved
these objectives (1 = not at all, 2 - very low, 3 = low, 4 = average, 50 = above average, 6
= high, 7 = very high)
Not	 Somewhat Very
Important	 Important	 Important
a. Spread Commercial risk	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
b. Obtain Technology transfer 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
c. Government incentives 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
d. Match competition	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
e. Enhance local image	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
f. Avail of partner's local knowledge	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
g. Market diversification	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
h. Access to new financial resources	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
i. Match competition strategies 	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	
6 7
j. Protect international market share	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
k. Avoid take over	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	
6 7
I. Tax implication	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	
6 7
m. Hedging against discrimination by 	 1	 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
host country
n. Pooling of resources 	 1	 2	 3 4 5
	
6 7
Please indicate the overall level of satisfaction of your firm with the performance of the JV
Satisfactory ( ) Not Satisfactory ( )
Please indicate whether you intend to continue your association with the partner in the future.
Yes ( )	 May be ( )
	
Never ( )
Thank-you for your sparing me your valuable time.
G.Sridharan
University College, London
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APPENDIX B
PREFERENTIAL MARGIN FOR CIVIL CONTRACTS
Please lodge a specific request to be included with your Tender
for Contract ___________ if your Joint Venture wishes the
Corporation to consider applying the preferential margin scheme
to the tenders to be submitted by your Joint Venture.
For the purpose of implementing the preferential margin scheme
for tender assessment and contract award, we require from your
company -
(1) a Certificate from your Auditor who shall be a registered
Public Accountant as to the level of local equity
participation in your joint venture at the time of
submission of tender.
(2) information printouts of each member of the joint venture
from the Registry of Companies and Businesses.
(3) a Certificate from the Construction Industry Development
Board (CIDB) granting approval for the preferential margin
scheme to be implemented in respect of your tender.
The application for this Certificate shall be made directly
by hand to CIDB at the following address at least three
weeks before the close of tender -
Construction Industry Development Board
133 Cecil Street #09-01/02
Keck Seng Tower
Singapore 0106
The Certificate from the Auditor shall be provided in accordance
with the specimen form attached hereto (Annex A). The scale of
preferential margin shall be considered in relation to the net
local equity participation as indicated below:
Net Local Equity Participation
50% or more
40% or more but less than 50%
30% or more but less than 40%
25% or more but less than 30%
Less than 25%
Preferential Margin
5% subject to a maximum of
$5 million
4% subject to a maximum of
$4 million
3% subject to a maximum of
$3 million
2.5% subject to a maximum of
$2.5 million
No preference
For the purpose of calculating the local net equity
participation, the following illustration is given as a guide:
Joint Venture Limited tenders for MRT Civil Works as
joint venture of local and foreign companies. The
percentage of participation in the joint venture by
the local company is 40%. If the local company is
80% owned by local citizens and permanent residents,
then the net local participation of the joint venture
shall be 0.80 x 40%, that is, 32%. The preference to
be given to the joint venture shall be 3% of the
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acceptable Tender Price subject to a maximum of $3
million.
Please also submit, together with your tender, a detailed
identification of the participation by the local Joint Venture
partner or partners.	 Essentially, the Corporation requires
information of your project organisation. The organisation
should reflect project control and administration. This may be
done in a form of an organisational chart and it is essential
that the chart should reflect the following areas of
responsibility: -
i. Overall Project Management
ii. Design
iii. Site Management
iv. Programming
v. Budgetary Control
vi. Contract Administration
The level of staffing to be provided by the local partner over
the contract period together with a general indication of the
nature of work of the various key personnel to be deployed must
also be indicated.
Your detailed proposals for technology transfer should also be
submitted for consideration.
Very truly yours,
Mass Rapid Transit Corporation
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APPENDIX C
Type of Bid
'V
S
iv
S
iv
Jv
Jv
Jv
Jv
S
iv
S
iv
S
iv
iv
'V
iv
iv
Nationality
Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong
UK
Singapore
Korea
Taiwan
Singapore
iapan
Singapore
Singapore
France
UK
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Australia
Italy
Singapore
Korea
Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Smgapore
UK
Singapore
Taiwan
Singapore
France
UK
USA
Singapore
Germany
Singapore
PRE QUALIFIED TENDERERS FOR MRTC CONTRACTS
Contractor
No
do'
1. Aoki
Lim Kah Ngam
2. Paul Y
3. HeniyBo
Keppel Shipyard
4. Daewoo
5. RSEA
Hock Lian Seng
6. Nishimatsu
Lum Chang
7. Lee Kim Tah
Societe Generale D'Enterprise
8. George Wimpey
Sembawang Construction
9. Ohbayashi-Gumi
Koon Construction
C102
1. Volker Stevin Civil Engineering
2. Cilia Construction
SPIE-Batignoile
Active Building & Civil Construction
3. Hyundai Engineering
4. Aoki
Lim Kah Ngam
5. PaulY
6. Gammon (HK)
Reliance Contractors
7. BES Engineering
Singa Development
8. RSEA
Hock Lian Seng
9. Dragages Et Travaux Publics
10. Fairclough Intl Construction
Fletcher Construction
Marples Ridgway Contractors
11. Dyckerhoff&WidmannAg
Neo Corporation
Spa Construction
Metrobilt Construction
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Siv
iv
'V
S
S
iv
iv
Jv
S
iv
S
Jv
iv
iv
iv
3.
4.
5.
12.
13.
C103
2.
6.
7.
8.
C104
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6
Leighton Contractors
Kumagai Gumi Co
RDC
Interbeton
Edmund Nuttall
Compagnie Francois D' Enterpnse
Franki
Eng Hup Heng Construction
Evergreat Construction
Hock Chuan Ann Construction
Job Associates
Tan Gim Huat Construction
Daewoo
Paul Y
Fougerolle
Reliance Contractors
Antara Koh
Chartered Project Management
Phiipp Holzman Aktiengessellschaft
Low Keng Huat Construction
Dillingham Construction
Metrobilt Construction
Neo Corporation
SPA Construction
RSEA
Tokishima Corporation
Takenaka Komuten
Takenaka Doboku
Maeda Construction
Lee Kim Tah
Bilfinger & Berger
Alfred Kunz
SGE
S & M Contractors Inc.
Keang Nam Ent.
Metrobilt Construction
Ong Chwee Kou
Mancini Construction
Dragages et Travaux
Shendan Construction
Sembawang Shipyard
Bored Piling
Tiong Seng Construction
Aoki
Lim Kah Ngam
Austrlia
Japan
Singapore
Belgium
Singapore
Korea
Hong Kong
France
Singapore
Germany
Singapore
USA
Singapore
Taiwan
Japan
Singapore
Germany
Germany
France
Singapore
Italy
France
UK
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
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Cl 05
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
C106
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
C107
2.
3.
4.
iv
Jv
Jv
S
Jv
Jv
S
Jv
S
S
Jv
Jv
Jv
Jv
Bone SA
Cogerar SPA
Trayloc Bros
Ong Chwec Kou
Ohbayashi-Gumi
Okumura Corporation
Nishimatsu Construction
Oh Teck Thye
Dragados Y Constructiones
Kumagai Gumi
RDC
BES Engineering
Daiho Construction
Tai & Son
Dumez Travaux Publics
Hazama-Gumi
Japan Dcv Construction
Sambu Construction
Sato Kogyo Co
S & M Contractors
Keang Nam Entr.
Metrobilt Construction
Ong Chwee Kou
Mancini Construction
Kumagai Gumi
RDC
Interbeton BV
Edmund Nuttail
Campenon Bernard
Singapore Piling & Civil Engineering
Italy
France
USA
Singapore
Japan
Japan
Singapore
Spain
Japan
Singapore
Korea
Japan
Korea
Japan
Singapore
Italy
Japan
Singapore
France
Singapore
Macda Construction
Lee Kim Tah
Bilfinger & Berger
Alfred Kunz
Societe Generale D Entre
Boric SAE
Cogerar SPA
Traylor Bros
Ong Chwee Kou
Hochtief AG
Gammon (HK)
AB Skanska
Jv
Jv
S
iv
Korea
Singapore
USA
Austiia
France
Italy
France
USA
Singapore
Germany
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
C108
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
iv
'V
S
iv
C109
1.
2.
3.
4.
iv
iv
S
5.
6.
7.
Japan
Singapore
UK
Korea
France
UK
Singapore
Germany
Singapore
Japan
Hong Kong
Aoki
Lim Kah Ngaan
Cementation International
Trafalgar House Engineering
Daewoo
Dragages Ct Travaux
Sheridan Construction (Overseas)
Sembawang Shipyard
Bored Piling
Tiong Seng Construction
Dyckerhoff & Widmann
Lian Hup Granite
SPA Construction
Ohbayashi-Gumi
Okumura Corporation
Paul Y
Jv
'V
iv
iv
S
iv
Jv
Jv
S
iv
iv
Nislumatsu Construction
Oh Teck Thye
Marubeni Corporation
Shimizu Construction
Taisei Corporation
Kajima Corporation
Keppel Shipyard
Fairclough International Constrn
fletcher Construction
Lum Chang Building Construction
Marpels Ridgway Construction
Hyundai Engineering
Hochtief AG
Gammon (HK)
AB Skanska
Kajima Corporation
Keppel Shipyard
Marubeni Corporation
Shimizu Construction
Taisei Corporation
Sambu Construction
Tobishima Corporation
Takenaka Komuten
Takenaka DObOkU
Wayss & Freytag
Samsung Construction
International Bechtel
iapan
Singapore
iapan
Japan
Singapore
USA
Singapore
Korea
Germany
iapan
Singapore
Japan
Korea
Japan
Germany
Korea
USA
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SJv
	
Japan
'V
	
France
Singapore
S
	
Korea
iv
	
France
Singapore
S
	
Taiwan
S
	
Spain
iv	 France
Singapore
iv	 Japan
Singapore
iv	 Korea
Singapore
iv	 Japan
USA
iv	 USA
Singapore
iv	 Australia
Italy
Singapore
iv
S
	
Hong Kong
8. Sato Kogyo Co Ltd	 S	 Japan
9. Wayss & Freytag	 JV	 Germany
Samsung Construction	 Korea
International Bechtel 	 USA
CIO3A
1.
2.
3
4.
5.
6.
C 105A
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
CIO6A
Maeda Construction
Tobishima Corporation
Takenaka Komuten
Takenaka Dobuku
Compagnie Francois D'Enterprise
Franki
Eng Hup Heng Constrn
Evergreat Constrn
Hock Chuan Ann Constm
Job Assoc
Tan Gim Huat Constrn
Daewoo
Fougerolle
Reliance Contractors
Antara Koh
Chartered Project Management
Ret-Ser Engineering Agency
Dragados Y Construccioness
Dragages Ct Travaux Publics
Sembawang Shipyard
Aoki Corporation
Lim Kah Ngam
Samwhan Corporation
Econ Piling
Ohbayashi-Gumi
Okumura Corporation
Parsons Brinckerhoff
Diilingham Consten
Metrobilt Constrn
Neo Corporation
SPA Constrn
Citra Constrn
SPIE-Baugnolles
Active Bldg & Civil Constrn
Boric SAB
Cogefar SPA
Traylor Bros
Cog Chwee Kou
Gammon (HK)
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Prance
Singapore
Japan
Japan
Singapore
Singapore
Jv
Jv
Jv
Jv
Jv
Jv
iv
Jv
iv
Jv
JV
iv
iv
iv
2.
3.
CIO7A
1.
2.
3.
Boric SAE
Cogefar SPA
Traylor Bros
Ong Chwee Kou
Campenon Bernard
Singapore Piling & Civil Engineerrng
Manibeni Corporation
Taisei Corporation
Shimizu Corporation
Hazama-Gumi Ltd
Japan Dcv Constni
RDC
Kier Int'l Ltd
Lilley Constrn
Sum Cheong Piling
CW7B
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Cilo
I.
2.
3.
4.
Nishimatsu Constrn
Lum Chang
Gammon (HK)
AB Skanska
Boric SAE
Cogefar SPA
Traylor Bros
Philip Holzmann Aktiengesel Schaft
Low Keng Huat Constrn
Kajima Corporation
Keppel Shipyard
Montcocol S.A.
Ong Chwee Kou
Sofretu
Wah Chang int'l Corpa
Thyssen Engrg Gmbh
Heitkamp
Low Keng Huat Constrn
Singapore Shipbuilding & Engrg
Cgee Alsthom
Spie Batignoiles
Henry Boot Int'l
Gammon (HK)
Singa Development
Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong
German
Italy
France
USA
German
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
France
Singapore
France
Singapore
German
Singapore
Jtly
UK
Hong Kong
Singapore
C201
Kier Int'l	 JV
Lilley Contin
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iv	 Japan
iv	 Japan
Singapore
iv	 Hong Kong
Singapore
iv	 Korea
S
S
Jv
Jv
'V
C202
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Jv
S
iv
IV
6.
7.
8.
9.
Paul Y
Penta-Ocean Constrn
Boric-Sac
Cogefar Construzioni Generali S.P.A.
Societe Generale D'Enterprise
Lee Kim Tah
Taisei Corpn
Shimizu Constrn
Marubeni Corpn
RSEA Int'l
Hock Lian Seng Engrg
Sumitomo Constrn
Samsung Constrn
Chuan Joo
Citra Constrn
Active Bldg & Civil Constrn
SPIE Batignolles
Hong Kong
Japan
Italy
France
France
Singapore
Japan
Taiwan
Singapore
Japan
Korea
Australia
Singapore
Italy
iv
'V
C203
2.
iv3.
Antara Koh
Samwhan Corpn
AB Skanska Cementjuteriet
Hexacon Constrn
Bored Piling
Kin Sun Contractors
Ahong Constrn
Singapore
Korea
Gennan
Singapore
Korea
Antara Koh
2. Paul Y
3. Ohbayashi Corpn
Okumura Corpn
4. Boric-Sac
Cogerar Construzioni Generali SPA.
Traylor Bros
Ong Chwee Kou
S	 Taisei Corpn
Shimizu Constm
Marubeni Corpn
6. Nishimatsu Constru
Lum Chang Bldg
7. Gammon (HK)
Reliance Contractors
8. Samsung Constrn
Chuan ioo
Singapore
S
	
Hong Kong
iv
	
Japan
iv
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
iv
S
iv
Jv
Jv
Jv
RSEA Int'l
Hock Lian Seng Engrg
Sumitomo Constm
Aoki Corpn
LKN Constrn
Tobishima Coipn
Econ Group
Kumagai Gumi
Resources Dcv Corpn
Citra Constm
Active Bldg & Civil Constrn
SPIE-Batignoiles
Taiwan
Singapore
Japan
Japan
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Australia
Singapore
Italy
C3O1A
Jv
S
iv
'V
iv
Jv
Jv
Jv
iv
iv
iv
iv
iv
C3OIB
2.
3
6.
7.
8.
9.
C204
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Antara Koh
Samwhan Corpn
GTM Entrepose
Okumura Corpn
Oh Teck Whye
Dragages et Trauvaux Publics
Sembawang Constrn
Dyckerhoff & Widmann AG
Metrobilt Constrn
Neo Corpn
SPA Constrn
Aoki
LKN Consirn
Kajima Corpn
Keppel Shipyard
Tobishima Corpn
Econ Group
Leighton Contractors
Mega Constrn
Kier Int'l
Lilley Constan
Antara Koh
Nishimatsu Constrn
Lum Chang
Dragages et Travaux Publics
Sembawang Constm
Singapore
Korea
France
Japan
Singapore
France
Singapore
Gennan
Singapore
iapan
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Australia
Singapore
Australia
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
France
Singapore
iapan
Singapore
Hazama-Gumi
RDC
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iv2.
iv
iv
iv
3.
4.
5.
Australia
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
France
Singapore
Singapore
Japan
Kier Int'l
Lilley Constm
Antara Kob
Nishimatsu Constm
Lum Chang Bldg
Dragages et Travaux Publics
Sembawang Constrn
Econ Group
Tobishima Corpn
iv
Jv
C302
1.
2.
iv
iv
iv
iv
3.
4
5.
6.
Singapore
Japan
Japan
Japan
Singapore
France
Singapore
Singapore
France
Singapore
Japan
RDC
Sato Kogyo
Taisei Corpn
Shimizu Constrn
Marubeni Corpn
Kajima Corpn
Keppel Shipyard
Dragages et Travaux Publics
Sembawang Constrn
Lee Kim Tah
Societe Generale D'Enterprises
Econ Group
Tobishima Corpn
iv
iv
iv
iv
iv
C303
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Singapore
Japan
Japan
Singapore
France
Singapore
Singapore
France
Singapore
Japan
RDC
Ohbayashi Gurni
Okumura Corpn
Oh Teck Thye
Campenon Bernard
Singapore Piling & Civil Constrn
Lee Kim Tah
Societe Generale D'Enterprises
Econ Group
Tobashima Corpn
Jv
iv
C304
I.
2.
3
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Korea
Hong Kong
Singapore
RDC
Ohbayashi Gumi
Wab Chang Int'l Corpn
Hyundai Engrg & Constrn
Gammon (HK)
Reliance Contractors
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iv
iv
Jv
iv
S
iv
iv
'V
iv
iv
iv
iv
iv
iv
S
iv
iv
S
iv
S
C308
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8
9.
Japan
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong
Singapore
Singapore
France
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Singapore
Aoki
LKN Constrn
Nishimatsu Constm
Lum Chang
Gammon (HK)
Reliance Contractors
Jurong Engrg
GTM Entrepose
hong Seng Contractors
Shimizu Constrn
Wang Coo-Kien & Co
Woh Hup
Sato Kogyo
RDC Constrn
Wah-Chang Int'l Corpn
3.
4.
5.
C306
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
C305
1.
2.
6.
RSEA
Hock Lian Seng Engrg
White Industries
Low Keng Huat
Antara Koh
Wah-Chang Int'l Corpn
Hyundai Engrg
Gammon (HK)
Reliance Contractors
Kumagai Gumi
RDC
Sato Kogyo
Borie-Sae
Cogefar Construzioni Generali S.P.A.
Taisei Corpn
Shimizu Constrn
Marubem Corpn
Wang Coo-Kien
RSEA Int'l
Hock Lian Seng
White Industries
Low Keng Huat
Antara Koh
Dragages et Travaux Publics
Sembawang Constrn
Taiwan
Singapore
Australia
Singapore
Singapore
Korea
Hong Kong
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Japan
Italy
France
Japan
Singapore
Taiwan
Singapore
Australia
Singapore
France
Singapore
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Jv
iv
C3 10
1.
2.
Jv
Jv
3.
4.
Japan
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong
Singapore
France
Singapore
Okumura Corpn
Oh Teck Thye
Taisei Corpn
Shimizu Constrn
Manibeni Corpn
Wang Coo-Kien
Gammon (HK)
Antara Koh
Campenon Bernard
Singapore Piling & Civil Constrn
S
Jv
S
iv
Jv
Jv
C402
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
France
Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong
UK
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
Singapore
GTM Enterprise
Sumitomo Constrn
Ong Chwee Kou
Paul Y
Geroge Wimpey Int'l
Sembawang Constm
Hazama-Gumi
RDC
Woh Hup
Kin Sun Contractors
S
iv
S
iv
'V
C403
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Jv6.
France
Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong
Japan
Singapore
UK
Singapore
Japan
Singapore
GTM Enterprise
Sumitomo Constrn
Ong Chwee Kou
Paul Y
Aoki
LKN Constrn
George Wiinpey Int'l
Sembawang Constrn
JDC Corpn
Jurong Engrg
Jv
	
Singapore
France
S
	
Singapore
iv
	
Singapore
10. Lee Kim Tah
Societe Generale D'Enteipnses
11. Singapore Piling & Civil Engrg
12. Low Keng Huat Constrn
Antara Koh
Metrobilt Constrn
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7.	 Dyckerhoff & Widmann	 JV
Neo Corpn	 Singapore
Metrobilt Constrn
SPA Constrn
C404
I.
2.
3
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
GTM Entrepose
Leighton Contractors
Mega Constrn
Sumitomo Constin
Ong Chwee Kou
Paul Y
Aoki
LKN Constin
George Wimpey
Sembawang Constrn
JDC Corpn
Jurong Engrg
Dyckerhoff & Widmann
Neo Corpn
Metrobilt Constrn
SPA Constm
S
	
France
Jv
	 Australia
Singapore
Jv
	
Japan
Singapore
S
	
Hong Kong
iv
	
Japan
Singapore
Jv
	
UK
Singapore
Jv
	
Japan
Singapore
Jv
Singapore
S
	
Hong Kong
Jv
	 Singapore
Japan
Jv
	
Hong Kong
Singapore
S
	
France
iv
	
Japan
iv
	
Taiwan
Singapore
iv
Singapore
iv
	
Japan
Singapore
C405
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
White Industries
Paul Y
RDC
Ohbayashi-Gumi
Gammon (HK)
Singapore Piling & Civil Engrg
GTM Entrepose
Taisei Corpn
Shimizu Constrn
Marubeni Corpn
RSEA
Hock Lian Seng
Dyckerhoff & Widmann AG
Neo Corpn
Metrobilt Constni
SPA Constrn
Aoki
LKN Constrn
10.	 Takenaka Doboku	 'V
	
Japan
Takenaka Komuten
Hytech Builders	 Singapore
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C501
1.
2.
3.
4
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
S
	
Japan
S
	
Singapore
S
	
Singapore
iv
	
Japan
Singapore
iv
	
Singapore
Hong Kong
Jv
	
Japan
Singapore
iv
	
Singapore
iv
	
Taiwan
Singapore
iv
	
Japan
Singapore
II
	 Chuan Joo	 iv
	
Korea
Samsung Constrn
Nissan Constrn
Sembawang Constrn
Wah-Chang Int'l
Aoki
LKN Constrn
Reliance Contractors
Ganunon PEe Ltd
Okumura Corpn
Bored Piling
RDC Constni
Singapore Piling
RSEA Int'l
Hock Lian Seng
Sato Kogyo
Evergreat Constrn
L&M Prestressing
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